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VMware Patches XSS, Certificate Validation Issues

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 12/08/2014 - 15:08
VMware released patches late last week to fix several vulnerabilities, including a cross-site scripting issue, in one of its server virtualization platforms.

FISC Approves 90-Day Extension of Section 215 Surveillance Authority

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 12/08/2014 - 14:44
The secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has authorized a 90-day extension to the Section 215 bulk telephone collection program used by the National Security Agency, giving the agency through the end of February to run the program in the absence of legislation establishing a new authority.

The 'Penquin' Turla

Secure List feed for B2B - Mon, 12/08/2014 - 14:05

Recently, an interesting malicious sample was uploaded to a multi-scanner service. This immediately triggered our interest because it appears to represent a previously unknown piece of a larger puzzle. That puzzle is "Turla", one of the most complex APTs in the world.

We have written previously about the Turla APT with posts about their Epic Turla operations  and Agent.btz inspiration.

So far, every single Turla sample we've encountered was designed for the Microsoft Windows family, 32 and 64 bit operating systems. The newly discovered Turla sample is unusual in the fact that it's the first Turla sample targeting the Linux operating system that we have discovered.

This newly found Turla component supports Linux for broader system support at victim sites. The attack tool takes us further into the set alongside the Snake rootkit and components first associated with this actor a couple years ago. We suspect that this component was running for years at a victim site, but do not have concrete data to support that statement just yet.

The Linux Turla module is a C/C++ executable statically linked against multiple libraries, greatly increasing its file size. It was stripped of symbol information, more likely intended to increase analysis effort than to decrease file size. Its functionality includes hidden network communications, arbitrary remote command execution, and remote management. Much of its code is based on public sources.

Md5 Size Verdict Name 0994d9deb50352e76b0322f48ee576c6 627.2 kb N/A (broken file) 14ecd5e6fc8e501037b54ca263896a11 637.6 kb HEUR:Backdoor.Linux.Turla.gen

General executable characteristics:

ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, for GNU/Linux 2.2.5, stripped

Statically linked libraries:

  • glibc2.3.2 - the GNU C library
  • openssl v0.9.6 - an older OpenSSL library
  • libpcap - tcpdump's network capture library

Hardcoded C&C, known Turla activity: news-bbc.podzone[.]org
The domain has the following pDNS IP: aut-num:        AS30982 announcement: as-name:        CAFENET descr:          CAFE Informatique et telecommunications admin-c:        YN2-AFRINIC tech-c:         AN39-AFRINIC org:            ORG-CIet1-AFRINIC mnt-by:         AFRINIC-HM-MNT mnt-lower:      CAFENET-NOC source:         AFRINIC # Filtered

Note: the C&C domain is currently sinkholed by Kaspersky Lab.

Functional description

The sample is a stealth backdoor based on the cd00r sources.

This Turla cd00r-based malware maintains stealth without requiring elevated privileges while running arbitrary remote commands. It can't be discovered via netstat, a commonly used administrative tool. It uses techniques that don't require root access, which allows it to be more freely run on more victim hosts. Even if a regular user with limited privileges launches it, it can continue to intercept incoming packets and run incoming commands on the system.

Startup and Execution

To start execution, the process requires two parameters: ID (a numeric value used as a part of the "magic packet for authentication") and an existing network interface name. The parameters can be inputted two different ways: from STDIN, or from dropper a launching the sample. This is NOT a command-line parameter, it's a real prompt asking the attacker user to provide the input parameters. After the ID and interface name are entered and the process launched, the backdoor's process PID is returned. Here is a screenshot of this simple interface:

While there is no initial network callback, a section of code maintains a hardcoded c2 string "news-bbc.podzone[.]org". This fully qualified domain name was first set up in 2010, suggesting that this binary is fairly recent in the string of Turla campaigns. Also, while we haven't seen additional file download activity from this server by this tool, it likely participated as a file server of sorts.

