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Home Depot Breached Via Vendor Credentials; 53 Million Email Addresses Also Stolen

Threatpost for B2B - Fri, 11/07/2014 - 07:03
Home Depot revealed that hackers used credentials stolen from a third-party vendor to steal 53 million email addresses in addition to 56 million payment card numbers.

iOS Trojan WireLurker: Statistics and New Information

Secure List feed for B2B - Fri, 11/07/2014 - 04:59

Recently, news appeared about an interesting attack where cybercriminals infect iPhones and Mac OSX users with a rather peculiar malware dubbed WireLurker. You can find a thorough paper from Palo Alto here. First of all, it's important to note that all Kaspersky Lab users are protected against this threat. The malicious files used by WireLurker are identified by our products with the following detection names:

  • Mac OS X:
    • Trojan-Downloader.OSX.WireLurker.a
    • Trojan-Downloader.OSX.WireLurker.b
    • Trojan.OSX.WireLurker.a
  • Apple iOS:
    • Trojan-Spy.IphoneOS.WireLurker.a
    • Trojan-Spy.IphoneOS.WireLurker.b
  • Windows:
    • Trojan.Win32.Wirelurker.a

Our sensors observed connections to the malicious C&C server located in Hong Kong in July, 2014. These continued throughout the following months, although the volume remains low.

Interestingly, discussions on various online forums about this subject appeared earlier this year, notably in Chinese and Korean, but also on some English resources:

On July 14th, someone named SirBlanton complained about it on a Chinese speaking BBS:

Translation:

The discussion above happened on "bbs.maiyadi.com", which is interesting, because another subdomain on "maiyadi.com" is used by the malware as a C&C (see below).

Even earlier, on May 29th, a discussion in Korea mentioned abnormal behavior of a Mac OS X infected by this threat:

Interestingly, Mac OS X and Apple iOS are not the only platforms through which these attacks were propagated. Yesterday, our friend Jaime Blasco from Alienvault discovered a Win32 malicious tool that appears to be related.

The WireLurker Windows module

File name: 万能视频播放器 2.21.exe md5: fb4756b924c5943cdb73f5aec0cb7b14

Win32 WireLurker module

The file appears to have been compiled in March 2014, assuming the timestamp is not altered:

Full metadata set:

Machine Type                    : Intel 386 or later, and compatibles Time Stamp                      : 2014:03:13 03:56:21-04:00 PE Type                         : PE32 Linker Version                  : 10.0 Code Size                       : 721920 Initialized Data Size           : 1364480 Uninitialized Data Size         : 0 Entry Point                     : 0xafb86 OS Version                      : 5.1 Image Version                   : 0.0 Subsystem Version               : 5.1 Subsystem                       : Windows GUI File Version Number             : 1.0.0.1 Product Version Number          : 1.0.0.1 File Flags Mask                 : 0x003f File Flags                      : (none) File OS                         : Windows NT 32-bit Object File Type                : Executable application File Subtype                    : 0 Language Code                   : Chinese (Simplified) Character Set                   : Unicode File Description                : 绿色IPA安装器 File Version                    : 1.0.0.1 Internal Name                   : 绿色IPA安装器.exe Original Filename               : 绿色IPA安装器.exe Product Name                    : 绿色IPA安装器 Product Version                 : 1.0.0.1

The internal file name is "绿色IPA安装器" which, when translated to English, means Green IPA installer. It supposed to be an application to install IPA files on iOS devices.

Interestingly, it contains a debug path which reveals information about the build:

 E:\lifei\libimobiledevice-win32-master_last\Release\appinstaller.pdb

The application contains two IPA (Apple application archives) inside, one called "AVPlayer" and one called "apps".
AVPlayer.app appears to be a legimitated iOS application that is used by the attackers as a decoy.

The image (icon) of the app can be seen below:

The "legit" application appears to have been authored by a popular developer going by the handle "teiron@25pp.com".

The second IPA is more interesting. It appears to have been created in March 2014. "apps" communicates with the wellknown "comeinbaby[.]com": The sfbase.dylib part communicates with a different C&C: To summarize, the Win32 application described here allows the installation of the mentioned iOS payload to the victim's iPhone. The creator likely developed it just to make sure Windows users can also get infected on their iOS devices.

