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First Arabic Cyberespionage Operation Uncovered

Threatpost for B2B - Tue, 02/17/2015 - 12:40
The Desert Falcons gang is the first Arabic APT group, according to researchers at Kaspersky Lab.

Inside nls_933w.dll, the Equation APT Persistence Module

Threatpost for B2B - Tue, 02/17/2015 - 12:01
The persistence module used by the Equation APT Group uncovered by researchers at Kaspersky Lab has been called the ultimate cyberattack tool.

APT Groups Emerging in Middle East

Threatpost for B2B - Tue, 02/17/2015 - 11:22
CANCUN–Since security researchers and vendors began exposing the inner workings of APT groups a few years ago, virtually all of the operations that have been made public have been the work of attackers in Europe, Asia or North America. But recently, groups in the Middle East have joined the game as well. In 2013, Adrian […]

A Fanny Equation: "I am your father, Stuxnet"

Secure List feed for B2B - Tue, 02/17/2015 - 05:00

At the Virus Bulletin conference in 2010, researchers from Kaspersky Lab partnered with Microsoft to present findings related to Stuxnet. The joint presentation included slides dealing with various parts of Stuxnet, such as the zero-days used in the attack.

Perhaps the most interesting zero-day exploit from Stuxnet was the LNK exploit (CVE-2010-2568). This allowed Stuxnet to propagate through USB drives and infect even machines that had Autorun disabled.

It was discovered during the 2010 research into Stuxnet that the LNK exploit has earlier been used in another malware, supposedly a Zlob PE, that pointed to "fanny.bmp".

Back in 2010, very few people paid much attention to a piece of malware that used the LNK exploit prior to Stuxnet. Zlob is a large malware family and these kinds of crimeware-grade samples are rarely of interest to researchers digging into zero-days and nation-state sponsored operations.

However, during our 2014 research into the Equation group, we created a special detection for the group's exploitation library, codenamed "PrivLib". To our surprise, this detection triggered a worm from 2008 that used the Stuxnet LNK exploit to replicate, codenamed Fanny.

What's so Fanny?

This PrivLib-boosted Worm, which spreads using the Stuxnet LNK exploit and the filename "fanny.bmp" was compiled on Mon Jul 28 11:11:35 2008, if we are to trust the compilation timestamp. It arrived in our December 2008 collection from the wild, so the compilation might very well be correct.

"Fanny my name" could be an introductory message from the authors

The 2008 "Fanny.bmp" Worm is detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Agent.bjqt. The malware includes the LNK exploit, which means that it is a piece of malicious software that used the Stuxnet LNK exploit before Stuxnet!

The second Stuxnet exploit (MS09-025)

If one piece of malicious software that used an exploit from Stuxnet before Stuxnet is a good catch, a second Stuxnet exploit makes it even more interesting.

The second exploit used to be a zero-day when Fanny was operational. This means that Fanny used two zero-days to replicate, both of which were later used by Stuxnet. The specific vulnerability used for privilege escalation was patched with MS09-025:

"The security update addresses these vulnerabilities by correcting the methods used for validating a change in specific kernel objects, for validating the input passed from user mode to the kernel, and for validating the argument passed to the system call. The security update also addresses a vulnerability by ensuring that the Windows kernel cleans up pointers under error conditions."

The same exploit was later used in an early Stuxnet module from 2009, which was embedded into a large binary built using the Flame platform. That Stuxnet module, also known as "atmpsvcn.ocx" or Resource 207 was the technical link between Stuxnet and Flame. This story has previously been covered in our post.

#Fanny used two zero-days to replicate, both of which were later used by #Stuxnet #EquationAPT #TheSAS2015


While the vulnerability exploited by both the Stuxnet/Flame module and Fanny is the same, the implementation of the exploit is different. The exploit in Stuxnet targets a specific OS version, while Fanny is designed to be universal and is capable of running on multiple platforms. It has a unique shellcode and exploit-triggering procedures for:

  • Windows NT 4.0
  • Windows 2000
  • Windows XP
  • Windows 2003
  • Windows Vista, 2008 and possibly others from NT6.x family

The implementation of the exploit in Fanny is more complex than in Stuxnet: instead of running just one payload the authors created a framework to run as many payloads as they want by replacing a system service call dispatcher nt!NtShutdownSystem with their own custom pointer from  theuser-space as shown in the next figure.

Fanny injected its own system service call dispatcher

This enables a persistent trampoline from user-mode to kernel-mode. This feature was not present in the Stuxnet module but there are other similarities. For instance, it seems that both the developers of Stuxnet and of Fanny follow certain coding guidelines such as the usage of unique magic numbers from each function call. Most of the returned results are simply disposed but they are still part of the code. This could be the remains of a debug version of the code which could potentially log every step in the code to ease the tracking down of an error while testing. In complex systems where kernel and user-space code is running with no interaction this seems a logical and even essential method. Again, it's implemented both in the Stuxnet code and in Fanny. See next figure.