Magic Packets for Remote Command Execution

The module statically links PCAP libraries, and uses this code to get a raw socket, applies a filter on it, and captures packets, checking for a specific condition (the *original cd00r first used this method, based on ports and SYN-packets). This condition is expressed here (it is based on the ID value input at startup by the attacker):

ID = 123 Filter = (tcp[8:4] & 0xe007ffff = 0xe003bebe) or (udp[12:4] & 0xe007ffff = 0xe003bebe) ID = 321 Filter = (tcp[8:4] & 0xe007ffff = 0x1bebe) or (udp[12:4] & 0xe007ffff = 0x1bebe)

In simple terms, it checks for an ACK number in the TCP header, or the second byte from the UDP packet body.

If such a packet is received and the condition check is successful, execution jumps to the packet payload contents, and it creates a regular socket. The backdoor handles this socket as a file with read/write operations. It's not the typical recv/send used in this code. It uses this new socket to connect to the source address of the "magic packets". Then it reports its own PID and IP to the remote address, and starts an endless loop for receiving remote commands. When a command arrives, it is executed with a "/bin/sh -c " script.

Further analysis of the sample's functionality will be updated here.


Although Linux variants from the Turla framework were known to exist, we haven't seen any in the wild yet.

This specific module appears to have been put together from public sources with some added functionality from the attackers. Some of the malicious code appears to be inactive, perhaps leftovers from older versions of the implant. Perhaps the most interesting part here is the unusual command and control mechanism based on TCP/UDP packets, as well as the C&C hostname which fits previously known Turla activity.

The discovery of this Turla module rises one big question: how many other unknown Turla variants exist?

Update: Since the publishing of this blogpost, we have discovered another Linux Turla module, which apparently represents a different malware generation than the previously known samples:

The new sample was heuristically detected by our product due to similarities with the previously discovered samples.

Md5 Size Verdict Name 19fbd8cbfb12482e8020a887d6427315 801,561 bytes HEUR:Backdoor.Linux.Turla.gen Related research:

Several Vulnerabilities Found in Google App Engine

Threatpost for B2B - Mon, 12/08/2014 - 10:41
A group of security researchers in Poland say they have discovered a long list of vulnerabilities in the Google App Engine, some of which enable an attacker to escape the Java sandbox.

Kaspersky Security Bulletin 2014. Overall statistics for 2014

Secure List feed for B2B - Mon, 12/08/2014 - 04:00

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  1. Predictions 2015
  2. Overall statistics for 2014
  3. Malware Evolution
  4. A Look into the APT Crystal Ball

All statistics used in this report were obtained using Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) a distributed antivirus network based on the work of various components of Kaspersky Lab's anti-malware protection. The data was collected from KSN users who agreed to transfer it. Millions of Kaspersky Lab products users from 213 countries and territories worldwide participate in the global exchange of information about malicious activity.

The data presented covers the period from November 2013 to October 2014.

The year in figures
  • According to KSN data, Kaspersky Lab products detected and neutralized a total of 6,167,233,068 threats during the reported period.
  • A total of 3,693,936 attempts to infect Mac OS X- based computers were blocked by Kaspersky Lab products.
  • Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked 1,363,549 attacks on Android-based devices.
  • Kaspersky Lab solutions repelled 1,432,660,467 attacks launched from online resources located all over the world.
  • To carry out their attacks, cybercriminals used 9,766,119 unique hosts.
  • 44% of web attacks neutralized by Kaspersky Lab products were carried out using malicious web resources located in the US and Germany.
  • 38% of user computers were subjected to at least one web attack over the year.
  • A total of 1,910,520 attempts to launch banking malware on user computers were neutralized in 2014.
  • Kaspersky Lab's web antivirus detected 123,054,503 unique malicious objects: scripts, exploits, executable files, etc.
  • Kaspersky Lab's antivirus solutions detected a total of 1,849,949 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.
Mobile threats

During the reporting period Kaspersky Lab detected the following:

  • 4,643,582 malicious installation packets
  • 295,539 new malicious mobile programs
  • 12,100 mobile banking Trojans

Overall from the beginning of November 2013 to the end of October 2014 Kaspersky Lab warded off 1,363,549 unique attacks.  For the same period in 2012-2013 the figure was 335,000 unique attacks.  There were four times as many attacks on Android devices compared with the previous 12 months.

19% of Android users encountered a mobile threat at least once during the year - nearly one in five users.

53% of Android-attacks used mobile Trojans designed to steal the user's money (SMS Trojans and banking Trojans).

