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Critical Vulnerabilities Patched in Schneider Electric Serial Modbus Driver

Threatpost for B2B - Fri, 03/28/2014 - 10:34

Schneider Electric, a leading provider of industrial control systems, recently patched a remotely exploitable vulnerability in a driver found in 11 of its products.

The Industrial Control Systems Computer Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) released an advisory yesterday alerting users to the availability of a patch and warning of the consequences associated with the stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability found in Schneider’s Serial Modbus Driver, ModbusDrv.exe.

The driver is started when a programmable logic controller is connected to the serial port on a server. It creates a listener on TCP port 27700, and when a connection is made the Modbus Application Header is read into a buffer, the ICS-CERT advisory said.

If the header is too large, a stack-based overflow results. The advisory cautions that a second overflow vulnerability is also exploitable by overwriting the return address. By doing so, an attacker could execute code remotely.

The vulnerable software driver is used across a gamut of industries, including chemicals, manufacturing, energy, nuclear reactors, government facilities, dams and transportation systems, primarily in the United States, Europe and China.

ICS-CERT said it is not aware of any public exploits. The patch is available from Schneider Electric.

ICS-CERT said the following Schneider products contain the vulnerable Modbus driver:

  • TwidoSuite Versions 2.31.04 and earlier,
  • PowerSuite Versions 2.6 and earlier,
  • SoMove Versions 1.7 and earlier,
  • SoMachine Versions 2.0, 3.0, 3.1, and 3.0 XS,
  • Unity Pro Versions 7.0 and earlier,
  • UnityLoader Versions 2.3 and earlier,
  • Concept Versions 2.6 SR7 and earlier,
  • ModbusCommDTM sl Versions 2.1.2 and earlier,
  • PL7 Versions 4.5 SP5 and earlier,
  • SFT2841 Versions 14, 13.1 and earlier, and
  • OPC Factory Server Versions 3.50 and earlier.

“The affected products are mostly software-based utilities and engineering tools designed for programming and configuring process, machine, and general control applications,” the ICS-CERT advisory said. “These applications rely on a common driver to communicate with PLCs.”

This is the third time this year that ICS-CERT has issued an alert about vulnerabilities in Schneider Electric gear. In January, an advisory was sent out about a remotely exploitable resource consumption vulnerability that was patched in Schneider’s ClearSCADA software. ClearSCADA is secure remote management software designed for use in large, geographically dispersed critical infrastructure systems.

In March, the company patched vulnerabilities in Schneider OPC Factory Server, which is an interface for client applications that require access to production data in real time. The buffer overflow flaws were not remotely exploitable, yet could allow an attacker with local access to run malicious programs on a computer running the vulnerable server software.

White House Releases Proposal to End Section 215 Bulk Collection

Threatpost for B2B - Thu, 03/27/2014 - 14:47

The White House today unveiled a five-point plan to end the National Security Agency’s bulk collection of phone call metadata, preserving what it says is a balance between the intelligence community’s national security needs and the public’s desire to maintain its privacy.

The proposal ends the government’s collection of phone records under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act as it exists today, keeping that data with telecommunications providers who will store those records for 18 months as they are currently federally mandated to do.

The government would have access to the records only under approval from the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which must approve the querying of a suspect phone number and only after judicial approval based on a national security concern.

Currently, the NSA collects and stores call metadata, and maps connections between numbers belonging to individuals suspected of terrorism or threatening national security. As the Snowden leaks began last June, the depths of NSA surveillance, including dragnet capturing of all Americans’ phone calls without warrants, drew the ire of civil libertarians, mainstream media and politicians on both sides of the aisle.

The new plan was ordered by President Obama during a Jan. 17 address to the nation on surveillance. During that speech, he ordered the Attorney General and the intelligence community to work together on an adequate solution that would alter the collection of data under Section 215. Obama imposed a March 28 deadline for the proposal, the day FISC is expected to renew the NSA program for another 90-day cycle, the final time it will do so.

The White House proposal, hints of which were released two days ago in a New York Times report, also changes the number of hops the government will be able to collect between suspects from three to two. While apparently a concession, ACLU National Security advisor and attorney Brett Max Kaufman told Threatpost this remains a red flag for privacy advocates.

“It’s unclear, if the government is able to satisfy FISC’s standard of a reasonable, articulable suspicion, why anyone connected to that person would also satisfy that same standard to get their call records?” Kaufman said.

The president’s proposal was a bit more stringent than a similar House Intelligence Committee bill that was introduced on Tuesday, which did not require prior judicial approval; a judge would rule on a request only after the FBI submits it to a provider.

Verizon general counsel Randal Milch said the provider supports the efforts to end bulk collection.

“At this early point in the process, we propose this basic principle that should guide the effort: the reformed collection process should not require companies to store data for longer than, or in formats that differ from, what they already do for business purposes,” Milch said. “If Verizon receives a valid request for business records, we will respond in a timely way, but companies should not be required to create, analyze or retain records for reasons other than business purposes.”

The final two provisions of today’s official proposal say the court-approved numbers can only be used for a limited period of time without again requiring approval from FISC. “The production of records would be ongoing and prospective,” the proposal said.

Also, under court order, the phone companies would be required to provide technical assistance to ensure the records can be accessed in a timely fashion and in an accessible format.

The White House plan would need to be ratified by Congress in order to go into effect, and because of this, the Department of Justice will seek another 90-day renewal from FISC for the program, much to the chagrin of experts.

“EPIC is encouraged by the President’s continued commitment to end the bulk collection program … however, the renewal of the FISC order on Friday would be a disappointing development,” said Alan Butler, appellate advocacy counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). “The bulk collection program will not end until the FISC order expires without the President seeking its renewal.”

New Platform Protects Data From Arbitrary Server Compromises

Threatpost for B2B - Thu, 03/27/2014 - 14:43

Researchers are in the midst of rolling out a secure new platform for building web applications that can protect confidential data from being stolen in the event attackers gain full access to servers.

The platform, Mylar, is the result of a project spearheaded by students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) set to be discussed at USENIX’s Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation conference next week in Seattle.

According to a paper – “Building web applications on top of encrypted data using Mylar” (.PDF) – , the platform can encrypt data on servers and decrypt it in users’ browsers, provided they have the correct key.

As it is, there are several ways in which data can be leaked from servers: Attackers could exploit a vulnerability and break in; a prying admin could overstep their bounds; or a server operator could be forced to disclose data by law.

While Mylar’s goal is to keep confidential data safe by preventing these incidents from happening, it does so by operating under the premise that the server where the data is stored has already been hacked.

“Mylar assumes that any part of the server can be compromised, either as a result of software vulnerabilities or because the server operator is untrustworthy, and protects data confidentiality in this setting,” according to the paper.

Raluca Ada Popa, the paper’s lead author and a Ph.D. Candidate at the school’s Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, worked with six colleagues from the school’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) for nearly two years on the project.

