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Updated: 12 hours 31 min ago

Organ donation: home delivery

Fri, 08/08/2014 - 04:17

Promises to marry a potential groom if he covers his bride-to-be's travel expenses to his hometown are a fairly common feature of fraudulent spam. Less common are more 'noble' offers of help, though even these charitable offers usually come at a price.

In a recent mailing, a resident from the Ukrainian city of Odessa expressed his wish to become an organ donor, but for a considerable fee. In the email, he provided an overview of his current state of health – "good, not perfect" – his biometric data (height – 1.74 m, weight - 63 kg) and even his blood type. The price for which he was willing to sell a kidney or his liver was not specified; the main condition was that the operation had to be done in a European clinic.

It is obvious that anyone who decides to take him up on his offer will have to pay a considerable sum of money. It is highly likely that our "man from Odessa" will also want money to pay for his trip to Europe or to carry out tests in a good laboratory, before disappearing once he receives a money transfer. Honesty and offers made in spam are just incompatible. Moreover, no one should ever enter into negotiations with people who send unsolicited emails, especially when it concerns health issues.

3 reasons to visit "SYN City" – aka Las Vegas

Thu, 08/07/2014 - 17:03

Summer, sand and sun may let you think about vacation at a beach, but not IT-Security interested people. Every year gatherings happen in Las Vegas attracting amateurs and professionals from around the globe – BlackHat and Defcon. But also the local BSides conference, BSidesLV, takes place before - which teamed-up with Passwordscon this year.

Seven streams of presentations with a wide spectrum of topics were offered at Tuscany. At Passwordscon talks were given on securing passwords and attacking. Among these topics as "Target specific automated dictionary generation" which covered ways to automatically create dictionaries used for attacks against password hashes from one specified source. Rick Redman, from KoreLogic, gave a defense talk "Password Topology Histogram Wear-Leveling, a.k.a. PathWell". As attacks are getting easier because of better Hardware, not using stronger hash-types and defenses as password policies may lead to predictable passwords a new approach on defending passwords on enterprise level was presented. This is based on targeting the topology of passwords by limiting the use of password topologies and ban common password topologies.

Password topology means how the password is created. For example the topology of "Passw0rd" is uppercase (u) + 4x lowercase (l) + digit (d) + 2x lowercase (l) (simple: ulllldll). By using Levenshtein distance algorithm the change of topologies may be measured on a password change, to enforce new topologies rather than just updating any character in a password, to make cracking more difficult. [Link]

Dimitri Fousekis also focused on passwords in enterprise underlining the importance of "associate the password with data ownership" in order to avoid users disrespecting the importance of a good password.

The Epic Turla Operation

Thu, 08/07/2014 - 08:55

 Technical Appendix with IOCs

Executive Summary

Over the last 10 months, Kaspersky Lab researchers have analyzed a massive cyber-espionage operation which we call "Epic Turla". The attackers behind Epic Turla have infected several hundred computers in more than 45 countries, including government institutions, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies.

The attacks are known to have used at least two zero-day exploits:

  • CVE-2013-5065 - Privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows XP and Windows 2003
  • CVE-2013-3346 - Arbitrary code-execution vulnerability in Adobe Reader

We also observed exploits against older (patched) vulnerabilities, social engineering techniques and watering hole strategies in these attacks. The primary backdoor used in the Epic attacks is also known as "WorldCupSec", "TadjMakhal", "Wipbot" or "Tavdig".

When G-Data published on Turla/Uroburos back in February, several questions remained unanswered. One big unknown was the infection vector for Turla (aka Snake or Uroburos). Our analysis indicates that victims are infected via a sophisticated multi-stage attack, which begins with the Epic Turla. In time, as the attackers gain confidence, this is upgraded to more sophisticated backdoors, such as the Carbon/Cobra system. Sometimes, both backdoors are run in tandem, and used to "rescue" each other if communications are lost with one of the backdoors.

Once the attackers obtain the necessary credentials without the victim noticing, they deploy the rootkit and other extreme persistence mechanisms.

The attacks are still ongoing as of July 2014, actively targeting users in Europe and the Middle East.