Geography of mobile threats

Attacks by malicious mobile software were recorded in more than 200 countries.

Percentage from total number of attacked users

TOP 10 countries by number of attacked users

  Country %  of attacked users* 1 Russia 45.7% 2 India 6.8% 3 Kazakhstan 4.1% 4 Germany 4.0% 5 Ukraine 3.0% 6 Vietnam 2.7% 7 Iran 2.3% 8 UK 2.2% 9 Malaysia 1.8% 10 Brazil 1.6%

*percentage of attacked users in the country from total number of attacked users

Russia maintained its leading position in terms of the number of users attacked.

The number of recorded attacks greatly depends on the number of users in a country.  To evaluate the danger of infection by mobile malware in various countries we counted the percentage of malicious applications among the total number applications that users tried to install.  This method produced very different results from those shown above.

TOP 10 countries by risk of infection

  Country* % of malicious applications 1 Vietnam 2.34% 2 Poland 1.88% 3 Greece 1.70% 4 Kazakhstan 1.62% 5 Uzbekistan 1.29% 6 Serbia 1.23% 7 Armenia 1.21% 8 Czech Republic 1.02% 9 Morocco 0.97% 10 Malaysia 0.93%

* Countries where the number of downloaded applications was less than 100,000 were excluded from these results

Vietnam leads this rating: 2.34% of all applications that users tried to download were malicious.

Russia, which suffered by far the most attacks, was only 22nd in terms of risk of infection with 0.69%.

In Spain the risk of infection was 0.54%, in Germany 0.18% and in the UK 0.16%, in Italy 0.09% and in the USA 0.07%.  The situation is best of all in Japan, where only 0.01% of all applications that users tried to install proved to be malicious.

TOP 20 mobile threats of 2014   Name % of attacks 1 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Stealer.a 18.0% 2 RiskTool.AndroidOS.MimobSMS.a 7.1% 3 DangerousObject.Multi.Generic 6.9% 4 RiskTool.AndroidOS.SMSreg.gc 6.7% 5 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.bo 6.4% 6 AdWare.AndroidOS.Viser.a 5.9% 7 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a 5.4% 8 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a 5.1% 9 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.fb 4.6% 10 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Erop.a 4.0% 11 AdWare.AndroidOS.Ganlet.a 3.8% 12 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.u 3.4% 13 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.ff 3.0% 14 RiskTool.AndroidOS.Mobogen.a 3.0% 15 RiskTool.AndroidOS.CallPay.a 2.9% 16 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao 2.5% 17 Exploit.AndroidOS.Lotoor.be 2.5% 18 Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.ei 2.4% 19 Backdoor.AndroidOS.Fobus.a 1.9% 20 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken.a 1.7%

10 out of the 20 programs in this rating are SMS Trojans from the following families: Stealer, OpFake, FakeInst, Agent and Erop.

Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Stealer.a were among the most widespread families throughout the year and finished up on top of the annual ranking by a considerable margin.

This SMS Trojan spread very actively.  After May 2014 the number of Stealer attacks matched the total number of attacks involving all other SMS Trojans.

The number of users attacked with Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Stealer.a and all other SMS Trojans (November 2013 - October 2014)

Reduction in attacks by SMS Trojans

As before, SMS Trojans are the single biggest component in the flow of mobile malware; in our figures they have 23.9% of the total.

Distribution of mobile threats by type (Kaspersky Lab collection)

However, as the above diagram shows, in the second half of 2014 there were fewer attacks with SMS Trojans.  As a result for the year their amount reduced by 12.3%.

Let's look in a bit more detail at the change in distribution of the SMS Trojans that are most popular with cybercriminals (other than Stealer.a).

Number of users attacked by popular SMS Trojans (November 2013 — October 2014)

May saw a sharp fall in the number of SMS Trojans detected in Russia, where attacks with the use of SMS Trojans are particularly widespread. The fall was caused by a change in the way paid messages work in Russia.  In May 2014 mobile operators in Russia were forced to use an Advice of Charge (AoC) mechanism. Now when a mobile device sends a message to a paid number the operator must inform the device owner of the cost of the service and get confirmation of the payment.

As a result, SMS Trojans are less profitable and their criminal nature is clearly exposed.  Now the only way to make a profit is to use Trojans that can send an SMS to a premium rate number and then intercept the operator's request and return a confirmation on behalf of the user.