The report makes light of recent privacy-minded applications such as Mega and Cryptocat, but acknowledges that while those apps allow users to decrypt information from servers via browsers with special keys, they still have their drawbacks.

Or as a description of the platform on M.I.T.’s website puts it, “simply encrypting each user’s data with a user key does not suffice.”

Mainly it’s because these apps don’t allow data sharing, they make keyword searches difficult and perhaps most concerning, they can still be tricked into letting the server extract user keys and data via malicious code.

To allow data sharing on Mylar, a special mechanism establishes the correctness of keys obtained from the server – backed up by X.509 certificate paths – to ensure that a server that has been compromised cannot trick the app into using a bogus key. This allows multiple users, with keys, to share the same item.

To verify app code, Mylar keeps application code and data separate, checking to make sure code it runs is properly signed by the website owner, something that in turn keeps HTML pages that are supplied by the server static.

While many schemes require document data be encrypted by a single key, this prevents easy keyword searches. A unique cryptographic scheme in Mylar allows clients to search through many documents with multiple encryption keys for keywords and without even learning what the word is or learning the contents of the documents, Mylar can return a list of instances of that word.

Mylar owes a lot to this specialized search scheme; something Ada Popa claims she discovered last May and helped get the ball rolling on the platform soon after.

Ada Popa and her team started working on the project in 2012 but it would take another year and a half to truly come to fruition. The researchers initially tried to build the framework over Django and Ruby on Rails before realizing the way the two platforms are designed made them incompatible with what they were looking for from a encryption and confidentiality standpoint.

In the summer of 2013, the group realized that the more secure Meteor, an emerging, open source web framework was their best option. Developers from Meteor helped the team test the software and it wasn’t long after until Ada Popa came up with the multikey search scheme, pieced together from elliptic curves, and they were off.

Three months later — a few design tweaks here and there — and Mylar was complete.

According to the paper, if adopted, the platform would require little effort by developers. The researchers ported six applications over to Mylar and only needed 36 additional lines of code on average, per app, to protect sensitive data.

The six apps that researchers have tested Mylar on so far consist of a website that lets endometriosis patients record their symptoms, a website for managing homework and grades, a chat application, a forum, a calendar and a photo sharing app.

It might not be long until Mylar catches on with some of those apps in real life.

Two of those apps, the medical app, and the website that lets professors at M.I.T. manage homework and grades; actually plan on implementing Mylar in the immediate future.

Endometriosis patients at Newton-Wellesley Hospital, a medical center in Newton, Mass., tested the medical app a month ago. According to Ada Popa, in another month or so it should be out of alpha deployment following approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB). Since the app is transferring highly sensitive patient information, she wouldn’t be surprised if the review period took a little bit longer than usual however.

Professors in CSAIL’s Computer Systems Security classes have successfully used an app running on Mylar for managing student’s homework and grade information.

Still though, while the researchers stress that Mylar isn’t perfect, it does work providing users follow a modicum of responsibility when it comes to privacy and security.

While Mylar’s main goal is to protect data from being compromised in arbitrary server compromises, conventional wisdom assumes users are not running the framework on a compromised machine and sharing information with untrustworthy users. Mylar also assumes users are checking to make sure they use the HTTPS version of the site/app they’re using and can safely recognize phishing attacks.

While it sounds promising for PC usage, the platform could also have a future on Android systems. The researchers claim they’ve tested Mylar on phones running the Google operating system but left the results out of their paper for brevity sake.

“Mylar’s techniques for searching over encrypted data and for verifying keys are equally applicable to desktop and mobile phone applications; the primary difference is that code verification becomes simpler, since applications are explicitly installed by the user, instead of being downloaded at application start time,” according to the paper.

The team’s research was aided by a handful of firms including Google, the National Science Foundation, and DARPA’s Clean-Slate Design of Resilient, Adaptive, Secure Hosts (CRASH) program – a program dedicated to crafting cyber-attack resistant systems.

This is the latest piece of software designed by Ada Popa, who considers Mylar the follow up to CryptDB, a piece of software she devised in 2011 that more or less did the same thing that Mylar does, but for databases.

“We started working on this project as a natural next step after the previous project, CryptDB, which did the same for databases,” Ada Popa said, “We realized that web applications are an even more common use case for placing on a cloud or on a compromised server.”

CryptDB encrypted information and ran SQL queries without decrypting the database. Some of Ada Popa’s CryptDB research even found its way into a system Google released later that year,Encrypted BigQuery, that can run SQL-like queries against large, multi-terabyte datasets.

Ada Popa plans to present Mylar in USENIX’s Security and Privacy session next Wednesday and demonstrate the platform later that afternoon alongside one of the paper’s co-authors, Jonas Helfer.

NTP Amplification, SYN Floods Drive Up DDoS Attack Volumes

Threatpost for B2B - Thu, 03/27/2014 - 13:23

There has been a steady but dramatic increase in the potency of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks from the beginning of 2013 through the first two months of this year. In large part, reason for this rise in volume has to do with the widespread adoption of two attack methods: large synchronization packet flood (SYN flood) attacks and network timing protocol (NTP) amplification attacks.

According to an Incapsula report tracking the DDoS threat landscape during this 14-month period of time, the largest such attacks in February 2013 were delivering traffic at a rate of four gigabytes per second (Gbps). By July 2013, 60 Gbps and larger DDoS attacks had become a weekly occurrence. In February of 2014, Incapsula reports having witnessed one NTP amplification attack peaking at 180 Gbps. Other reports have found the volume of NTP amplification attacks as high as 400 Gbps.

DDoS Attacks Increase in Volume

“As early as February 2013 we were able to track down a single source 4Gbps attacking server, which – if amplified – could alone have generated over 200Gbps in attack traffic,” the report claims. “With such available resources it is easy to explain the uptick in attack volume we saw over the course of the year.”

At present, large scale DDoS attacks, which Incapsula defines as those of 20 Gbps and more, account for more nearly one-third of all attacks. Attackers are able to achieve these high volumes by launching large SYN floods and DNS and NTP amplification attacks.

Types of DDoS Attacks

A new entrant to the DDoS landscape is a technique called “hit and run” DDoS attacks. These attacks first emerged in April 2013, and, according to Incapsula, target human-controlled DDoS protections by exploiting weaknesses in services that are supposed to be manually triggered, like generic routing encapsulation tunneling and domain name server re-routing.

Not only is each classification of DDoS attack becoming more potent, but 81 percent of attacks exploit multiple vectors.

“Multivector tactics increase the attacker’s chance of success by targeting several different networking or infrastructure resources,” Incapsula claims. “Combinations of different offensive techniques are also often used to create ‘smokescreen’ effects, where one attack is used to create noise, diverting attention from another attack vector.” Furthermore, multivector attacks can be used for trial and error style reconnaissance as well.