KSN Detections

Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) is a complex distributed infrastructure dedicated to processing cybersecurity-related data streams from millions of voluntary participants around the world. It delivers Kaspersky Lab's security intelligence to every partner or customer who is connected to the Internet, ensuring the quickest reaction times, lowest false positive rate and maintaining the highest level of protection. A detailed description of KSN can be found here. The following chart below shows detections of WireLurker on OSX:

Over 60% of the detections are coming from China, which is to be expected.

Conclusions

This incident is yet another reminder of why the use of pirated software remains dangerous, no matter which platform you're using. Downloading applications from unofficial sources, such as alternative marketplaces, file sharing websites or torrents and other P2P file sharing networks, increases the risk of malware infections. On Mac OS X for instance, it is one of the main infection vectors.

The need for anti-malware protection on Mac OS X devices cannot be overstated. It's not only that your Mac OS X machine can get infected, but WireLurker showed us how the infection can move from your Mac to your iPhone. The good news is: there are plenty of options to chose from out there, including our own Kaspersky Internet Security for Mac.

As a first line of defense, Mac OS X users should check their Security & Privacy settings to make sure the configuration of their system is optimal. We recommend setting up Gatekeeper so that only applications downloaded from the Mac App Store and identified developers are allowed to be installed. More information on Gatekeeper can be found here.

Make sure to also check out our own guide for Mac security: 10 Simple Tips for Boosting The Security Of Your Mac

This should also be a wake-up call for Apple users and the way they think about security. Just like Mac OS X malware quickly evolved from being just a myth to becoming a sad reality, we are seeing iOS being targeted more and more often lately - with nobody being able to offer protection for this platform. Anti-malware vendors are still not allowed to develop protection for iPhone users.

In the light of recent events, will this strategy change in the future?

Indicators of compromise:

C&Cs:
app.maiyadi[.]com
comeinbaby[.]com
61.147.80.73
124.248.245.78

MD5s:
3fa4e5fec53dfc9fc88ced651aa858c6
5b43df4fac4cac52412126a6c604853c
88025c70d8d9cd14c00a66d3f3e07a84
9037cf29ed485dae11e22955724a00e7
a3ce6c8166eec5ae8ea059a7d49b5669
aa6fe189baa355a65e6aafac1e765f41
bc3aa0142fb15ea65de7833d65a70e36
c4264b9607a68de8b9bbbe30436f5f28
c6d95a37ba39c0fa6688d12b4260ee7d
c9841e34da270d94b35ae3f724160d5e
dca13b4ff64bcd6876c13bbb4a22f450
e03402006332a6e17c36e569178d2097
fb4756b924c5943cdb73f5aec0cb7b14

Security Holes in Corporate Networks: Network Vulnerabilities

Secure List feed for B2B - Fri, 11/07/2014 - 03:52

In our previous blogpost, we told you about the types of attacks that a cybercriminal can undertake while working with a regular user account without local administrator privileges. In particular, we presented an example of how the simplified inheritance of privileges within the context of domain authorization (Single-Sign-On) enables cybercriminals to gain access to various network resources and services while using the limited access allowed by a regular user account. In this blogpost, we will review in detail the possible vectors for an attack launched on a corporate network from an infected computer within it.

Once a cybercriminal has gained control over a user system in a corporate network, subsequent events form three consecutive stages: establishing a foothold in the system, analyzing the environment, and propagating malware. Each of these stages can be implemented in various ways, distinguished by the technical methods, strategies and tactics employed. The flow chart below shows the cybercriminal's possible approaches to establishing a foothold in the system, analyzing the environment, and propagating malware across the corporate network.

A flow chart of a cybercriminal's actions

It is important for information security specialists to recognize the distinctive signs of different types of attack. Using this proposed "action plan", information security specialists can detect an attack by matching events occurring in the network to various templates of cybercriminal activity.

Gaining a Foothold in the System

After penetrating a corporate network, attackers typically download utilities (including malware) to the victim computer within a few hours or minutes. These utilities are required to collect information about the system and its installed software, search for files and data, establish a connection to the C&C, steal login credentials, brute-force passwords, hack accounts, escalate privileges, infect a system, intercept network traffic, scan network devices etc.

To hide these essential tools from network administrators during the download process and avoid triggering any security system that might be in place, attackers use different maneuvers of varying degrees of complexity:

  • Files are transferred via network protocols and general-purpose ports (HTTP, FTP, HTTPS, SFTP) so they get lost in the huge amounts of daily user-generated traffic.
  • Files are downloaded from compromised servers, using Fast Flux networks or via Tor.
  • Files are transmitted in parts, in obfuscated and/or encrypted form.
  • Various types of steganography are sometimes used to transfer data, such as masking data within audio/video files, images or headers of internet protocols, especially when general-purpose ports are closed by a firewall.