As a result partners in several semi-legal programs, which had earlier distributed applications with SMS Trojan functionality, left this business.  Their operating model had been based on badly explained conditions for the provision of paid services, or subscription and service charges that were simply not indicated.

We can assume that Russian creators of SMS Trojans who found themselves out of work will have to look for new projects.  Some of them might switch to attacking users in other countries and some to working on more serious malware such as banking programs.  Hopefully at least some of them will turn their backs on the underworld and will put their skills to lawful use.

The changes in distribution patterns are clearly visible with once-popular SMS trojans like OpFake.bo, FakeInst.a and OpFake.a.  They used to be seen in 10-20,000 attacks a month; now the numbers are 1-2,000.

Mobile banking Trojans

During the period in question we detected 12,100 mobile banking Trojans — nine times as many as than in 2013.

Number of mobile banking Trojans in the Kaspersky Lab collection (November 2013 — October 2014)

45,032 users were attacked with mobile banking Trojans at least once in the course of the year.

And the number of countries under attack is growing: at least one attack using a mobile banking Trojan was recorded in 90 different countries worldwide.

Geography of mobile banking threats (number of attacked users in the period November 2013 — October 2014)

TOP 10 countries for banking Trojan attacks

  Country Number of attacked users % of all attacks* 1 Russia 39,561 87.85% 2 Kazakhstan 1,195 2.65% 3 Ukraine 902 2.00% 4 USA 831 1.85% 5 Belorus 567 1.26% 6 Germany 203 0.45% 7 Lithuania 201 0.45% 8 Azeraijan 194 0.43% 9 Bulgaria 178 0.40% 10 Uzbekistan 125 0.28%

* Percentage of attacked users in each country from the total all attacked users

Russia has retained its place as the leader in this rating.

Threats designed for Mac OS X

In 2014 Kaspersky Lab security products designed to protect Mac OS X-based computers blocked 3,693,936 infection attempts.

Kaspersky Lab experts detected 1,499 new malicious programs for Mac OS X, 200 samples more than in the previous year.

Every second user of Kaspersky Lab products was exposed to a malicious attack.

An average Mac user encountered 9 threats during the year.

TOP 20 threats designed for Mac OS X   Name % of attacks* 1 AdWare.OSX.Geonei.b 9.04% 2 Trojan.Script.Generic 5.85% 3 Trojan.OSX.Vsrch.a 4.42% 4 Trojan.Script.Iframer 3.77% 5 AdWare.OSX.Geonei.d 3.43% 6 DangerousObject.Multi.Generic 2.40% 7 AdWare.OSX.Vsrch.a 2.18% 8 Trojan.Win32.Generic 2.09% 9 AdWare.OSX.FkCodec.b 1.35% 10 Trojan.OSX.Yontoo.i 1.29% 11 Trojan-PSW.Win32.LdPinch.ex 0.84% 12 AdWare.Win32.Yotoon.heur 0.82% 13 Trojan.OSX.Yontoo.j 0.80% 14 Exploit.Script.Generic 0.76% 15 AdWare.OSX.Bnodlero.a 0.58% 16 AdWare.JS.Agent.an 0.57% 17 Trojan.OSX.Yontoo.h 0.52% 18 Exploit.PDF.Generic 0.51% 19 AdWare.Win32.MegaSearch.am 0.50% 20 Trojan.Win32.AutoRun.gen 0.43%

* The percentage of users attacked by the malicious program of all attacked users

Almost half of our TOP 20 programs, including the one in first place, were occupied by AdWare programs. As a rule, these malicious programs arrive on users' computers alongside legitimate programs if they are downloaded from a software store rather than from the official website of the developer. These legitimate programs might become a carrier for the AdWare-module: once installed on the user's computer it can add advertising links to browser bookmarks, change the default search engine, add contextual advertising, etc.

Interestingly, 8th place is occupied by Trojan.Win32.Generic which affects Windows OS. This is probably because this particular Trojan can penetrate into virtual machines that run under Windows.

In 2014 the experts detected several interesting malicious programs for Mac OS X that should be mentioned separately.