Note: A full analysis of the Epic attacks is available to the Kaspersky Intelligent Services subscribers. Contact:

The Epic Turla attacks

The attacks in this campaign fall into several different categories depending on the vector used in the initial compromise:

  • Spearphishing e-mails with Adobe PDF exploits (CVE-2013-3346 + CVE-2013-5065)
  • Social engineering to trick the user into running malware installers with ".SCR" extension, sometimes packed with RAR
  • Watering hole attacks using Java exploits (CVE-2012-1723), Flash exploits (unknown) or Internet Explorer 6,7,8 exploits (unknown)
  • Watering hole attacks that rely on social engineering to trick the user into running fake "Flash Player" malware installers

The attackers use both direct spearphishing and watering hole attacks to infect their victims. Watering holes (waterholes) are websites of interest to the victims that have been compromised by the attackers and injected to serve malicious code.

So far we haven't been able to locate any e-mail used against the victims, only the attachments. The PDF attachments do not show any "lure" to the victim when opened, however, the SCR packages sometime show a clean PDF upon successful installation.

Some of known attachment names used in the spearphishing attacks are:

  • ؤتمر جنيف.rar (translation from Arabic: "Geneva conference.rar")
  • NATO position on Syria.scr
  • Note_№107-41D.pdf
  • Talking Points.scr
  • border_security_protocol.rar
  • Security protocol.scr
  • Program.scr

In some cases, these filenames can provide clues about the type of victims the attackers are targeting.

The watering hole attacks

Currently, the Epic attackers run a vast network of watering holes that target visitors with surgical precision.

Some of the injected websites include:

The website of the City Hall of Pinor, Spain

A site promoting entrepreneurship in the border area of Romania

Palestinian Authority Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In total, we observed more than 100 injected websites. Currently, the largest number of injected sites is in Romania.

Here's a statistic on the injected websites:

The distribution is obviously not random, and it reflects some of the interests of the attackers. For instance, in Romania many of the infected sites are in the Mures region, while many of the Spanish infected sites belong to local governments (City Hall).

Most of the infected sites use the TYPO3 CMS (see:, which could indicate the attackers are abusing a specific vulnerability in this publishing platform.

Injected websites load a remote JavaScript into the victim's browser:

The script "sitenavigatoin.js" is a Pinlady-style browser and plugin detection script, which in turn, redirects to a PHP script sometimes called main.php or wreq.php. Sometimes, the attackers register the .JPG extension with the PHP handler on the server, using "JPG" files to run PHP scripts:

Profiling script

The main exploitation script "wreq.php", "main.php" or "main.jpg" performs a numbers of tasks. We have located several versions of this script which attempt various exploitation mechanisms.

One version of this script attempts to exploit Internet Explorer versions 6, 7 and 8:

Internet Explorer exploitation script

Unfortunately, the Internet Explorer exploits have not yet been retrieved.

Another more recent version attempts to exploit Oracle Sun Java and Adobe Flash Player:

Java and Flash Player exploitation scripts

Although the Flash Player exploits couldn't be retrieved, we did manage to obtain the Java exploits:

Name MD5 allj.html 536eca0defc14eff0a38b64c74e03c79 allj.jar f41077c4734ef27dec41c89223136cf8 allj64.html 15060a4b998d8e288589d31ccd230f86 allj64.jar e481f5ea90d684e5986e70e6338539b4 lstj.jar 21cbc17b28126b88b954b3b123958b46 lstj.html acae4a875cd160c015adfdea57bd62c4

The Java files exploit a popular vulnerability, CVE-2012-1723, in various configurations.

The payload dropped by these Java exploits is the following:

MD5: d7ca9cf72753df7392bfeea834bcf992

The Java exploit use a special loader that attempts to inject the final Epic backdoor payload into explorer.exe. The backdoor extracted from the Java exploits has the following C&C hardcoded inside:


This C&C is still online at the moment although it redirects to a currently suspended page at "hxxp://[.]au". For a full list of C&C servers, please see the Appendix.

The Epic Turla attackers are extremely dynamic in using exploits or different methods depending on what is available at the moment. Most recently, we observed them using yet another technique coupled with watering hole attacks.  This takes advantage of social engineering to trick the user into running a fake Flash Player (MD5: 030f5fdb78bfc1ce7b459d3cc2cf1877):

In at least one case, they tried to trick the user into downloading and running a fake Microsoft Security Essentials app (MD5: 89b0f1a3a667e5cd43f5670e12dba411):

The fake application is signed by a valid digital certificate from Sysprint AG:

Serial number: ‎00 c0 a3 9e 33 ec 8b ea 47 72 de 4b dc b7 49 bb 95
Thumbprint: ‎24 21 58 64 f1 28 97 2b 26 22 17 2d ee 62 82 46 07 99 ca 46

Valid signature from Sysprint AG on Epic dropper

This file was distributed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan's website, at "hxxp://mfa[.]tj/upload/security.php".