Multi-Vector DDoS Attacks

The most commonly deployed attacks are a combination of two types of SYN floods – one deploying regular SYN packets and another using large SYN (above 250 bytes) packets.

“In this scenario, both attacks are executed at the same time, with the regular SYN packets used to exhaust server resources (e.g., CPU) and large SYN packets used to cause network saturation,” they say. “Today SYN combo attacks account for ~75% of all large scale network DDoS events (attacks peaking above 20Gbps). Overall, large SYN attacks are also the single most commonly used attack vector, accounting for 26% of all network DDoS events.”

However, in February 2014, NTP amplification attacks surpassed all others as the most commonly seen form of DDoS. This may be the beginning of a new trend or merely a temporary spike, but as the report notes, it is too early to tell.

Government Requests for Google User Data Continue to Climb

Threatpost for B2B - Thu, 03/27/2014 - 12:37

While the number of requests for user information that Google receives from governments around the world continues to rise–climbing by 120 percent in the last four years–the company is turning over some data  in fewer cases as time goes on. Google received more than 27,000 requests for user information from global law enforcement agencies in the last six months of 2013 and provided some user data in 64 percent of those cases.

The new report from Google includes information on requests for user data from governments around the world, as well as new data on National Security Letters sent by the United States government to Google. In the second half of 2013, Google received between 0-999 NSLs, the same range it reported in all of the previous periods, going back to January 2009. However, those letters affected more users or accounts this time, between 1000-1999, up from 0-999 in the first six months of 2013.

The U.S. government only allows companies to report NSLs in ranges of 1,000. The Google transparency report also includes data on orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, but that information is subject to a six-month delay, so there is no data for June through December 2013. In the first six months of last year, Google received 0-999 content request and the same number of non-content requests.

As usual, the U.S. was the largest contributor to the volume of requests for user data that Google reported, sending 10,574 requests, covering 18,254 accounts. France was second, with 2,750 requests for information about 3,378 accounts. Germany, India, the U.K. and Brazil followed.

“Government requests for user information in criminal cases have increased by about 120 percent since we first began publishing these numbers in 2009. Though our number of users has grown throughout the time period, we’re also seeing more and more governments start to exercise their authority to make requests,” Richard Salgado, Legal Director, Law Enforcement and Information Security at Google, wrote in a blog post on the report.

“We consistently push back against overly broad requests for your personal information, but it’s also important for laws to explicitly protect you from government overreach. That’s why we’re working alongside eight other companies to push for surveillance reform, including more transparency. We’ve all been sharing best practices about how to report the requests we receive, and as a result our Transparency Report now includes governments that made less than 30 requests during a six-month reporting period, in addition to those that made 30+ requests.”

When Google first began reporting the percentage of user data requests that it complies with in some way in 2010, the company reported providing some information in 76 percent of cases. That number has decreased steadily in the years since, down to the 64 percent Google complied with in some way in the second half of 2013.

Malware Hijacks Android Mobile Devices to Mine Cryptocurrency

Threatpost for B2B - Thu, 03/27/2014 - 11:44

On its surface, the idea of turning a smartphone into a cryptocurrency mining machine sounds novel. But practical and profitable? Not so much.

That hasn’t stopped thieves from corrupting a number of popular Android applications for just that purpose, including two on the Google Play store called Songs and Prized; Songs has been downloaded a million times.

Several versions exist too of the CoinKrypt malware, said researchers at mobile security company Lookout. The malicious CoinKrypt apps, Lookout said, have been confined to forums in Spain and France that distribute pirated software.

CoinKrypt is an add-on to a legitimate app and hijacks an Android phone’s resources—which are limited for this purpose to begin with—in order to mine Litecoin, Dogecoin, and Casinocoin.

Desktop computers, for example, have much more resources that can be dedicated for this purpose than a mobile device, and yet are still insufficient to mine coins for profit.

People do mine coins, rather than buy them, using purpose-built software to do so. Essentially, people who mine are lending their machine’s processing power for the purpose, and in return are rewarded with a new coin.

Mining digital currency, however, does come with some gotchas, especially on a mobile device. Namely, mining can be a resource hog and will quickly drain battery life, overheat hardware causing damage, or can exhaust a user’s data plan by downloading a blockchain, or transaction history, which can be gigabytes in size.

Lookout experts said that CoinKrypt does not include a feature that is native to other mining software which controls the rate at which coins are mined in order to preserve the hardware from damage. This may also be why the attackers are staying away from mining Bitcoins, which despite being far more valuable, are much more difficult to mine.

“This leads us to believe this criminal is experimenting with malware that can take advantage of lower-hanging digital currency fruit that might yield more coins with less work,” said Marc Rogers, a researcher with Lookout. “With the price of a single Bitcoin at $650 and other newer currencies such as Litecoin approaching $20 for a single coin we are in the middle of a digital gold rush. CoinKrypt is the digital equivalent of a claim jumper.”

Rogers said it’s almost one million times easier to mine Litecoin than Bitcoin; 3.5 million times easier to mine Dogecoin.

“When we tested the feasibility of mining using a Nexus 4 by using Android mining software such as the application ‘AndLTC,’ we were only able to attain a rate of about 8Kh/s – or 8,000 hash calculations per second, the standard unit of measure for mining,” Rogers said. “Using a Litecoin calculator and the difficulty setting mentioned above we can see that this would net us 0.01 LTC after seven days non-stop mining. That’s almost 20 cents.”

Other samples, Rogers said, have been targeting newer digital coins in order to avoid these issues.

Researchers at G Data Software also found mining software embedded in a version of the TuneIn Radio Pro app on the Google Play store. The Trojan, dubbed MuchSad, mines Dogecoin in addition to serving streaming radio to the user.

“The malicious functionality is put on hold when the user of the smartphone or tablet is using it. When the malicious app is first launched, a service called ‘Google Service’ is initialized,” researchers at G Data said. “After five seconds, and thereafter every twenty minutes, this checks whether the user is actively using the device. If the device is free – not in use – the malicious app starts to ‘mine’ Dogecoins for the attacker.”

In three days, the attacker was able to mine nearly 1,900 Dogecoins, or about $6.

“The only clues that might quickly raise a user’s suspicions are the increased battery usage and the heat from the mobile phone, due to the constant high load at times when the user is not actively using the device. You can even see the battery consumption in the Android system logs,” G Data researchers said. “However, the ‘Google Service’ disguise will very probably come into play again here. Barely a single user will question such battery consumption, assuming it is a system process.”

Image courtesy BT Keychain

Data Breaches Show Difficulty of Defenders’ Task

Threatpost for B2B - Thu, 03/27/2014 - 11:14

When attackers broke into the network of the University of Maryland last month, the university’s wasn’t sure how to react. The organization had never had a major security incident before, and this one qualified as major: 310,000 Social Security numbers and other information was gone. And then three weeks later, it happened again.