Stuxnet (on the left) and Fanny (on the right) using magic return values

The Fanny Malware

So, what is Fanny essentially? It is a USB Worm with a sophisticated backdoor that uses the so-called "Stuxnet LNK vulnerability" to automatically execute from the USB drive even if Autorun has been disabled. It can elevate privileges to the local System using kernel exploit and drops and registers additional modules. It attempts to connect to a C&C server and deploys additional components if connection is available. If not, it uses the USB drive as a carrier to send/receive requests to and from the operator via a hidden storage area created in raw FAT structure.

Typically a victim plugs in a new USB drive and opens it with Windows Explorer. You can visually observe the two stages of infection from the USB which take seconds to execute.

Fanny modules MD5 0a209ac0de4ac033f31d6ba9191a8f7a Size 184320 Type Win32 DLL Internal name dll_installer.dll Compiled 2008.07.28 08:11:35 (GMT)

This file is a DLL with two exports (to install and uninstall the malware). It contains a xor-encrypted config in binary resource with number 101. The config determines malware behavior: there is a command to deploy malware on the current system, URLs for the C&C server and local filenames and paths used to install embedded malware components.

Fanny components inside the main executable

Upon starting it checks the following mutexes:

  • Global\RPCMutex
  • Global\RPCMutex

Where is a 1-byte long integer taken from the config. If any of these mutexes exist, the code doesn't run. It means that another instance of the same code is running. InstanceNum most likely identifies a variant or generation of Fanny preventing the same version from reinfecting the system but allowing for different versions to run (possibly to enable enforced update of components).

The module also checks another important byte in its configuration. This byte is a counter that is decreased during successful system infection. When the counter reaches a minimal value of one the module cleans up the USB drive and stops spreading the worm. In this way the attackers limit the maximum length of the Worm's killchain.

If the module is named "fanny.bmp" (the file name that Fanny uses to spread via USB drives) the module self-installs from the USB drive.

As part of the initial infection process Fanny attempts to elevate current privileges if the user has no administrative rights on the current system. It uses a vulnerability patched by MS09-025 for that purpose. Only if the elevation succeeds does the malware attempt to connect to the C&C server using a URL which is stored in the config:

  • http://webuysupplystore[.]mooo[.]com/ads/QueryRecord200586_f2ahx.html

Below is a sample request issued by the malware:

GET /ads/QueryRecord200586_f2ahx.html HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;)
Host: webuysupplystore.mooo.com

The malware expects the C&C server to reply with an HTTP 200 response and append a 0x7f-xored string that has a second stage URL. The second stage response may contain an executable file body which is saved on disk and executed.

The C&C server is currently sinkholed by Kaspersky Lab, but according to our pDNS records it previously pointed to the following IP address:

IP information

The following describes the stages that were identified during the analysis of the initial and embedded components of Fanny.


The module searches for fanny.bmp in the root of disk drives starting from drive D: and copies it to the following locations:

  • %WINDIR%\system32\comhost.dll
  • %WINDIR%\system32\mscorwin.dll

Why does Fanny make two copies of itself? Actually, there is a minor difference between these two files. Fanny patches its config in the resource section of one of the files (comhost.dll). The patched data is the value of remained maximum length of the Fanny killchain. "mscorwin.dll" is the original file copied as-is from the removable drive. So far, one copy is used for infecting other USB drives, the other is loaded on the system boot.

It also copies all *.lnk files from the USB drive to "%WINDIR%\system32\" in order to reuse them when infecting other attached USB drives. Note that there may be more than one LNK file, because each LNK contains a distinct path to the DLL which gets loaded. As far as the letter of a new drive on the target system is unknown, Fanny uses several LNKs for the most common drive letters. This method was improved later in Stuxnet, which used a relative DeviceID-dependent path to the USB drive. However, even that method required several LNK files (up to four) because of different relative paths on different versions of Windows, but that's far fewer than an almost full set of letters from the Latin alphabet.


Fanny creates the following registry value to achieve persistence:

This is not a common way to make code start automatically on a system boot and it's extremely invasive, but it guarantees that the module is loaded in the address space of each process in the system, including some critical processes such as lsass.exe and services.exe running as SYSTEM user.

When the module is loaded it checks other values that start from "filter" in the same registry key, i.e.:

  • HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\MediaResources\acm\ECELP4\filter2
  • HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\MediaResources\acm\ECELP4\filter3
  • HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\MediaResources\acm\ECELP4\filter8

The values contain a hosting process name and a path to a DLL or EXE file. If the current process name contains the value set as hosting process, then the module loads a DLL or starts a new process (in case of EXE file) depending on target file extension.