  • Backdoor.OSX.Callme – a backdoor that provides the fraudster with remote access to the system and at the same time steals contact lists, apparently, to find new victims. It is distributed in the body of a specially designed MS Word document: when run it installs the backdoor via the vulnerability in the system.
  • Backdoor.OSX.Laoshu –  a malicious program which makes screenshots every minute. This backdoor is signed by the trusted certificate of the developer which means the creators of the program were about to place it in the AppStore.
  • Backdoor.OSX.Ventir – a multi-module Trojan spy with a hidden remote control function. It includes the keystrokes interception driver logkext, the source code for which is publicly available.
  • Trojan.OSX.IOSinfector – used to install the mobile version of Trojan-Spy.IPhoneOS.Mekir (OSX/Crisis).
  • Trojan-Ransom.OSX.FileCoder – the first file coder for OS X. It is a conditionally working prototype produced by an author who, for whatever reason, decided to abandon malware development.
  • Trojan-Spy.OSX.CoinStealer –  the first malicious program designed to steal bitcoins for OS X. It imitates different bitcoin utilities built from open source code while it installs a malicious browser extension and/or a patched version of bitcoin-qt.
  • Trojan-Downloader.OSX.WireLurker – an unusual piece of malware designed to steal victims' data. It attacks not only Mac-based computers but iOS-based devices connected to them. There is also a Windows-based version of this malicious program. It is distributed via a well-known Chinese store that sells apps for OS X and iOS.
The geography of threats

The geography of attacks on Mac OS X users in 2014 (based on the number of all attacked users)

The TOP 10 of countries under attack

  Country Number of attacked users % of all attacks* 1 USA 98,077 39.14% 2 Germany 31,466 12.56% 3 Japan 13,808 5.51% 4 UK 13,763 5.49% 5 Russia 12,207 4.87% 6 France 9,239 3.69% 7 Switzerland 6,548 2.61% 8 Canada 5,841 2.33% 9 Brazil 5,558 2.22% 10 Italy 5,334 2.13%

* The percentage of users attacked per country

The USA (39.14%) tops this rating, perhaps because of the popularity of Apple computers in the country. Germany (12.56%) came second followed by Japan (5.51%).

Vulnerable applications used by fraudsters

The graph of vulnerable applications shown below is based on information about the exploits blocked by our products. These exploits were used by hackers in Internet attacks and when compromising local applications, including those installed on mobile devices.

The distribution of exploits used by fraudsters, by type of application attacked, 2014

In 2014, the fraudsters most often exploited Oracle Java vulnerabilities. However, the popularity of Java vulnerabilities declined steadily throughout the year, and its overall share was less than half of last year's figure – 45% against 90.5% 12 months ago. This might be due to the closure of old vulnerabilities and a lack of information about any new ones.

Second place was occupied by the Browsers category (42%) which includes exploits for Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, etc. According to the quarterly ratings, for much of 2014 this was the leading category but it didn't quite outstrip the large number of Java exploits in late 2013 and early 2014.

Adobe Reader exploits were in third place (5%). These vulnerabilities are exploited in drive-by attacks via the Internet, and PDF exploits form part of many exploit packs.

During the year, we saw a decrease in the number of attacks using exploit packs. There may be several reasons for this, including the arrests of some of their developers. In addition, many exploit packs have stopped attacking computers protected by Kaspersky Lab products (exploit packs check the victim computer and halt the attack if a Kaspersky Lab solution is installed on it). Despite this, exploitation of vulnerabilities remains one of the main ways to deliver malicious software on the user's computer.

Online threats (Web-based attacks)

The statistics in this section were derived from web antivirus components that protect Windows users when malicious code attempts to download from a malicious/infected website. Malicious websites are deliberately created by cybercriminals; infected sites include those with user-contributed content (such as forums) as well as legitimate resources that have been hacked

In 2014, there were 1,432,660,467 attacks launched from online resources #KLReport


In 2014, there were 1,432,660,467 attacks launched from online resources located all over the world. It means that Kaspersky Lab products protected users an average of 3,925,097 times per day during their Internet sessions.

The main attack method - via exploit packs - gives attackers an almost guaranteed opportunity to infect the user computer if it is not protected with a security solution and if it has at least one popular and vulnerable (not updated) application installed.