The file is a .NET application that contains an encrypted resource. This drops the malicious file with the MD5 7731d42b043865559258464fe1c98513.

This is an Epic backdoor which connects to the following C&Cs, with a generic internal ID of 1156fd22-3443-4344-c4ffff:


A full list with all the C&C server URLs that we recovered from the samples can be found in the technical Appendix.

The Epic command-and-control infrastructure

The Epic backdoors are commanded by a huge network of hacked servers that deliver   command and control functionality.

The huge network commanded by the Epic Turla attackers serves multiple purposes. For instance, the motherships function as both exploitation sites and command and control panels for the malware.

Here's how the big picture looks like:

Epic Turla lifecycle

The first level of command and control proxies generally talk to a second level of proxies, which in turn, talk to the "mothership" server. The mothership server is generally a VPS, which runs the Control panel software used to interact with the victims. The attackers operate the mothership using a network of proxies and VPN servers for anonymity reasons. The mothership also work as the exploitation servers used in the watering hole attacks, delivering Java, IE or fake applications to the victim.

We were able to get a copy of one of the motherships, which provided some insight into the operation.

It runs a control panel which is password protected:

Epic mothership control panel login

Once logged into the Control panel, the attackers can see a general overview of the system including the number of interesting potential targets:

Epic control panel status overview

A very interesting file on the servers is task.css, where the attackers define the IP ranges they are interested in. To change the file, they are using the "Task editor" from the menu. Depending on the "tasks", they will decide whether to infect the visitors or not. In this case, we found they targeted two ranges belonging to:

  • "Country A" - Federal Government Network
  • "Country B" - Government Telecommunications and Informatics Services Network

It should be noted though, the fact that the attackers were targeting these ranges doesn't necessarily mean they also got infected. Some other unknown IPs were also observed in the targeting schedules.

There is also an "except.css" file where attackers log the reasons they didn't try to exploit certain visitors. There are three possible values:

  • TRY
  • DON'T TRY -> Version of the browser and OS does not meet the conditions
  • DON'T TRY -> (2012-09-19 10:02:04) - checktime

These are the "don't meet the conditions" reasons observed in the logs:

  • Windows 7 or 2008 R2
  • MSIE 8.0
  • Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; .NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
  • Adobe Shockwave
  • Adobe Flash
  • Adobe Reader
  • Win Media Player 12.0.7601.17514
  • Quick Time null
  • MS Word null
  • Java null
The Epic / Tavdig / Wipbot backdoor

For this first stage of the attack, the threat actor uses a custom backdoor. In some cases, the backdoor is packaged together with the CVE-2013-5065 EoP exploit and heavily obfuscated. This makes the analysis more difficult.

The CVE-2013-5065 exploit allows the backdoor to achieve administrator privileges on the system and run unrestricted. This exploit only works on unpatched Microsoft Windows XP systems.

Other known detection names for the backdoor is Trojan.Wipbot (Symantec) or Tavdig.

The main backdoor is about 60KB in size and implements a C&C protocol on top of normal HTTP requests. The communication protocol uses requests in the C&C replies, which the malware decrypts and processes. The replies are sent back to the C&C through the same channel.

The malware behavior is defined by a configuration block. The configuration block usually contains two hard-coded C&C URLs. He have also seen one case where the configuration block contains just one URL. The configuration can also be updated on the fly by the attackers, via the C&C.

The backdoor attempts to identify the following processes and, if found, it will terminate itself:

  • tcpdump.exe
  • windump.exe
  • ethereal.exe
  • wireshark.exe
  • ettercap.exe
  • snoop.exe
  • dsniff.exe

It contains an internal unique ID, which is used to identify the victim to the C&C. Most samples, especially old ones, have the ID 1156fd22-3443-4344-c4ffff. Once a victim is confirmed as "interesting", the attackers upload another Epic backdoor which has a unique ID used to control this specific victim.

During the first C&C call, the backdoor sends a pack with the victim's system information. All further information sent to the C&C is encrypted with a public key framework, making decryption impossible. The commands from the C&C are encrypted in a simpler manner and can be decrypted if intercepted because the secret key is hardcoded in the malware.