This is a map of the processes and modules that are used in Fanny:

Process Fanny module Short Description winlogon c:\windows\MSAgent\AGENTCPD.DLL USB backdoor explorer c:\windows\system32\shelldoc.dll Windows Explorer rootkit lsass c:\windows\system32\mscorwin.dll USB worm USB Worm

The code of the actual Worm is part of %WINDIR%\system32\comhost.dll export with ordinal 4 (name of export is "dll_installer_4"). The DLL is a modified next-generation Worm which is copied to every attached USB drive with all related LNK files stored in Windows\System32 directory. This module is distributed by mscorwin.dll which is part of the lsass system process.

Windows Explorer Rootkit

The rootkit functionality is provided by a shelldoc.dll file loaded in the Windows Explorer process. It hides some Fanny-related files (LNK-files and fanny.bmp) in Windows Explorer by removing them from the list of items in the foreground window that uses SysListView32 control (normally Windows Explorer window).

Some screenshots with disappearing files were demonstrated previously, however sometimes this approach may raise suspicions. Here is what it looks like if the user opens a system32 directory with Explorer:

Seven Fanny-related file icons disappeared in Windows Explorer

Apparently, it looks as if some of the file icons were cut off. In addition some of standard directories seem to be missing due to a bug in the rootkit code. It appears as if this component was not tested properly by the authors.

Masquerade Mode On

There is an interesting part of the code in USB Backdoor DLL which at first glance doesn't make much sense. It takes some hardcoded constants and generates a random value which is saved to a registry key.

Fanny generates random values that are saved to the registry

Then it moves the current executable which is hosting the DLL to c:\windows\system32\msdtc32.exe. After that the executable path is appended to HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell registry value which makes this executable run on system boot.

The trick to mimic the behavior of traditional malware was used to avoid revealing further secret activities #Fanny


This may look like a traditional way for malware to add itself to autostart, but don't be fooled by that. The purpose of this move is to make certain automated systems and software, such as those based on sandboxes and emulators, believe that they have caught some known malware and not to let it run further. It seems that the component is so unique that the authors decided to avoid the risk of looking even more suspect. It might seem a paradox, but the authors prefer this code to be detected as malware if someone is checking it. The trick is to mimic the behavior of some traditional cybercriminal malware, a bot, and get detected as soon as possible, thereby not revealing any further secret activities. Considering that this component was spreading via USB drives and could pop up on many systems, discovering it as a traditional bot would put it in lower risk zone and as a result the malware would probably end up being deleted without proper analysis.

This might explain why this code was detected as a variant of Zlob malware in the past and no one paid proper attention to it.

USB Backdoor

One of the modules, agentcpd.dll, is a backdoor that was designed to work as an advanced reconnaissance tool for air-gapped computers that are normally used in highly secure facilities. The backdoor waits for a USB drive to be plugged in and if that's a new disk, it instantly allocates some space for a hidden container using its own FAT16/FAT32 filesystem driver.

This is what the FAT root directory looks like before and after plugging a USB drive into an infected machine:

Hexdump of raw disk partition before and after plugging into an infected machine

On top of this hexdump the drive label "MYDRIVE" can be found (corresponding hex bytes are underlined with green). It is followed by a single byte flag value (0x08 in hex) which, according to Microsoft, means ATTR_VOLUME_ID. Each entry in this root directory table is 32-bytes long.

Subdirectory entries such as Pictures, Music, Documents and Work occupy 63 bytes, because of the long filename FAT feature. There are two variants of subdirectory names – short and long. A subdirectory entry uses a flag 0x10 following the short directory name, which, according to Microsoft, means ATTR_DIRECTORY.

The last record inserted by Fanny (highlighted in red) uses an invalid directory name and a flag 0x18, which combines ATTR_VOLUME_ID and ATTR_DIRECTORY. This combination of flags is not documented according to current FAT specifications and the whole entry is therefore ignored by filesystem drivers as if it were a data corruption or a bad block. As a result this entry is not visible in Windows, Mac OS and Linux and probably all other implementations of FAT driver.

It's possible that #Fanny was used to map some of the future targets of #Stuxnet #EquationAPT #TheSAS2015


While Fanny doesn't rigorously protect data in hidden storage (it doesn't mark the allocated space as bad blocks, probably to avoid attention), it changes the filesystem driver hint value indicating where to look for the next free cluster. In this way it reserves disk space of approximately 1Mb in size to use for a hidden storage.

When Fanny detects a new USB drive, with the help of its own FAT driver it looks into the root directory and locates the entry which starts with magic value 51 50 40 98 (see above). It then uses the offset which follows the flag value of 0x18. On the figure above it is set to 0x001e9c00. This offset on the same USB disk will have another magic value D0 CF CE CD serving as a marker for the beginning of the hidden storage:

Hexdump of Fanny hidden storage with list of running processes

Once Fanny has allocated space for hidden storage it populates the storage with basic information about the current system: i.e. OS Version, Service Pack number, computer name, user name, company name, list of running processes, etc.