When the required tools have been loaded, the cybercriminal attempts to gain access to the local administrator's or system account. The first attempt normally uses keyloggers, attempts to brute-force passwords and hack accounts, or phishing scams. Further approaches involve exploiting vulnerabilities in system services, typically to gain access to the system account (i.e. to escalate to kernel-level privileges).

Having obtained these privileges, cybercriminals can entrench themselves in the system by implanting a rootkit or bootkit in the operating system. They can also clean the system from traces of penetration, hiding their tools and traces of active infections from security tools. If the attackers failed to gain a foothold in the system in the regular way, they can set up an automatic infection of the system, e.g. by using the regular task scheduler.

Naturally, there are many ways of establishing a foothold, and scenarios may differ dramatically from the above description. However, as we said at the beginning of this article, it is important that an information security specialist understands the principles of how an attack is conducted, and realizes the tasks that cybercriminals face. Thus, at the foothold stage, the attacker's main task to arrange for reliable, lasting access to the system under attack. In general, the task of arranging remote access has two parts: establishing a data communication channel and implanting a remote control tool (backdoor).

Depending on the network configuration, firewall policies and IDS/IPS settings, attackers might use direct or reverse connection. Direct connection involves the attackers establishing a connection to the victim system, and is possible only if the system has an external IP-address and open network ports that are not blocked from outside connections by a firewall. Otherwise, reverse connection is used, when the attacked system establishes a connection to the remote server. Regardless of the connection type, data is communicated using the same methods that are used to download utilities and malware to the victim computer: data is transferred in encrypted / obfuscated format via general-purpose protocols / ports, using Fast Flux or Tor. In addition, cybercriminals can also use regular user software and services as a data communication channel, such as cloud-based file storages, e-mail, IM clients etc.

Environment analysis

At the same time as establishing a foothold – or sometimes even before – cybercriminals need to collect information about the operating system and its configuration, updates installed for software, and security tools. That information is needed to evaluate the situation on the victim computer and plan further attack activities. It is also very useful when accurately selecting the most effective utilities and exploits.

The following readily available tools are usually sufficient to collect information about the system:

  • cmd, regedit, vbs, powershell in Windows,
  • bash, grep, python, perl in Unix/Linux and Mac OS.

From the attacker's viewpoint, there are many advantages to using the above tools: they are available in any system, they are useable even with restricted user rights, and their operation is not controlled by most security tools. To tackle more complicated tasks cybercriminals use both popular and customized tools to intercept network traffic, scan network devices, connect to various network services using domain authentication etc. If the hacker's tools are written, say, in Python, the cybercriminals will certainly install the required software on the infected computer. In this case, Python (or other required software) probably will not be concealed in the system using a rootkit, as that may prevent the interpreter from working properly.

To search for and analyze other devices in the corporate network, cybercriminals apply passive and active scanning methods. In particular, using a sniffer to listen to traffic from a local network interface, anyone can easily detect various devices thanks to ARP packets or active connections, determine the URLS of servers hosting corporate applications such as Active Directory, Outlook, databases, corporate websites etc. To obtain detailed information about a specific network node, cybercriminals use network scanners (e.g. nmap) to determine available network services, guess names and versions of installed software, and detect the presence of a firewall and IDS/IPS.

Distribution

Now the attackers have a foothold in the system, have a reliable remote access channel and have sufficient information about the network. The next actions usually pursue the primary objective. That may be stealing confidential information, attacks on corporate infrastructure, gaining control over critical systems for blackmail purposes, or other personal purposes. Unless the initially attacked system is the ultimate target (that can be e.g. a CEO's laptop, a central server or a website), the attacker needs to gain control over other systems within the corporate network. Depending on the nature of the target, infection may be pinpointed or broad scale.

For example, if the attackers plan to launch an infrastructure attack, they will probably need massive infections of the servers running various business processes and the workstations of operators and administrators. On the other hand, a cybercriminal aiming to steal confidential information or conduct espionage will have to act very carefully and attack only the top priority systems.

There are a number of ways of propagating malware within a corporate network. Cybercriminals normally go for the simplest approach, such as using existing accounts. For example, by launching malicious code from under a domain account belonging to a user of an infected system, the cybercriminal can freely connect to various network services (to which the user has access) using domain authorization (Single Sign-On), i.e. without entering the login credentials. On the other hand, the cybercriminal can use a keylogger and easily get hold of the login credentials to the domain account as well as other services that do not maintain domain authorization. I addition, the cybercriminal may attempt to take advantage of vulnerabilities in the mechanisms for storing and checking credentials, or simply brute-force the password.