Through monitoring, we were able to capture a large amount of commands sent to the victims by the attackers, providing an unique view into this operation. Here's a look at one of the encrypted server replies:

Once a victim is infected and "checks in" with the server, the attackers send a template of commands:

Next, the attackers try to move through the victim's network using pre-defined or collected passwords:

Listing all .doc files recursively is also a common "theme":

In total, we have decoded several hundreds of these command packages delivered to the victims, providing an unique insight into the inner workings of the attackers.

In addition to generic searches, some very specific lookups have been observed as well.  These include searches for:

  • *NATO*.msg
  • eu energy dialogue*.*
  • EU*.msg
  • Budapest*.msg

In this case, the attackers were interested to find e-mails related to "NATO", "Energy Dialogue within European Union" and so on.

For some of the C&C servers, the attackers implemented RSA encryption for the C&C logs, which makes it impossible to decrypt them. This scheme was implemented in April 2014.

Lateral movement and upgrade to more sophisticated backdoors

Once a victim is compromised, the attackers upload several tools that are used for lateral movement.

One such tool observed in the attacks and saved as "C:\Documents and Settings\All users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\winsvclg.exe" is:

Name: winsvclg.exe
MD5: a3cbf6179d437909eb532b7319b3dafe
Compiled: Tue Oct 02 13:51:50 2012

This is a keylogger tool that creates %temp%\~DFD3O8.tmp. Note: the filename can change across victims. On one Central Asian government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs victim system, the filename used was "adobe32updt.exe".

In addition to these custom tools, we observed the usage of standard administration utilities. For instance, another tool often uploaded by the attackers to the victim's machine is "winrs.exe":

Name: winrs.exe
MD5: 1369fee289fe7798a02cde100a5e91d8

This is an UPX packed binary, which contains the genuine "dnsquery.exe" tool from Microsoft, unpacked MD5:  c0c03b71684eb0545ef9182f5f9928ca.

In several cases, an interesting update has been observed --  a malware from a different, yet related family.

Size: 275,968 bytes
MD5: e9580b6b13822090db018c320e80865f
Compiled: Thu Nov 08 11:05:35 2012

another example:

Size: 218,112 bytes
MD5: 071d3b60ebec2095165b6879e41211f2
Compiled: Thu Nov 08 11:04:39 2012

This backdoor is more sophisticated and belongs to the next level of cyber-espionage tools called the "Carbon system" or Cobra by the Turla attackers. Several plugins for the "Carbon system" are known to exist.

Decoded configuration for e9580b6b13822090db018c320e80865f

Note: the command and control servers www.losguayaberos[.]com and thebesttothbrushes[.]com have been sinkholed by Kaspersky Lab.

Other packages delivered to the victims include:

MD5: c7617251d523f3bc4189d53df1985ca9
MD5: 0f76ef2e6572befdc2ca1ca2ab15e5a1

These top level packages deploy both updated Epic backdoors and Turla Carbon system backdoors to confirmed victims, effectively linking the Epic and Turla Carbon operations together.

The Turla Carbon dropper from these packages has the following properties:

MD5: cb1b68d9971c2353c2d6a8119c49b51f

This is called internally by the authors "Carbon System", part of the "Cobra" project, as it can be seen from the debug path inside:

This acts as a dropper for the following modules, both 32 and 64 bit:

MD5 Resource number 4c1017de62ea4788c7c8058a8f825a2d 101 43e896ede6fe025ee90f7f27c6d376a4 102 e6d1dcc6c2601e592f2b03f35b06fa8f 104 554450c1ecb925693fedbb9e56702646 105 df230db9bddf200b24d8744ad84d80e8 161 91a5594343b47462ebd6266a9c40abbe 162 244505129d96be57134cb00f27d4359c 164 4ae7e6011b550372d2a73ab3b4d67096 165

The Carbon system is in essence an extensible platform, very similar to other attack platforms such as the Tilded platform or the Flame platform. The plugins for the Carbon system can be easily recognized as they always feature at least two exports named:

  • ModuleStart
  • ModuleStop

Carbon system plugin with characteristic exports

Several Epic backdoors appear to have been designed to work as Carbon system plugins as well - they require a specialized loader to start in victim systems that do not have the Carbon system deployed.