This secret storage is also used to pass commands to computers that are not connected to the Internet. According to Fanny code, the container may carry additional components and internal commands: such as to copy certain file from the local filesystem to the USB drive (locations are defined as parameters, the file is set hidden and system file attributes), or to update the configuration block. It uses RC4 with the following hard-coded key to protect critical information:

18 05 39 44 AB 19 78 88  C4 13 33 27 D5 10 6C 25

When the USB drive travels to another infected computer connected to the Internet it can be used to carry important files and provide a way to interact with the operator. This simple and extremely slow method of communication is not used by traditional cybercriminals, that is why the whole code looks like a toolkit for professional cyberespionage. This component is one of the rare malware samples from a new class of malware called USB-Backdoors.

If you find this or a similar code of USB-Backdoor on some of your systems this is an indicator of a professional cyberattack.

Sinkholing and victim statistics

We sinkholed the Fanny C&C server and collected victim statistics, shown below. In total, we observed over 11,200 unique IPs connecting to the sinkhole server over a period of five months:

At the moment, the vast majority of victims are located in Pakistan (a whopping 59.36%). Indonesia and Vietnam follow at great distance, with 15.99% and 14.17% respectively. The infection numbers in other countries are probably too small to be relevant.

Of course, this could raise the question: was Pakistan the true target of Fanny? To be honest, we do not know. The current infection situation might be different from what it was in 2008-2010. Considering that there are still over ten thousand victims worldwide, the number back in 2009 might have been much, much higher – perhaps even as high as  50,000 infections. It may be relevant that Pakistan is a top target for the Equation group's other malware, along with Russia and Iran.


With Fanny, we begin yet another chapter in the story of Stuxnet, the Equation Group and Flame. Created in 2008, Fanny used two zero-day exploits. These two were added to Stuxnet in June 2009 and March 2010. Effectively, it means that the Equation group had access to these zero-days (and others) years before the Stuxnet group did.

While the true target of Fanny remains unknown, its unique capability to map air-gapped networks and communicate via USB sticks indicate a lot of work went into gaining the ability to access these air-gapped networks. As a precursor for the versions of Stuxnet that could replicate through the network, it's possible that Fanny was used to map some of the future targets of Stuxnet.

Another unusual fact is the very high number of infections coming from Pakistan. Since Fanny spreads only through USB sticks, which is rather slow, this indicates that the infection began in Pakistan, possibly before many other countries.

Was Fanny used to map some highly sensitive networks in Pakistan, for an unknown purpose, or was it used in preparation for Stuxnet? Perhaps time will tell.

Examining the Risks and Advantages of Biohacking

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 02/16/2015 - 18:47
At the Security Analyst Summit, expert Hannes Sjoblad described the potential uses for NFC implants as authenticators and transaction verifiers.

Preventing Silent Data Exits a Workable Problem for Businesses

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 02/16/2015 - 17:45
CANCUN–Businesses, especially those in the financial sector, should operate under the assumption that data exfiltration either is or will soon happen in their organization. A lot like car insurance, end users should hope for the best and prepare for the worst, according to Wells Fargo’s Steve Adegbite, who spoke on the challenges of detecting silent […]

Massive, Decades-Long Cyberespionage Framework Uncovered

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 02/16/2015 - 15:02
CANCUN--Researchers at Kaspersky Lab have uncovered a cyberespionage group that has been operating for at least 15 years and has worked with and supported the attackers behind Stuxnet, Flame and other highly sophisticated operations.

Don’t Build a Bounty Program; Build an Incentive Program

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 02/16/2015 - 14:59
At the Security Analyst Summit, Katie Moussouris encouraged enterprises to build bug bounty programs that feed a software development lifecycle.

Equation: The Death Star of Malware Galaxy

Secure List feed for B2B - Mon, 02/16/2015 - 14:55

Download "Equation group: questions and answers" PDF

"Houston, we have a problem"

One sunny day in 2009, Grzegorz Brzęczyszczykiewicz1 embarked on a flight to the burgeoning city of Houston to attend a prestigious international scientific conference. As a leading scientist in his field, such trips were common for Grzegorz. Over the next couple of days, Mr Brzęczyszczykiewicz exchanged business cards with other researchers and talked about  the kind of important issues such high level scientists would discuss (which is another way of saying "who knows?").  But, all good things must come to an end; the conference finished and Grzegorz Brzęczyszczykiewicz flew back home, carrying with him many highlights from a memorable event. Sometime later, as is customary for such events, the organizers sent all the participants a CDROM carrying many beautiful pictures from the conference. As Grzegorz put the CDROM in his computer and the slideshow opened, he little suspected he had just became the victim of an almost omnipotent cyberespionage organization that had just infected his computer through the use of three exploits, two of them being zero-days.