Wallace Loh, the president of the University of Maryland, told the Senate Commerce Committee Wednesday that the university’s security and IT team was caught off guard when the attackers infiltrated the college’s network on Feb. 18. The attackers made their initial intrusion into the network by uploading a piece of malware to one of the university’s Web sites that is designed to allow users to upload photos. Once on the network, the attackers began to move laterally and eventually ended up finding the directory for the university’s IT management team and was able to change the passwords they found there.

The attackers, who had come in over the Tor network to hide their identity and location, then located a database that stored Social Security numbers of students, alumni and others, as well as university IDs, and downloaded 310,000 of them.

“It turns out, because we’ve never been hacked before, we were just flying by the seat of our pants,” Loh told the committee in his testimony.

Within 24 hours of discovering the breach, the university had disclosed the breach publicly, contacted credit-monitoring services and begun notifying the people who were affected by the breach. The university got in touch with the FBI, who came in to investigate the attack. Three weeks later, while the FBI was still digging through the details of the Feb. 18 breach, attackers again compromised Maryland’s network and had access to quite a bit of sensitive information, more than was at risk during the first attack, in fact. This time, however, the attackers simply posted one victim’s personal details to Reddit as a show of force before the FBI investigators were able to mitigate the attack.

In the wake of the first attack, Loh said that the university’s IT team had taken a number of steps to harden its network and ensure that the organization was no longer storing data it didn’t need.

“We have migrated almost all of our Web sites to the cloud,” he said. “What we have done immediately is purge almost all unnecessary data. We have purged approximately two hundred and twenty-five thousand names from our records. We have isolated sensitive information. And the cost is very, very high.”

That cost is one that many organizations around the country are feeling. Target, the victim of one of the larger breaches in history last year, is still feeling the repercussions from the attack, which affected more than 100 million people. John Mulligan, the vice president and CFO of Target, also spoke before the Commerce Committee Wednesday, and said that the company is going through many of the same machinations that Maryland did, including increasing segmentation on its networks. Mulligan also said that the company is expanding its use of two-factor authentication on its networks and will, by early next year, begin issuing and accepting chip-enabled credit cards.

The Target data breach and the attack on the University of Maryland illustrate a truism that many in the security industry have known for years.

“The people who play offense will always be one step ahead of those who play defense,” Loh said.

NSA Reforms Demonstrate Value of Public Debate

Threatpost for B2B - Wed, 03/26/2014 - 12:04

The Snowden leaks and the ensuing critical spotlight shone on the National Security Agency’s surveillance programs have nudged many technologists, privacy hounds and politicians away from their desks and onto the front lines calling for reforms.

Two nights ago, the New York Times reported that President Obama responded to those calls and would soon reveal a new legislative proposal that would end the agency’s bulk collection of phone call records. While shy on many important details, the move demonstrates that public debate still holds some sway with policy makers.

“The only [turning point] was disclosure of the program,” said Brett Max Kaufman, National Security Fellow and attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union. “Since that day, this has almost been inevitable because the claims the government made in secret to FISC [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court] and to Congress were never given a fair hearing from the other side. Once these programs became public and the government had to defend them in a court of law and in the court of public opinion, it was clear that these claims made in secret could not withstand arguments from civil libertarians and the public at large.”

While the president’s proposal carries the weight of the White House, it addresses only the NSA’s collection of phone metadata, and none of the other alleged surveillance activities made public by the Snowden documents. Other bills, such as the USA FREEDOM Act, extend beyond phone records to digital information collected through what’s known as the PRISM program under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and provide for enhanced oversight over intelligence gathering.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation, one of the most vocal advocacy groups opposing government surveillance of Americans, applauded the White House proposal yesterday, but endorsed the FREEDOM Act. The EFF called it “a giant step forward” and said it was a more favorable proposal than the president’s or another introduced by the House Intelligence Committee yesterday.

“Or better still, we urge the Administration to simply decide that it will stop misusing section 215 of the Patriot Act and section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act and Executive Order 12333 and whatever else it is secretly relying on to stop mass spying,” said EFF legal director Cindy Cohn and EFF legislative analyst Mark M. Jaycox. “The executive branch does not need congressional approval to stop the spying; nothing Congress has done compels it to engage in bulk collection.  It could simply issue a new Executive Order requiring the NSA to stop.”

The president’s proposal would end the NSA’s collection and storage of phone data; those records would remain with the providers and the NSA would require judicial permission under a new court order to access those records. The House bill, however, requires no prior judicial approval; a judge would rule on the request after the FBI submits it to the telecommunications company.

“It’s absolutely crucial to understand the details of how these things will work,” the ACLU’s Kaufman said in reference to the “new court order” mentioned in the New York Times report. “There is no substitute for robust Democratic debate in the court of public opinion and in the courts. The system of oversight is broke and issues like these need to be debated in public.”

Phone metadata and dragnet collection of digital data from Internet providers and other technology companies is supposed to be used to map connections between foreigners suspected of terrorism and threatening the national security of the U.S. The NSA’s dragnet, however, also swept up communication involving Americans that is supposed to be collected and accessed only with a court order. The NSA stood by claims that the program was effective in stopping hundreds of terror plots against U.S. interests domestic and foreign. Those numbers, however, quickly were lowered as they were challenged by Congressional committees and public scrutiny.

“The president said the effectiveness of this program was one of the reasons it was in place,” Kaufman said. “But as soon as these claims were made public, journalists, advocates and the courts pushed back and it could not withstand the scrutiny. It’s remarkable how quickly [the number of] plots turned into small numbers. The NSA was telling FISC the program was absolutely necessary to national security, but the government would not go nearly that far in defending the program. That shows the value of public debate and an adversarial process in courts.”

GUI Vulnerabilities Expose Information Disclosure, Privilege Escalation

Threatpost for B2B - Wed, 03/26/2014 - 11:14

Developers are creating countless information disclosure and privilege escalation vulnerabilities by misusing elements of various graphical user interfaces as a mechanisms for access control, according to a new research paper from the Northeastern University College of Computer and Information Science.

The paper – coauthored by Collin Mulliner, William Robertson, and Engin Kirda – explores GUI element misuse (GEM). Essentially, the researchers assert that GUIs are the primary conduit through which users interact with computer programs. Each contains a unique list of visual elements – referred to in the paper as widgets. The “GUIs typically provide the ability to set attributes in these widgets to control their visibility, enabled status, and whether they are writable.”

While these attributes are helpful for users, in the context of GUI-based applications with multiple levels of privilege, they are very often misused to control who has access to which information under what circumstances. The researchers claim that fairly unsophisticated attackers can use easily accessible programming utilities such as WinSpy++ or Spy++ in order to select, view, and modify any window in a system, including the hierarchy the widgets within those windows.

“For example, a developer might disable a text field if a user is not authorized to enter any input into the backfield database via the user interface,” the researchers wrote in their paper. “Generally speaking developers might start to rely on user interface element attributes to enforce privilege levels within the application. Unfortunately, these user interface attributes are not suitable as an access control mechanism.”