The most effective propagation path within corporate networks is to exploit vulnerabilities, since most corporate network security focuses on preventing attacks from outside the perimeter. Consequently, there are a multitude of varied vulnerabilities within the network, including unsecured corporate servers, test servers, management/virtualization systems etc. Practice shows that even if information security specialists and IT engineers are aware of all the vulnerabilities existing in their corporate network(s), it takes them years to fix them because it requires a lot of manpower. Nevertheless, experienced hackers are cautious about using exploits to known vulnerabilities and prefer to attack unsecured corporate services. If a local or network-based IDS/IPS is still used in the network, using exploits to known vulnerabilities may unmask the cybercriminals.

Detecting an Attack

At each stage of the attack, cybercriminals often use the environment and the available tools for their own purposes, remaining inconspicuous against the backdrop of regular users' activities. To address this problem, it is important wherever possible to reduce redundancy in the environment and the business processes; in all other cases, it is vital to monitor what's happening, identify anomalies and react to them.

A vivid example of the problem of redundancy in business processes is the free access to business assets (confidential documents, critical applications, hardware etc.), local administrator privileges, and the capability of remote connection to the corporate network for staff who do not need this level of access and privilege. This applies to the control of access rights at the domain level as well as at the level of application software: browsers do not typically need access to other processes' memory, while Microsoft Office does not need to install drivers.

For an example of environment redundancy, we can think of a regular corporate employee (not a developer, tester, administrator or information security specialist) whose desktop has software designed for network traffic interception, scanning the network, remote access, creation of local HTTP/FTP servers, use of third-party network hardware (Wi-Fi and/or 3G modems), software development tools etc.

Any effective strategy to prevent attacks from within the corporate network must prevent cybercriminals from acting secretly, and force them to take complicated and risky steps that betray their plans to information security specialists who can neutralize the threat. For that, two things must be present in the corporate network: smart security and an information security management system.

If you marry these two technologies you create a fundamentally different animal from the established information security model. It can see everything that takes place in the system and immediately reacts to threats.

Smart security tools include some antiviruses, firewalls, IDS/IPS/HIPS, Application Control, Device Control - however they must be capable of interacting with the information security management system. These security tools should not only collect all types of information and send it to the information security management system, but also execute commands that block attempts to gain access, establish connections, transfer data via the network, launch applications, read and write files etc. Naturally, for all of this to work, an information security specialist must be able to differentiate between legitimate and malicious activity.

DigiCert Considering Certs for Hidden Services Beyond Facebook

Threatpost for B2B - Thu, 11/06/2014 - 15:05
DigiCert explains why it issued a signed certificate to Facebook's .Onion Tor domain, noting it may offer more hidden services certs in the future.

Microsoft Ready with 16 Patch Tuesday Bulletins; 5 Critical

Threatpost for B2B - Thu, 11/06/2014 - 14:34
Microsoft is expected to release 16 bulletins next week, including five rated critical, as part of its November 2014 Patch Tuesday updates.

WireLurker Mac OS X Malware Shut Down

Threatpost for B2B - Thu, 11/06/2014 - 12:13
Researchers at Palo Alto Networks discovered a new family of Mac OS X malware that was capable of also infecting iOS devices. The command infrastructure supporting WireLurker has been shut down.

ekoParty Security Conference

Secure List feed for B2B - Thu, 11/06/2014 - 09:37

The ten year anniversary edition of the Electronic KnockOut Party, held annually in Buenos Aires, Argentina, was certainly special! Over the years, ekoParty has become a standard for other conferences in Latin America, bringing together researchers from all over the world for nearly a full week packed with trainings, workshops, and ground breaking talks about different aspects of the field of information security.

Ten year anniversary, epic uptime!

This year, the conference changed venues from the previously known 'Ciudad Cultural Konex' in favor of a much bigger space near the airport, the 'Aeroparque Jorge Newbery'. The loud engines from passing planes could not stop the speakers from sharing their knowledge with the audience. Organizers were prepared for this and outfitted the main stage with airport-themed decorations. Even the badges resembled boarding passes, making the most of the new venue's quirks and leaving nothing to chance.