A rendezvous with the "God" of cyberespionage

It is not known when the Equation2 group began their ascent. Some of the earliest malware samples we have seen were compiled in 2002; however, their C&C was registered in August 2001. Other C&Cs used by the Equation group appear to have been registered as early as 1996, which could indicate this group has been active for almost two decades. For many years they have interacted with other powerful groups, such as the Stuxnet and Flame groups; always from a position of superiority, as they had access to exploits earlier than the others.

The #EquationAPT group is probably one of the most sophisticated cyber attack groups in the world #TheSAS2015


Since 2001, the Equation group has been busy infecting thousands, or perhaps even tens of thousands of victims throughout the world, in the following sectors:

  • Government and diplomatic institutions
  • Telecoms
  • Aerospace
  • Energy
  • Nuclear research
  • Oil and gas
  • Military
  • Nanotechnology
  • Islamic activists and scholars
  • Mass media
  • Transportation
  • Financial institutions
  • Companies developing encryption technologies

To infect their victims, the Equation group uses a powerful arsenal of "implants" (as they call their Trojans), including the following we have created names for: EQUATIONLASER, EQUATIONDRUG, DOUBLEFANTASY, TRIPLEFANTASY, FANNY and GRAYFISH. No doubt other "implants" exist which we have yet to identify and name.

The #EquationAPT group interacted with other powerful groups, such as the #Stuxnet and #Flame groups #TheSAS2015


The group itself has many codenames for their tools and implants, including SKYHOOKCHOW, UR, KS, SF, STEALTHFIGHTER, DRINKPARSLEY, STRAITACID, LUTEUSOBSTOS, STRAITSHOOTER, DESERTWINTER and GROK. Incredible as it may seem for such an elite group, one of the developers made the unforgivable mistake  of leaving his username: "RMGREE5", in one of the malware samples as part of his working folder: "c:\users\rmgree5\".

Perhaps the most powerful tool in the Equation group's arsenal is a mysterious module known only by a cryptic name: "nls_933w.dll". It allows them to reprogram the hard drive firmware of over a dozen different hard drive brands, including Seagate, Western Digital, Toshiba, Maxtor and IBM. This is an astonishing technical accomplishment and is testament to the group's abilities.

Over the past years, the Equation group has performed many different attacks.  One stands out: the Fanny worm. Presumably compiled in July 2008, it was first observed and blocked by our systems in December 2008. Fanny used two zero-day exploits, which were later uncovered during the discovery of Stuxnet. To spread, it used the Stuxnet LNK exploit and USB sticks. For escalation of privilege, Fanny used a vulnerability patched by the Microsoft bulletin MS09-025, which was also used in one of the early versions of Stuxnet from 2009.

LNK exploit as used by Fanny

It's important to point out that these two exploits were used in Fanny before they were integrated into Stuxnet, indicating that the Equation group had access to these zero-days before the Stuxnet group. The main purpose of Fanny was the mapping of air-gapped networks. For this, it used a unique USB-based command and control mechanism which allowed the attackers to pass data back and forth from air-gapped networks.

Two zero-day exploits were used by the #EquationAPT group before they were integrated into #Stuxnet #TheSAS2015


In the coming days, we will publish more details about the Equation group malware and their attacks. The first document to be published will be a general FAQ on the group together with indicators of compromise.

By publishing this information, we hope to bring it to the attention of the ITSec community as well as independent researchers, who can extend the understanding of these attacks. The more we investigate such cyberespionage operations, we more we understand how little we actually know about them. Together, we can lift this veil and work towards a more secure (cyber-)world.