Some modules have artifacts which indicate the Carbon system is already at version 3.x, although the exact Carbon system version is very rarely seen in samples:

The author of the Carbon module above can be also seen in the code, as "gilg", which also authored several other Turla modules.

We are planning to cover the Turla Carbon system with more details in a future report.

Language artifacts

The payload recovered from one of the mothership servers (at newsforum.servehttp[.]com/wordpress/wp-includes/css/img/upload.php, MD5: 4dc22c1695d1f275c3b6e503a1b171f5, Compiled: Thu Sep 06 14:09:55 2012) contains two modules, a loader/injector and a backdoor. Internally, the backdoor is named "Zagruzchik.dll":

The word "Zagruzchik" means "boot loader" in Russian.

The Control panel for the Epic motherships also sets the language to codepage "1251":

Codepage 1251 is commonly used to render Cyrillic characters.

There are other indications that the attackers are not native English language speakers:

  • Password it´s wrong!
  • Count successful more MAX
  • File is not exists
  • File is exists for edit

The sample e9580b6b13822090db018c320e80865f that was delivered to several Epic victims as an upgraded backdoor, has the compilation code page language set to "LANG_RUSSIAN".

The threat actor behind the "Epic" operation uses mainly hacked servers to host their proxies. The hacked servers are controlled through the use of a PHP webshell. This shell is password protected; the password is checked against an MD5 hash:

The MD5 "af3e8be26c63c4dd066935629cf9bac8" has been solved by Kaspersky Lab as the password "kenpachi". In February 2014 we observed the Miniduke threat actor using the same backdoor on their hacked servers, although using a much stronger password.

Once again, it is also interesting to point out the usage of Codepage 1251 in the webshell, which is used to render Cyrillic characters.

There appears to be several links between Turla and Miniduke, but we will leave that for a future blogpost.

Victim statistics

On some of the C&C servers used in the Epic attacks, we were able to identify detailed victim statistics, which were saved for debugging purposes by the attackers.

This is the country distribution for the top 20 affected countries by victim's IP:

According to the public information available for the victims' IPs, targets of "Epic" belong to the following categories:

  • Government
    •  Ministry of interior (EU country)
    •  Ministry of trade and commerce (EU country)
    •  Ministry of foreign/external affairs (Asian country, EU country)
    •  Intelligence (Middle East, EU Country)
  • Embassies
  • Military (EU country)
  • Education
  • Research (Middle East)
  • Pharmaceutical companies
  • Unknown (impossible to determine based on IP/existing data)

When G-Data published their Turla paper, there were few details publicly available on how victims get infected with this malware campaign. Our analysis indicates this is a sophisticated multi-stage infection; which begins with Epic Turla. This is used to gain a foothold and validate the high profile victim. If the victim is interesting, they get upgraded to the Turla Carbon system.

Most recently, we observed this attack against a Kaspersky Lab user on August 5, 2014, indicating the operation remains fresh and ongoing.

Note: A full analysis of the Epic attacks is available to the Kaspersky Intelligent Services customers. Contact:

We would like to add the following at the end of the blogpost, right before the detection names:

Further reading

If you'd like to read more about Turla/Uroburos, here's a few recommendations:

Kaspersky products' detection names for all the malware samples described in this post:

 Technical Appendix with IOCs

Android Backdoor disguised as a Kaspersky mobile security app

Wed, 08/06/2014 - 10:23

This week, our virus lab handled a case where a customer received a phishing email with an Android Backdoor archive masquerading as a Kaspersky mobile security app (we are aware that those who created this app are also disguising it as apps from other major AV brands).

It prompts recipients to install the fake Kaspersky Android app to protect their mobile security. From the context we can presume the intended targets are users in Poland.

Most email phishing attacks tend to target PC users, but this time the attackers have turned their attention to mobile platforms. We think it's a new trend in spreading virus. Mobile security is related to user privacy. In most cases, a mobile device is more important than PC for users. It contains user contacts, text messages, photos and call logs. And mobile security is generally considered to be a weak point. So, most people will believe these phishing emails and are likely to install the fake mobile security app.

In this case, the Android apk in the phishing email is a powerful and aggressive backdoor which is detected as Backdoor.AndroidOS.Zerat.a. The backdoor is full of malicious functions, but the GUI is a little simple and crude.

Maybe it only wants you to install it and click the button. By executing, it links to hxxp:// to register the victim device info.