In other words, attackers could potentially modify widgets in order to achieve deeper access to information stored by or made accessible to the application deploying that widget. Problematically, such attacks can be simultaneously easy to perform but difficult to detect.

“We see this class of bugs likely to appear in custom applications within (big) organizations (enterprises),” Mulliner told Threatpost in an email interview. “GEM bugs only exist in applications that provide multiple privilege levels within the application, these type of enterprise applications most likely handle sensitive data.”

The key point of this class of bugs, Mulliner continued, is that it requires only minimal skill to exploit them. An attack, he claims, is reduced to manipulating one or multiple user interface widgets, which is easier than reverse engineering an application’s binary, database format, or network protocol.

“Manipulating a widget is easily carried out by using one of many point and click tools that are freely available on the Internet,” Mulliner said. “Therefore, allowing an average user to bypass access controls to gain access to sensitive data and even the ability to modify it.”

The researchers also developed what they are calling a GEM mining tool that automatically detects insecurely configured GUIs. This specific tool works only on Windows systems (though they believe that this type of vulnerability is in no way limited to Windows) and the trio identified a number of previously unknown GEM bugs in Windows-platform software, which they have reported to the appropriate vendors.

In order to be considered for analysis by their GEM miner, an application has to offer at least two levels of privilege, because an attacker obviously cannot escalate his or her position if there is only one level of privilege (such is a prerequisite for GEM bugs).

Specifically, the researchers used this tool to root out an assortment of different bugs of varying degrees of severity in three separate applications, two of which remain unnamed. The first, an inventory management tool, is vulnerable in such a way that an unauthorized user could create new entries and delete existing ones within the application’s database. Worse yet, the researchers say, the application’s account management window, which is initiated at start-up and merely hidden from view, is totally accessible to an attacker. Without much difficulty, an attacker can modify the visibility attribute of this window (again, using readily available tools) and directly access user credentials. However, if a user were to attempt to log in as the admin, a similar attack could be launched against the admin login window, after which point the attacker would merely need to convince the admin to log in or simply wait for that to happen.

In the second app, used for employee and project management, an attacker could modify the visibility of a certain hidden window, achieving access to an entire employee database consisting of work schedules, business trips, and vacation days. Leveraging a separate callback GEM bug, the attacker would also have the capacity to change this information.

The third app tested in their experiment – named Proffix – is one that provides client management, order processing, and financial accounting functions. In this case, the vendor has acknowledged the bug and admitted it was not aware of GEM issues. The GEM vulnerabilities discovered by the researchers in this application could give an attacker the ability to modify data stored in the application’s database that normal users are not authorized to modify, completely bypassing the application’s intended access control scheme.

Milluner, Robertson, and Kirda will discuss their findings next month at the IEEE Security and Privacy conference in San Jose, California.

Security the Facebook Way

Threatpost for B2B - Wed, 03/26/2014 - 11:03

Protecting the internal network as well as the users of Facebook is an unenviable task. Facebook users constantly are the target of all manner of phishing, malware and other attacks, and the company’s own network is a major prize for attackers, as well. To help better defend those assets, Facebook’s security team has built an internal framework known as ThreatData that sucks up and processes massive amounts of threat information and helps the company respond more quickly to emerging threats.

Many large enterprises build their own custom security tools and analysis systems, but the details of those systems typically never see the light of day. Under the old security saw that publishing any information about your defensive methods is tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy, most companies prefer to remain silent about what they’re doing on this front. But Facebook has on a couple of occasions been quite open about the way it protects its internal networks and Facebook users. Last year at the CanSecWest conference, a pair of Facebook security employees detailed a complex red team exercise that the company ran in preparation for a real-world hack.

And now the company is providing an inside look at the ThreatData framework that Facebook security engineers created to help them stay abreast of the new malware and phishing threats that emerge every day. Facebook’s answer was to build a set of feeds of malicious URLS, malware hashes and other information, store it in a database that has a couple of custom search capabilities and then push the data through a custom processing engine to look for new threats that need immediate responses.

“The ThreatData framework is comprised of three high-level parts: feeds, data storage, and real-time response. Feeds collect data from a specific source and are implemented via a light-weight interface. The data can be in nearly any format and is transformed by the feed into a simple schema we call a ThreatDatum. The datum is capable of storing not only the basics of the threat (e.g., evil-malware-domain.biz) but also the context in which it was bad. The added context is used in other parts of the framework to make more informed, automatic decisions,” Mark Hammel, a threat researcher at Facebook, wrote in an explanation of the framework.

The ThreatData framework consumes feeds from VirusTotal, malicious URL repositories, paid data from vendors and other sources, the data is pushed into the company’s Hive and Scuba data repositories. Hive helps analysts answer long-term queries about whether the system has seen a specific piece of malware before, while Scuba is focused on shorter-term problems, like emerging phishing site clusters. Facebook’s team can then implement various responses, such as sending any new malicious URLs to a blacklist that is used on Facebook.

The system has enabled the Facebook security team to identify some ongoing attacks that were affecting the company’s users, as well as other victims. One example is an odd spam campaign last summer that was sending links from fake Facebook accounts that led users to a piece of malware designed to infect some feature phones. The malware had the ability to steal contact list data and send premium-rate SMS spam messages.

“With this discovery, we were able to analyze the malware, disrupt the spam campaign, and work with partners to disrupt the botnet’s infrastructure,” Hammel said.

“We realize that not all aspects of this approach are entirely novel, but we wanted to share what has worked for us to help spark new ideas. We’ve found that the framework lets us easily incorporate fresh types of data and quickly hook into new and existing internal systems, regardless of their technology stack or how they conceptualize threats.”

Image from Flickr photos of Coletivo Mambembe

Full Disclosure List Rises From the Ashes For Fresh Start

Threatpost for B2B - Wed, 03/26/2014 - 08:10

When the Full Disclosure mailing list closed down last week, many in the security community wondered what, if anything, would fill the void. As it turns out, Full Disclosure will fill that void.

John Cartwright, one of the creators of the list, announced on March 19 that he was shutting it down after growing tired of requests from a particular user to remove some archived messages. Cartwright said he had endured years of legal threats from vendors and other issues associated with maintaining a list that often included zero day vulnerability information and exploit code, and he had had enough of it.

“I’m not willing to fight this fight any longer.  It’s getting harder to operate an open forum in today’s legal climate, let alone a security-related one.  There is no honour amongst hackers any more. There is no real community.  There is precious little skill.  The entire security game is becoming more and more regulated.  This is all a sign of things to come, and a reflection on the sad state of an industry that should never have become an industry,” Cartwright wrote.

But now, Fyodor, the creator of the Nmap network scanner, has stepped in and started a new version of Full Disclosure that will carry on in the same vein as the original list.  Fyodor, whose real name is Gordon Lyon, said in an announcement of the new list that he had talked with Cartwright about starting a new list, and Cartwright had told him to go ahead if he so desired.