Download "Equation group: questions and answers" PDF

Indicators of compromise ("one of each"): Name EquationLaser MD5 752af597e6d9fd70396accc0b9013dbe Type EquationLaser installer Compiled Mon Oct 18 15:24:05 2004 Name Disk from Houston "autorun.exe" with EoP exploits MD5 6fe6c03b938580ebf9b82f3b9cd4c4aa Type EoP package and malware launcher Compiled Wed Dec 23 15:37:33 2009 Name DoubleFantasy MD5 2a12630ff976ba0994143ca93fecd17f Type DoubleFantasy installer Compiled Fri Apr 30 01:03:53 2010 Name EquationDrug MD5 4556ce5eb007af1de5bd3b457f0b216d Type EquationDrug installer ("LUTEUSOBSTOS") Compiled Tue Dec 11 20:47:12 2007 Name GrayFish MD5 9b1ca66aab784dc5f1dfe635d8f8a904 Type GrayFish installer Compiled Compiled: Fri Feb 01 22:15:21 2008 (installer) Name Fanny MD5 0a209ac0de4ac033f31d6ba9191a8f7a Type Fanny worm Compiled Mon Jul 28 11:11:35 2008 Name TripleFantasy   MD5 9180d5affe1e5df0717d7385e7f54386 loader (17920 bytes .DLL) Type ba39212c5b58b97bfc9f5bc431170827 encrypted payload (.DAT) Compiled various, possibly fake   Name _SD_IP_CF.dll - unknown MD5 03718676311de33dd0b8f4f18cffd488 Type DoubleFantasy installer + LNK exploit package Compiled Fri Feb 13 10:50:23 2009 Name nls_933w.dll MD5 11fb08b9126cdb4668b3f5135cf7a6c5 Type HDD reprogramming module Compiled Tue Jun 15 20:23:37 2010 Name standalonegrok_2.1.1.1 / GROK MD5 24a6ec8ebf9c0867ed1c097f4a653b8d Type GROK keylogger Compiled Tue Aug 09 03:26:22 2011 C&C servers (hostnames and IPs): DoubleFantasy: advancing-technology[.]com
config.getmyip[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB
myhousetechnews[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB
newsterminalvelocity[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB
successful-marketing-now[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB
techasiamusicsvr[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB
www.forboringbusinesses[.]com EquationLaser: lsassoc[.]com - re-registered, not malicious at the moment
gar-tech[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB Fanny: webuysupplystore.mooo[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB EquationDrug: newjunk4u[.]com
newip427.changeip[.]net - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB
ad-servicestats[.]net - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB
subad-server[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB
rapidlyserv[.]com GrayFish: ad-noise[.]net
unwashedsound[.]com TripleFantasy: arm2pie[.]com
tropiccritics[.]com Equation group's exploitation servers: standardsandpraiserepurpose[.]com
technology-revealed[.]com IPs hardcoded in malware configuration blocks: Kaspersky products detection names:
  • Backdoor.Win32.Laserv
  • Backdoor.Win32.Laserv.b
  • Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.ad
  • HEUR:Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.gen
  • HEUR:Exploit.Java.Generic
  • HEUR:Trojan.Java.Generic
  • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.DoubleFantasy.gen
  • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.gen
  • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic
  • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.GrayFish.gen
  • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.TripleFantasy.gen
  • Rootkit.Boot.Grayfish.a
  • Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Agent.bjqt
  • Trojan.Boot.Grayfish.a
  • Trojan.Win32.Agent.ajkoe
  • Trojan.Win32.Agent.iedc
  • Trojan.Win32.Agent2.jmk
  • Trojan.Win32.Diple.fzbb
  • Trojan.Win32.DoubleFantasy.a
  • Trojan.Win32.DoubleFantasy.gen
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.b
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.c
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.d
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.e
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.f
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.g
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.h
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.i
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.j
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.k
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationLaser.a
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationLaser.c
  • Trojan.Win32.EquationLaser.d
  • Trojan.Win32.Genome.agegx
  • Trojan.Win32.Genome.akyzh
  • Trojan.Win32.Genome.ammqt
  • Trojan.Win32.Genome.dyvi
  • Trojan.Win32.Genome.ihcl
  • Trojan.Win32.Patched.kc
  • Trojan.Win64.EquationDrug.a
  • Trojan.Win64.EquationDrug.b
  • Trojan.Win64.Rozena.rpcs
  • Worm.Win32.AutoRun.wzs
Yara rules: rule apt_equation_exploitlib_mutexes { meta: copyright = "Kaspersky Lab" description = "Rule to detect Equation group's Exploitation library" version = "1.0" last_modified = "2015-02-16" reference = "https://securelist.com/blog/" strings: $mz="MZ" $a1="prkMtx" wide $a2="cnFormSyncExFBC" wide $a3="cnFormVoidFBC" wide $a4="cnFormSyncExFBC" $a5="cnFormVoidFBC" condition: (($mz at 0) and any of ($a*)) } rule apt_equation_doublefantasy_genericresource { meta: copyright = "Kaspersky Lab" description = "Rule to detect DoubleFantasy encoded config" version = "1.0" last_modified = "2015-02-16" reference = "https://securelist.com/blog/" strings: $mz="MZ" $a1={06 00 42 00 49 00 4E 00 52 00 45 00 53 00} $a2="yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy" $a3="002" condition: (($mz at 0) and all of ($a*)) and filesize < 500000 } rule apt_equation_equationlaser_runtimeclasses { meta: copyright = "Kaspersky Lab" description = "Rule to detect the EquationLaser malware" version = "1.0" last_modified = "2015-02-16" reference = "https://securelist.com/blog/" strings: $a1="?a73957838_2@@YAXXZ" $a2="?a84884@@YAXXZ" $a3="?b823838_9839@@YAXXZ" $a4="?e747383_94@@YAXXZ" $a5="?e83834@@YAXXZ" $a6="?e929348_827@@YAXXZ" condition: any of them } rule apt_equation_cryptotable { meta: copyright = "Kaspersky Lab" description = "Rule to detect the crypto library used in Equation group malware" version = "1.0" last_modified = "2015-02-16" reference = "https://securelist.com/blog/" strings: $a={37 DF E8 B6 C7 9C 0B AE 91 EF F0 3B 90 C6 80 85 5D 19 4B 45 44 12 3C E2 0D 5C 1C 7B C4 FF D6 05 17 14 4F 03 74 1E 41 DA 8F 7D DE 7E 99 F1 35 AC B8 46 93 CE 23 82 07 EB 2B D4 72 71 40 F3 B0 F7 78 D7 4C D1 55 1A 39 83 18 FA E1 9A 56 B1 96 AB A6 30 C5 5F BE 0C 50 C1} condition: $a }