Then it visits hxxp:// to get commands.

According to the commands, it will perform lots of malicious activities.

Some of the commands are shown below.
Getting location:


Intercepting text messages:

Browsing history:

Recording call:

Store and upload:

This is a new type of mobile security threat that works just like a phishing site or phishing SMS. With the phishing email, the backdoor will spread more easily. There is reason to believe that more increasingly complex mobile attacks with follow. Composite attacks on mobile platforms are simply a matter of time.

In this day and age it is very important to protect our privacy and device security. It's recommended to follow these tips:

  • Download a mobile security app from the official Kaspersky website.
  • Don't trust strange emails.
  • Don't just open and execute files in email attachments.

Android Worm on Chinese Valentine's day

Wed, 08/06/2014 - 07:30

On August 2, the Chinese Valentine's Day, an Android SMS worm struck China. It is called XXshenqi.apk. In the space of six hours, it infected about 500,000 devices. It has received widespread coverage in the local media. It's not just an SMS worm, containing two malicious modules: XXshenqi.apk and its asset Trogoogle.apk.

The function of XXshenqi.apk is to send SMS to spread itself and to drop another backdoor on the victim device. It is detected as Trojan.AndroidOS.Xshqi.a by Kaspersky Lab.

After installation, it sends an SMS to all the names on the victim's contact lists to get them to install the Trojan as well.

Then it probes whether or not is present on the mobile device. If not, it displays a dialog window to prompt the user to install Trogoogle.apk.

Trogoogle.apk is a resource file in the assets folder of XXshenqi.apk.

After that, it asks the user to register the app. The Trojan will steal the user's personal ID and name and send them to those controlling the malware.

Trogoogle.apk contains more malicious functions. It is a backdoor and detected as Backdoor.AndroidOS.Trogle.a by Kaspersky Lab. It hides its icon after installation so the user is unaware of its presence. It will then respond to commands to perform malicious activity. The commands include:


It also monitors the victim's text messages and sends them to the malware owner by email or SMS.

The fact that this Trojan combintion appeared on the Chinese Valentine's Day is premeditated, taking advantage of user credulity on this special day. And it uses social engineering techniques to spread as much as possible and infect more devices. This Trojan is a good example of why it's always worth thinking twice about trusting a link received on your mobile phone. No matter who sends it, it could still be a malicious program.

Obfuscated malicious office documents adopted by cybercriminals around the world

Wed, 08/06/2014 - 02:00

After going out of fashion for a number of years, malicious macros inside Office files have recently experienced a revival. And why not, especially if they are a lot cheaper than exploits and capable of doing the same job?

Yes, that's right, cybercriminals are busily recycling this old technique, introducing new obfuscation forms to make it more effective. Let's look at two examples.

Sample 1

This is an excel file with malicious embedded macros. However if you use standard Office tools to look at the macros, depending on the version, you will not see anything malicious at all or you won't be allowed to see the macros itself:

That is because the sample all strings in macros are obfuscated with a base64 encoding technique.

After de-obfuscation you can see clearly the URLs used to download the payloads:

This is a very simple technique but it is effective against simple heuristics that use string analysis of all incoming email attachments, and this is reflected in a very low VT detection

This particular sample is also interesting since in some Excel versions it is able to run macros automatically without prompting the user, enabling it. Once it has run, it drops a password-stealing Trojan directly onto the victim's system.

Sample 2

This another example is a fake Aeromexico ticket.

There is no obfuscation but the URL is written from right to left, which again it might be quite useful against simple GREP analysis techniques:

It is interesting to note that the first sample was found in the wild in Venezuela, the second in Mexico and then the third in Brazil:

This one drops a ChePro banker. All three malicious samples drop only Trojans that steal financial data, but the same technique can be easily used to drop any type of malware.

So does it mean that only Latin American cybercriminals use this technique? The answer is no, not really. Our relative user's infections statistics show that actually the countries with the most attempted infections using this kind of malware are Germany and then Poland.

However, the technique is seen elsewhere, including Spain, Mexico, Brazil and others.

While analyzing malicious macro office files, you can see that the original document is created by one user and then somebody else (another criminal) assists in embedding the malicious macros.

The same technique can be easily used to drop any kind of malware in any country since this is all about social engineering and it will easily pass through email gateway security because it is basically an office document, and security email policies allow those.

You may follow me on twitter: @dimitribest