What differentiates ekoParty from other conferences is the passion exhibited by everyone in attendance. Thanks in part to the Latin American way of doing things, ekoParty is proud of not taking itself too serious and encourages its attendees to behave the same way. A loud siren blares when it's time for the speaker to take a drink and loosen up a bit mid-talk. Rushing forward with a shot of vodka, the conference staff is alert and engaging, making sure that both speaker and audience are having fun.

The main stage, where speakers from all around the world shared their latest research.

During the first day, we were welcomed by an interesting discussion panel and a wide array of workshops to choose from. In addition, several corporate sponsors gave away free trainings to showcase some of their latest tools and also administered challenges for the duration of the conference. With tempting cash prizes and fancy gadgets on the line, some participants chose to forego the talks altogether in order to test their skills in areas such as reverse engineering, penetration testing, and networking.

By the time the talks began on the second day, the tone of the conference was set by Cesar Cerrudo who presented on how to hack traffic control systems. Using 'Live Free or Die Hard' references to engage the audience proved successful and Hollywood-worthy research was presented in a compelling and understandable way. As the day went on, attendees could choose to participate in one of the workshops (as I did with Juliano Rizzo's bitcoin security training) or keep attending assorted talks. Among the topics covered were "Exploring the Jolla Phone", "Cooking an APT the paranoid way" or even browser exploitation techniques with Alex Rad's presentation "Pointer Subterfuge in the Browser Address Space".

There were just too many topics and talks to cover all in detail but a common thread emerges. Speakers not only share their knowledge but also ask the community to join them in their research to create something useful for all parties involved. This was the case with Anibal Sacco's "IDA Synergy – Collaborative Reverse Engineering", which showed a combination of IDAPython Plugin and control version system that resulted in a new reverse engineering collaborative add-on for IDA Pro.

Though a lot of talks focused on exploiting different technologies (as in the case of Luis Colunga's presentation on Software Defined Radio), other presentations could be easily mistaken for university courses. This was the case with Alfredo Ortega's "Deep-submicron backdoors" which led the audience from concepts like Fourier transformations to CPU low-level backdoors. With a touch of 3D modeling and some lines of code in the right place, Ortega demonstrated that building a backdoored ARM CPU isn't as hard as it might seem.

The final day of the conference started early with discussions about the current state of privacy and a historical perspective on the many state-backed surveillance programs of recent years.  Just before lunch we had a great presentation by Marcio Almeida Macedo on 'Hacking RFID Billing Schemes for fun and free rides', mentioning our recent blogpost on the topic, specifically referring to vulnerabilities in the Chilean transportation system. All researchers went above and beyond to show the hardware and principles involved in their investigations, always enticing the audience to follow in their footsteps.

Malware made its appearance with Thiago Bordini who shared techniques for 'Monitoring Malicious Domains on the Internet in real time for forensic purposes'. Brazilians presenters were, of course, forced to withstand chanting and taunting from Argentinians in the crowd pleased by World Cup results. That's to be expected. The day ended with bells and whistles as Rahul Sasi presented his sequel presentation on hacking TV networks, an investigation that stemmed from a penetration testing job that ended with him finding ways to inject video signals in TV networks and even shutting down the receiver's box remotely.

A nice attendance for this edition of ekoParty Security Conference.

An emotive award's ceremony brought the event to a close by recognizing local talent and remembering Barnaby Jack's appearance years ago. The ekoParty left everyone wanting more and eager to attend the following year. ekoParty is one of those conferences were attendees get back what they put in -they can choose to just enjoy the talks or instead get involved in the many challenges, workshops, and networking activities offered. Until next year, I encourage you to check out the content covered during the conference and hope to see you there!

Chertoff Reminds Enterprises There is Hope in Security

Threatpost for B2B - Thu, 11/06/2014 - 09:00
Former DHS secretary Michael Chertoff laid out a game plan for enterprise network security, one heavy on risk management and prioritization in the context of current threats and vulnerabilities, and potential consequences.

Hack In The Box 2014 KUL

Secure List feed for B2B - Thu, 11/06/2014 - 07:19

The Hack In The Box (HITB) SecConf 2014 was held from the 13 to the 16 of October, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. More than 500 people from around the world participated in the event. Unfortunately, 2014 was the final round of this nice event.

The event is made up of four main elements: Technical training sessions, a security conference, Capture the Flag 'Live Hacking' Attack & Defense Competition, Developer Hackathon (HackWEEKDAY) and A CommSec Village & Technology Showcase Area.