1 pseudonym, to protect the original victim's identity >>
2 the name "Equation group" was given because of their preference for sophisticated encryption schemes >>

Kaminsky: DNS Insecurity Isn’t Coincidence, it’s Consequence

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 02/16/2015 - 14:18
Dan Kaminsky insisted that there's a cost to doing security crypto through DNS at Kaspersky Lab's 2015 Security Analyst Summit Monday.

Hackers’ Op-Sec Failures Important Clues to Uncover APT Gangs

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 02/16/2015 - 13:06
At the Security Analyst Summit, a researcher from PwC explained how some huge operational security failures on the part of APT gangs helped uncover those behind attacks.

The Great Bank Robbery: the Carbanak APT

Secure List feed for B2B - Mon, 02/16/2015 - 12:20

Download Full Report PDF

The story of Carbanak began when a bank from Ukraine asked us to help with a forensic investigation. Money was being mysteriously stolen from ATMs. Our initial thoughts tended towards the Tyupkin malware. However, upon investigating the hard disk of the ATM system we couldn't find anything except a rather odd VPN configuration (the netmask was set to

At this time we regarded it as just another malware attack. Little did we know then that a few months later one of our colleagues would receive a call at 3 a.m. in the middle of the night. On the phone was an account manager, asking us to call a certain number as matter of urgency. The person at the end of the line was the CSO of a Russian bank. One of their systems was alerting that data was being sent from their Domain Controller to the People's Republic of China.

Up to 100 financial institutions have been hit.Total financial losses could be as a high as $1bn#TheSAS2015#Carbanak


When we arrived on site we were quickly able to find the malware on the system. We wrote a batch script that removed the malware from an infected PC, and ran this script on all the computers at the bank. This was done multiple times until we were sure that all the machines were clean. Of course, samples were saved and through them we encountered the Carbanak malware for the first time.

Modus Operandi

Further forensic analysis took us to the point of initial infection: a spear phishing e-mail with a CPL attachment; although in other cases Word documents exploiting known vulnerabilities were used. After executing the shellcode, a backdoor based on Carberp, is installed on the system. This backdoor is what we know today as Carbanak. It is designed for espionage, data exfiltration and remote control.

Each bank robbery took 2-4 months, from infecting the first computer to cashing the money out #TheSAS2015 #Carbanak


Once the attackers are inside the victim´s network, they perform a manual reconnaissance, trying to compromise relevant computers (such as those of administrators') and use lateral movement tools. In short, having gained access, they will jump through the network until they find their point of interest. What this point of interest is, varies according to the attack. What they all have in common, however, is that from this point it is possible to extract money from the infected entity.

The gang behind Carbanak does not necessarily have prior knowledge of the inner workings of each bank targeted, since these vary per organisation. So in order to understand how a particular bank operates, infected computers were used to record videos that were then sent to the Command and Control servers. Even though the quality of the videos was relatively poor, they were still good enough for the attackers, armed also with the keylogged data for that particular machine to understand what the victim was doing. This provided them with the knowledge they needed to cash out the money.

Cash out procedures

During our investigation we found several ways of cashing out:

ATMs were instructed remotely to dispense cash without any interaction with the ATM itself, with the cash then collected by mules; the SWIFT network was used to transfer money out of the organisation and into criminals' accounts; and databases with account information were altered so that fake accounts could be created with a relatively high balance, with mule services being used to collect the money.

Infections and losses

Since we started investigating this campaign we have worked very closely with the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) tracking the Carbanak group. As a result of this cooperation we know that up to 100 targets have been hit. When it comes to financial institutions, In at least half of the cases the criminals were able to extract money from the infected institution. Losses per bank range from $2.5 million to approximately $10 million. However, according to information provided by LEAs and the victims themselves, total financial losses could be as a high as $1 billion, making this by far the most successful criminal cyber campaign we have ever seen.

Losses from #Carbanak per bank range from $2.5 million to approximately $10 million #TheSAS2015


Our investigation began in Ukraine and then moved to Moscow, with most of the financial entities targeted by the group located in Eastern Europe. However thanks to KSN data and data obtained from the Command and Control servers, we know that Carbanak also targets victims in the USA, Germany and China. Now the group is expanding its operations to new areas. These include Malaysia, Nepal, Kuwait and several regions in Africa, among others.

The group is still active, and we urge all financial organizations to carefully scan their networks for the presence of Carbanak. If detected, report the intrusion to law enforcement immediately.