When I mailed John recently asking how I could help, he said he was through with the list but “if you want to start a replacement, go for it.”  So here we are.  I already deal with (or ignore) many legal threats and removal demands since I’ve long run the most popular Full Disclosure web archive, and I already run mail servers and Mailman software for my other lists (like Nmap dev and Nmap announce).  I love the Full Disclosure philosophy and movement, so I’ve started a new list!” Fyodor wrote in the announcement of the new list.

Users will need to re-subscribe to the new Full Disclosure list, but Fyodor said that he envisions the new list being a successor in spirit to the original one and being a resource for the security community.

“The new list must be run by and for the security community in a vendor-neutral fashion. It will be lightly moderated like the old list, and a volunteer moderation team will be chosen from the active users. As before, this will be a public forum for detailed discussion of vulnerabilities and exploitation techniques, as well as tools, papers, news, and events of interest to the community,” Fyodor wrote. “FD differs from other security lists in its open nature, light (versus restrictive) moderation, and support for researchers’ right to decide how to disclose their own discovered bugs. The full disclosure movement has been credited with forcing vendors to better secure their products and to publicly acknowledge and fix flaws rather than hide them. Vendor legal intimidation and censorship attempts won’t be tolerated!”

Photo by Jacob Appelbaum.

MH 370-Related Phishing Attacks Spotted Against Government Targets

Threatpost for B2B - Tue, 03/25/2014 - 16:04

Hold off on the notion that watering hole attacks may supplant phishing as the initial means of compromise in advanced attacks. A number of recent targeted campaigns have used the crash of Malaysia Airlines 370 as a lure to infect government officials in the U.S. and Asia-Pacific.

FireEye today published research on a number of spear phishing attacks that contained either infected attachments or links to malicious websites. One Chinese group, admin@338, has been active in the past targeting international financial firms that have expertise in analyzing global economic policies. Two days after flight 370 was reported missing, a spear phishing email was sent to government officials in Asia-Pacific, FireEye said, with an attachment referring to the missing airliner.

Users who clicked on the attachment saw a blank document, while in the background a variant of the Poison Ivy Trojan was installing and eventually established a backdoor to www[.]verizon[.]proxydns[.]com. This group has used both Poison Ivy and this domain in previous attacks, FireEye said.

Poison Ivy has some miles on it, but security researchers say hacker groups, in particular some with ties to China, continue to make use of it. The malware is a remote access Trojan that allows attackers to not only set up backdoor communication with infected machines, but push additional malicious code, steal documents and system information, and pivot internally.

FireEye said it monitored a second attack from the admin@338 group which targeted a “U.S.-based think tank” on March 14. The malicious attachment pretended to be a Flash video related to the missing plane and attached a Flash icon to the executable, researchers said.

This version of Poison Ivy connected to its command and control at dpmc[.]dynssl[.]com:443 and www[.]dpmc[.]dynssl[.]com:80, FireEye said, adding that the phony Verizon domain used in the first attack also resolved to an IP used by this attack as well.

Admin@338 is not the only hacker group using the Malaysia tragedy to its advantage. On March 9, a malicious executable disguised as a PDF connected to a command and control server at net[.]googlereader[.]pw:443. The victim is shown a phony PDF purporting to be a CNN story about the disappearance of the flight.

Three more samples were detected that used a Word document, or an executable, disguised as a .DOC extension, dropping an exploit for CVE-2012-0158 used in the IceFog, NetTraveler and Red October APT campaigns reported by Kaspersky Lab. All of these exploits behaved similarly, targeting high-value victims with backdoor connections.

Basecamp Online After DDoS Attack, Extortion Attempt

Threatpost for B2B - Tue, 03/25/2014 - 14:52

The project management console Basecamp is back online and its developers are in the process of restoring customers’ network access Tuesday after the service was taken down by a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack Monday.

The attack started at 8:46 a.m. CST yesterday and flooded the site with 20 gigabits of data per second, and took it and all of its services offline for a few hours according to a David Heinemeier Hansson, a partner at Basecamp.

Hansson, the Danish programmer who also created the Ruby on Rails development framework, described the attack in a Github gist Monday.

“We’re doing everything we can with the help of our network providers to mitigate this attack and halt the interruption of service. We’re also contacting law enforcement to track down the criminals responsible. But in the meantime, it might be a rough ride, and for that we’re deeply sorry,” Hansson wrote at the time.

According to a subsequent note on Signal v. Noise, no data was compromised in the attack, but Hansson lamented that users weren’t able to get to their data when they needed, calling it unacceptable.

As with any DDoS attack, the attackers flooded their services with requests, the attack shares some similarities with an a DDoS that affected social networking site Meetup.com just over two weeks ago.

Like the Meetup incident, the attack against Basecamp was launched following a blackmail attempt wherein Basecamp could have paid to mitigate the attack. According to Hansson the blackmail came from someone who “hit others just last week” and came from an email matching the following address: “dari***@gmail.com.”

It’s unclear if Hansson is referring to Meetup.com as the “others” hit last week, as the Meetup.com attack took place three weeks ago.

The attackers behind Meetup.com’s DDoS demanded $300 to keep the site online. In a blog post the site’s CEO and co-founder Scott Heiferman claimed the company refused to honor it as to avoid setting a nasty precedent, yet was still hit with a series of attacks that kept their site offline nearly the entire weekend.

Like Meetup, Basecamp acknowledged it would never give in to blackmail.

“The only thing we’re certain of is that, like Meetup, we will never negotiate by criminals, and we will not succumb to blackmail. That would only set us up as an easy target for future attacks,” Hansson said.

While the attack appears to have stopped for now Basecamp claims “there’s no guarantee” it won’t resume and that it’s “remaining on the highest alert for now.” At last update Basecamp developers were able to restore service for about 95 percent of its customers yesterday morning but were still dealing with a variety of extenuating network issues.

While the group is still investigating the attack with law enforcement, it does plan on posting a technical postmortem of the attack within 48 hours, barring it isn’t attacked again.

Largely headquartered in Chicago, Basecamp is a web-based project management infrastructure that lets developers outline to-do lists, share files and message colleagues back and forth.

White House Proposal Would End NSA Metadata Program

Threatpost for B2B - Tue, 03/25/2014 - 13:45

Privacy advocates are cautiously applauding the reports that the Obama administration will unveil a legislative proposal to end the National Security Agency’s collection of Americans’ bulk phone records, but are concerned what the fine print on that proposal might hold.

“Given all the various ways that the NSA has overreached, piecemeal change is not enough,” said Electronic Frontier Foundation legal director Cindy Cohn and EFF legislative analyst Mark M. Jaycox.

A report in the New York Times last night explains that the administration wants to end the intelligence agency’s collection and storage of phone records; those instead would stay with telecommunications providers who would continue to store them for 18 months as they are federally mandated to do. The NSA currently stores those records for five years, longer if the agency is unable to crack an encrypted communication from a suspect.