Although there were many interesting presentations at the conference, I have too little space here to introduce all of them, so let's take a look of three of them.

Filippo Valsorda gave a presentation entitled "Exploiting ECDSA Failures in the Bitcoin Blockchain". Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is an EC-based signature scheme as implemented in TLS, DNSsec and PS3. He pointed out that ECDSA might not be as secure as it is believed to be.

Haroon Meer, Marco Slaviero and Azhar Desai picked up the topic of "sockpuppet"- a false online identity adopted for deceptive purposes – in their presentation. They demonstrated mass-posting, mass-voting and mass-down-voting at some forums, with the help of only one line of bash script. The presentation was entitled "Weapons of Mass Distraction: Sock Puppetry for Fun & Profit".

Mike Ryan's "The NSA Playset: Bluetooth Smart Attack Tools" presentation introduced a series of tools used by the NSA and demonstrated keyboard hijacking via Bluetooth using some of the tools.

For those who are interested, the presentation materials are available at the official web site of HITB2014.

The CTF session was also quite interesting. Let's take a look at Challenge 2.

As a problem to solve, a pcap file was provided. It was a capture of some network traffic.

Inspecting the file, you could find that ICMPv6 packets contain unknown strings that start with "G01". In fact, the strings are G-codes, computer numerical control commands (for industrial hardware, 3D printers, etc.). If is it run using emulator software, a string is displayed – this is the answer to the problem.

In my opinion, CTF is a good exercise for IT engineers, because it gives the chance to learn technologies that are not familiar to you.

In the closing session, the event organizers announced the end of HITB KUL and the beginning of a new event "HITB GSEC". This is planned to take place in Singapore in October 2015.

I hope the new HITB GSEC will be as fantastic as HITB KUL and I'm looking forward to meeting great security specialists there again!!

Be Ready: Next Internet Bug Won’t Be The Last

Threatpost for B2B - Wed, 11/05/2014 - 15:12
Panelists at the Advanced Cyber Security Center annual conference discuss how readiness for the next Internet-scale bug is no longer a luxury.

Samsung Fires Back at NIST, Says Find My Mobile Service Safe

Threatpost for B2B - Wed, 11/05/2014 - 14:00
Samsung this week fired back at NIST who warned last month that the company's Find My Mobile service could be exploited.

Government Requests for Facebook User Data Increasing

Threatpost for B2B - Wed, 11/05/2014 - 13:16
Facebook’s latest transparency report shows that U.S law enforcement agencies requested more user information from the social network in the first six months of this year than ever before.

NSA Director Says Agency Shares Vast Majority of Bugs it Finds

Threatpost for B2B - Wed, 11/05/2014 - 11:01
When the National Security Agency discovers a new vulnerability that looks like it might be of use in penetrating target networks, the agency considers a number of factors, including how popular the affected software is and where it’s typically deployed, before deciding whether to share the new bug. The agency shares most of the bugs […]

New Variant of Backoff Malware Tougher to Detect

Threatpost for B2B - Tue, 11/04/2014 - 16:15
The new Backoff variant ROM has tweaks that help the malware better evade detection and hinder the analysis process.

AirHopper Program Decodes Radio Signals to Steal from Air-Gapped Computers

Threatpost for B2B - Tue, 11/04/2014 - 13:51
Researchers have developed malware called AirHopper that decodes radio frequencies emitted from a computer monitor, video card or cable, in order to steal data from an air-gapped machine.

Hacking Team Defends Spyware, Attacks Researchers’ Methods

Threatpost for B2B - Tue, 11/04/2014 - 13:30
Hacking Team joins the choir of critics, including GCHQ and the FBI, rallying against anti-surveillance and privacy advocates, who, they say, aid criminals and terrorists.

Linksys Patches (Most) Routers Running SMART Wi-Fi Firmware

Threatpost for B2B - Tue, 11/04/2014 - 10:53
Linksys released updates for routers running its SMART Wi-Fi firmware, patching vulnerabilities leading to credential theft and information disclosure. Two popular models, however, remain unpatched.

Google Releases Nogotofail Tool to Test Network Security

Threatpost for B2B - Tue, 11/04/2014 - 10:02
The last year has produced a rogues’ gallery of vulnerabilities in transport layer security implementations and new attacks on the key protocols, from Heartbleed to the Apple gotofail flaw to the recent POODLE attack. To help developers and security researchers identify applications that are vulnerable to known SSL/TLS attacks and configuration problems, Google is releasing a […]
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