For a full description of the campaign, IOCs and list of infections please see our report.

To check your network for Carbanak's presence, you can also use the open IOC file available here.

FAQ What is Carbanak?

Carbanak is the name we use for an APT-style campaign targeting (but not limited to) financial institutions. The main difference with other APT attacks is that attackers do not see data but money as their primary target. We say APT-like, however the attack is not strictly speaking Advanced. Strictly speaking, the main feature defining the attackers is Persistence.

We name the backdoor Carbanak since it is based on Carberp and the name of the configuration file is "anak.cfg".

What are the malicious purposes of this campaign?

The attackers infiltrate the victim´s network looking for the critical system they can use for cashing money out. Once they have stolen a significant amount of money (from 2.5 to 10 MM USD per entity), they abandon the victim.

Why do you think it is significant?

Banking entities have always been a primary target for cybercriminals. However it was almost always through their customers. This time attackers are targeting financial entities directly in an unprecedented, determined, highly professional and coordinated attack, and using any means from the target to cash as much money out as possible, up to an apparently auto-imposed limit.

Can you explain the timeline of the campaign?

According to what we know, the first malicious samples were compiled in August, 2013 when the cybercriminals started to test the Carbanak malware. The first infections were detected in December, 2013.

On average, each bank robbery took between two and four months, from infecting the first computer at the bank's corporate network to cashing the money out.

We believe that the gang was able to successfully steal from their first victims during the period of February-April 2014. The peak of infections was recorded in June 2014.

Currently the campaign is still active.

Why didn´t you make the details public until now?

Since we started working on this campaign we have collaborated with the different LEAs involved in the investigation and helped them as much as possible. As it remains an open investigation, we were asked not to share any details until it was safe to do so.

Have you reached victims and Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) in those countries where you have detected the incidents?

Yes, this investigation turned into a joint operation between Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team and international organizations, national and regional law enforcement agencies and a number of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) worldwide.

One of our main goals was to disseminate our knowledge of the campaign and IOCs among all detected and potential victims. We used national CERTs and LEAs as the distribution channel.

How did you contribute to the investigation?

We're helping to assist in investigations and countermeasures that disrupt malware operations and cybercriminal activity. During the investigations we provide technical expertise such as analyzing infection vectors, malicious programs, supported Command & Control infrastructure and exploitation methods.

How was the malware distributed?

Attackers used spear phishing emails with malicious attachments against employees of the targeted financial institutions, in some cases sending them to their personal email addresses. We believe the attackers also used drive by download attacks, but this second assumption is still not 100% confirmed.

What is the potential impact for victims?

Based on what the attackers stole from victims, a new victim faces potential losses of up to 10 million $. However this figure is arbitrary based on what we know: nothing limits the potential loss once an institution is infected.

Who are the victims? What is the scale of the attack?

Victims are mainly institutions in the financial industry; however we have also found traces of infections in POS terminals and PR agencies. For a sense of the scale of the attack please see the different charts and maps we provide in our report.

As with many malware campaigns there are a variety of companies/individuals analyzing the malware, resulting in requests to the Command and Control server. When we analyze those servers, all we see are the IPs and possibly some additional information. When this additional information is not present, and when the IP cannot be traced back to its owner, we mark it as an infection.

Based on this approach our analysis concludes that Russia, the US, Germany and China are the most affected countries in number of traces of infection (IP addresses).

How are corporate users protected against this type of attack? Does Kaspersky Lab protect their users?

Yes, we detect Carbanak samples as Backdoor.Win32.Carbanak and Backdoor.Win32.CarbanakCmd.

All Kaspersky Lab's corporate products and solutions detect known Carbanak samples. To raise the level of protection, it is recommended to switch on Kaspersky's Proactive Defense Module included in each modern product and solution.

We also have some general recommendations:

  • Do not open suspicious emails, especially if they have an attachment;
  • Update your software (in this campaign no 0days were used);
  • Turn on heuristics in your security suites, this way it is more likely that such new samples will be detected and stopped from the beginning.

Evolution and Adaptation in the Security Jungle

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 02/16/2015 - 11:51
CANCUN--Chris Hoff, vice president and CTO of the security business at Juniper Networks, compares the current enterprise security situation to that of a mixed-martial arts fighter who needs to be proficient in multiple disciplines.

Carbanak Ring Steals $1 Billion from Banks

Threatpost for B2B - Sun, 02/15/2015 - 20:14
The Carbanak cybercrime gang could be responsible for stealing up to $1 billion from as many as 100 banks in 30 countries, researchers at Kaspersky Lab said.

Google Adds Grace Period to Disclosure Policy

Threatpost for B2B - Fri, 02/13/2015 - 16:04
Google announced that it was adding a 14-day grace period to its 90-day vulnerability disclosure deadline if the affected vendor says it will have a patch ready inside the extension.
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