The NSA would need a judge’s OK under a new proposed court order to be able to access those records going forward, the Times article said. The legislative proposal is a response to a March 28 deadline imposed by the president in January during a speech in which he promised significant NSA reforms to the agency’s collection and use of phone call metadata. The metadata—records of calls made to and from a suspect, and their duration—is used to map connections between foreigners thought to be involved in terrorism. The NSA’s collection of metadata admittedly also ensnares call data from Americans, which is supposed to be outside the scope of the program and obtainable only with a court order.

“This is just one example of where these surveillance programs were approved in secret by all three branches of government, but could not withstand public scrutiny, so much so that the president has come around and decided reform is necessary,” said Brett Max Kaufman, National Security Fellow and attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union. “Today he apparently abandoned that need to engage in bulk collection; that shows that secret policies will not hold up to public scrutiny.”

On Friday, the current authorization from the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court which authorizes the collection program is set to expire. Under the proposal, the president is expected to ask the court to renew the program for another 90-day cycle, administration officials told the Times. Once those 90 days are up, reforms are expected to kick in.

The House Intelligence Committee today also drafted a bill that would end the NSA program and keep phone records with providers. Similar to the president’s proposal, the House bill would prevent the NSA from collecting records of phone calls and Internet activity, but unlike the White House proposal, it would not require a judge’s prior approval for a phone number before that request is submitted to a provider, the Washington Post said. A judge would have to rule on the request after the FBI submits the request to the provider.

“If there is no judicial authorization beforehand, I don’t see the civil liberties community getting behind it,” Harley Geiger, senior counsel for the Center for Democracy & Technology, told the Washington Post.

The USA FREEDOM Act seeks to ban the collection of any records, including Internet searches, email and other electronic communication. The president’s proposal and the House bill address only phone metadata.

“It’s important to keep in mind that today’s proposal is a step in the right direction,” Kaufman said, “but wouldn’t solve all the problems that need to be addressed.”

The EFF, meanwhile, threw its endorsement to the proposed USA FREEDOM Act from Judiciary chairmen Sen Patrick Leahy and Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, saying that a new proposal is unnecessary.

“It’s a giant step forward and better than either approach floated today since it offers more comprehensive reform, although some changes are still needed,” Cohn and Jaycox said.

The new court order under which the NSA would operate, according to unnamed administration officials, would require phone companies to provide records in a compatible format, and it must include data about new calls placed or received after the order is granted, the New York Times article said. The government would also be able to seek records on calls up to two calls, or hops, away from a suspect’s number.

“The executive branch does not need congressional approval to stop the spying; nothing Congress has done compels it to engage in bulk collection.  It could simply issue a new Executive Order requiring the NSA to stop,” the EFF’s Cohn and Jaycox said.

Many of these reforms were laid out in the president’s January speech, which called for increased Executive branch oversight of the intelligence community’s dragnet surveillance activities. He ordered annual reviews by the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence that would help declassify Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court opinions that have broad privacy implications. Obama also called on Congress to establish a panel of privacy experts outside of government to render opinions on significant cases before the FISC hears them.

The many reforms the president proposed came from a review board’s recommendations in December. The board recommended to the president that metadata be left with the telecommunications providers who already store it for business purposes, or that it be handed over to an independent third party. It also recommended at the time that the NSA director job be Senate-confirmed and a civilian. That was shot down, however, when Obama announced that the NSA director would continue to be the head of U.S. Cyber Command, a military position.

Word Zero Day Attacks Use Complex Chain of Exploits

Threatpost for B2B - Tue, 03/25/2014 - 11:05

The exploit that attackers are using to target a zero day vulnerability in Microsoft Word relies on a complex series of pieces, including an ASLR bypass, ROP techniques and shellcode with several layers of tools designed to detect and defeat analysis. Microsoft officials said the exploit is being used in targeted attacks right now and attackers are employing it to drop a backdoor on vulnerable machines.

The vulnerability, which Microsoft acknowledged yesterday in a security advisory, affects several versions of Word and Office, both on Windows and OS X, and is related to a problem in the handling of RTF files. Microsoft also acknowledged that there is a theoretical method through which an attacker could trigger the vulnerability in Outlook, but that method hasn’t been seen in the wild yet.

The targeted attacks that have been identified thus far are going after Word 2010, and Microsoft officials said that the exploit doesn’t seem to work against Word 2013, which has ASLR enforcement enabled. Rather, the exploit will simply crash the application. But on vulnerable machines, the exploit works well.

“The attack detected in the wild is limited and very targeted in nature. The malicious document is designed to trigger a memory corruption vulnerability in the RTF parsing code. The attacker embedded a secondary component in order to bypass ASLR, and leveraged return-oriented-programming techniques using native RTF encoding schemes to craft ROP gadgets,” Chengyun Chu and Elia Florio of the MSRC engineering team wrote in a blog post analyzing the exploit.

“When the memory corruption vulnerability is triggered, the exploit gains initial code execution and in order to bypass DEP and ASLR, it tries to execute the ROP chain that allocates a large chunk of executable memory and transfers the control to the first piece of the shellcode (egghunter). This code then searches for the main shellcode placed at the end of the RTF document to execute it.”

The shellcode itself has a number of components designed to detect whether it’s being run in an environment where it’s being analyzed. Many malware authors have employed this technique for several years. The shellcode used in the Word attack has several layers of encryption and also checks for debugging flags and indicators that the code is running in a sandbox. The shellcode also has a feature that looks at the patch level of the compromised machine to determine when the last update was installed.

“The shellcode will not perform any additional malicious action if there are updates installed after April, 8 2014. This means that even after a successful exploitation with reliable code execution, after this date the shellcode may decide to not drop the secondary backdoor payload and simply abort the execution. When the activation logic detects the correct condition to trigger, the exploit drops in the temporary folder a backdoor file named ‘svchost.exe’ and runs it. The dropped backdoor is a generic malware written in Visual Basic 6 which communicates over HTTPS and relies on execution of multiple windows scripts via WScript.Shell and it can install/run additional MSI components,” the Microsoft researchers said.

Microsoft has released a list of indicators of compromise by the backdoor this attack is dropping, one of which is that the malware communicates over SSL with a command and control server that presents a self-signed certificate.

Image from Flickr photos of Al Shep.

Hootsuite Back Online Following Denial of Service Attack

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 03/24/2014 - 15:22

Social media management system Hootsuite recovered rapidly from a denial of service (DoS) attack late last week, bouncing back after being offline for a few hours Thursday morning.

During that time, starting around 9:45 a.m. EST., users of the site were unable to use the service after a malicious actor flooded its services and brought its dashboard and mobile APIs offline.

The company’s CEO Ryan Holmes, insisted no customer data was compromised in the attack in a short blog post and claims that the company was quick to respond and in the midst of working on a solution to prevent future attacks.

“HootSuite Engineering and Security teams were able to respond immediately, and are working with hosting providers to mitigate the impact of any future attacks.”

Similar to Tweetdeck, Hootsuite is a web-based dashboard client used by social media professionals to manage Twitter.

Several thousand of the service’s users had their accounts briefly hacked last fall to send out a barrage of pharmaceutical phishing spam. While Hootsuite wasn’t compromised per se, the company did blame the spamming on weak passwords and at the time acknowledged that a “small number of successful attempts to log in to HootSuite were made using user IDs and passwords that were acquired elsewhere.”

The service implemented a handful of security methods last summer to prevent further password theft including Social Verification — verification using Twitter or Facebook log-in credentials associated with HootSuite accounts and Location Verification – verification if the account logs in from an unusual location.

Twitter mandated earlier this year that companies such as Hootsuite using the service’s application programming interface (API) only accept traffic traveling via Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). The move was largely done to harden user security for those who use third-party apps by encrypting sensitive information via HTTPS.

Targeted Attacks Exploit Microsoft Word Zero Day

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 03/24/2014 - 15:20

Targeted attacks have been spotted against a zero-day vulnerability in Microsoft Word 2010, leading Microsoft to issue a special security advisory and produce a Fix-it solution for users until a patch is ready.

Microsoft also said that its Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) is a temporary mitigation for the zero-day. Some versions of EMET would have to be configured to work with Microsoft Office in order to ward off exploits; EMET 4.1 is already configured for Office, for example.

While attacks are currently targeting Microsoft Word 2010, Microsoft said the vulnerability affects Word 2003, 2007, 2013 and 2013RT, as well as Office for Mac, Office Web Apps 2010 and 2013, and Word Viewer.

An attacker could exploit the vulnerability with a malicious Rich Text Format file or email in Outlook configured to use Microsoft Word as the email viewer, said Dustin Childs, a Trustworthy Computing group manager at Microsoft.

The vulnerability can also be exploited over the Web where an attacker could host a website containing a malicious RTF exploit, or upload a malicious RTF exploit onto a site that accepts user-provided content. Victims would have to be enticed into opening the content; an exploit cannot be triggered without user interaction.

The Fix it disables opening of RTF content in Word, Microsoft said.

“The issue is caused when Microsoft Word parses specially crafted RTF-formatted data causing system memory to become corrupted in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code,” Microsoft said in its advisory, adding that Word is by default the email reader in Outlook 2007, 2010 and 2013.

Microsoft said it could release an out-of-band patch, but more likely it will wait until its next Patch Tuesday security updates are released on April 8. That date also signals the end of support for Windows XP, Microsoft announced some time ago.

Microsoft has made it a common practice to release Fix it mitigations or recommend the use of EMET as a temporary stopgap while zero-day vulnerabilities are being actively exploited in the wild. The last one issued was in February for a string of attacks against a zero day in Internet Explorer.

The vulnerability in IE 10 was exploited by two different hacker groups against government and aerospace targets in the U.S. and France respectively. The same use-after-free vulnerability was present in IE 9 but was not being exploited.

EMET has also been a popular mitigation recommendation from Microsoft against memory-based vulnerabilities. The toolkit contains a dozen mitigations that fend off buffer overflow attacks and others that allow attackers to execute code on vulnerable machines.

Most recently, Microsoft released a technical preview of EMET 5.0 that included two new exploit mitigations. Researchers, however, have been finding moderate success in developing bypasses for some of the protections bundled in with EMET.

Advocates Seek ‘Smart Regulation’ of Surveillance Technology

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 03/24/2014 - 15:18

The long shadow cast by the use of surveillance technology and so-called lawful intercept tools has spread across much of the globe and has sparked a renewed push in some quarters for restrictions on the export of these systems. Politicians and policy analysts, discussing the issue in a panel Monday, said that there is room for sensible regulation without repeating the mistakes of the Crypto Wars of the 1990s.

The last couple of years have seen a major uptick in the use of surveillance technology by governments around the world. Researchers have found government agencies in many countries, including Egypt, Syria Iran and others, using surveillance technology to identify and track dissidents, journalists and activists.

Some politicians, especially in Europe, and privacy advocates have been calling for some regulation of the sale of such technologies, and on Monday Marietje Schaake, a Dutch member of the European Parliament who has publicly supported such regulations in the past, said she believes there’s a clear need for some sort of control of the export of surveillance technology and that it can be done without restricting commerce.

“There’s virtually no accountability or transparency, while he technologies are getting faster, smaller and cheaper,” she said during a panel discussion put on by the New America Foundation. “We’re often accused of over-regulating everything, so it’s ironic that there’s no regulation here. And the reason is that the member states [of the EU] are major players in this. The incentives to regulate are hampered by the incentives to purchase.

“There has been a lot of skepticism about how to regulate and it’s very difficult to get it right. There are traumas from the Crypto Wars. Many of these companies are modern-day arms dealers. The status quo is unacceptable and criticizing every proposed regulation isn’t moving us forward.”

In the 1990s, there was a pitched battle between the United States government and the technology community over the regulation of encryption software and its classification as a munition, which restricted its export. One of the points of argument by the government was the possibility that intelligence agencies would lose much of their ability to spy on foreign governments and citizens if encryption software was widely deployed on the Internet. A proposal at the time from the government sought to solve this problem through the use of key escrow, which essentially would allow the government to hold a copy of the private key for any user, giving it the ability to decrypt communications if there was a legal need.

The scars from that period of time have taken a long time to heal in the security community, and the resistance to export controls on other types of software can be traced to the Crypto Wars in some cases. But others see it as a road full of potential potholes and fear it could lead to broader regulation of the Internet as a whole. The panelists on Monday said they understood those concerns but saw control of surveillance technology as a way to protect, rather than hinder, online freedoms.

“We look at the Internet as a medium for self-expression and it needs to be protected,” said Arvind Ganesan, director of the Business and Human Rights Division at Human Rights Watch. “Not everyone is going to respect the rule of law or people’s rights when they use these technologies. There are a number of companies out there selling these technologies in an unregulated fashion.”

Schaake said that while some companies make no bones about what their products are designed to do, others have found themselves in situations where a customer was using the technology for something they hadn’t anticipated, leading to an unusual situation.

“We’ve been asked by companies to apply sanctions so they could breach contract without being liable,” she said.

While the discussion of export controls for surveillance technology is a relatively new one, Schaake said she hopes that it will continue to evolve and eventually lead to an international agreement on how such tools should be sold.

“We’re not talking about over-regulating the Internet for the sake of regulating the Internet. What I hope will happen is that gradually a set of open norms will emerge. Right now, we’re not even close to knowing what norms we’re looking at. You have to start somewhere, and of course you will lose some market to someone, but we have real policies that are being compromised by these companies. That problem needs to be addressed. That’s why we’re seeking smart regulation to make that happen.”

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