Online threats in the banking sector

During the reporting period, Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked 1,910,520 attacks attempting to launch malware capable of stealing money from online banking accounts.

The number of computers attacked by financial malware, November 2013-October 2014

Noticeably, the number of attacks grew considerably in May and June 2014. This might have been be caused by an increase in online banking activity at the beginning of the holiday season as well as by the main sport event of the year – the World Cup-2014 in Brazil – where cybercriminals used financial malware to steal tourists' payment data.

A total of 16,552,498 notifications of malicious activity by programs designed to steal money via online access to bank accounts were registered by Kaspersky Lab security solutions in 2014.

The geography of attacks

The geography of banking malware attacks in 2014

The TOP 20 countries by the number of attacked users:

  Country Number of attacked users 1 Brazil 299,830 2 Russia 251,917 3 Germany 155,773 4 India 98,344 5 USA 92,224 6 Italy 88,756 7 UK 54,618 8 Vietnam 50,040 9 Austria 44,445 10 Algeria 33,640 The TOP 10 banking malware families

The table below shows the programs most commonly used in 2014 to attack online banking users, based on the number of reported infection attempts:

  Name Number of attacked users 1 Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot 742,794 2 Trojan-Banker.Win32.ChePro 192,229 3 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Lohmys 121,439 4 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Shiotob 95,236 5 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Agent 83,243 6 Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken 50,334 7 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Banker 41,665 8 Trojan-Banker.Win32.Banbra 40,836 9 Trojan-Spy.Win32.SpyEyes 36,065 10 Trojan-Banker.HTML.Agent 19,770

Zeus (Trojan-Spy.Win32.Zbot) remained the most widespread banking Trojan. It kept its leading position in quarterly ratings so its 1st place in the TOP 10 for 2014 is not a surprise. Second came Trojan-Banker.Win32.ChePro, followed by Trojan-Banker.Win32.Lohmys. Both families have the same functionality and are spread via spam messages with a theme related to online banking (for example, an invoice from an online banking service). The email includes a Word document with the attached picture: clicking on the picture launches malicious code execution.

Trojan-Banker.Win32.Shiotob was in 4th place. This malicious program is most often spread via spam messages and is designed to monitor traffic in order to intercept payment data.

The majority of the Top 10 malicious programs work by injecting random HTML code in the web page displayed by the browser and intercepting any payment data entered by the user in the original or inserted web forms.

Although three quarters of attacks targeting users' money were carried out with the help of banking malware these are not the only financial threats.

Distribution of attacks targeting user money by malware type, 2014

Bitcoin wallet theft was the second most popular banking threat (14%). Yet another threat related to crypto currency is Bitcoin mining software (10%) which uses computing resources to generate bitcoins.

The TOP 20 malicious objects detected online

In 2014, Kaspersky Lab's web antivirus detected 123,054,503 unique malicious objects: scripts, exploits, executable files, etc.

We identified the 20 malicious programs most actively involved in online attacks launched against computers in 2014. These 20 accounted for 95.8% of all online attacks.

  Name* % of all attacks** 1 Malicious URL 73.70% 2 Trojan.Script.Generic 9.10% 3 AdWare.Script.Generic 4.75% 4 Trojan.Script.Iframer 2.12% 5 Trojan-Downloader.Script.Generic 2.10% 6 AdWare.Win32.BetterSurf.b 0.60% 7 AdWare.Win32.Agent.fflm 0.41% 8 AdWare.Win32.Agent.aiyc 0.38% 9 AdWare.Win32.Agent.allm 0.34% 10 Adware.Win32.Amonetize.heur 0.32% 11 Trojan.Win32.Generic 0.27% 12 AdWare.Win32.MegaSearch.am 0.26% 13 Trojan.Win32.AntiFW.b 0.24% 14 AdWare.JS.Agent.an 0.23% 15 AdWare.Win32.Agent.ahbx 0.19% 16 AdWare.Win32.Yotoon.heur 0.19% 17 AdWare.JS.Agent.ao 0.18% 18 Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Generic 0.16% 19 Trojan-Clicker.JS.Agent.im 0.14% 20 AdWare.Win32.OutBrowse.g 0.11%

* These statistics represent detection verdicts from the web antivirus module. Information was provided by users of Kaspersky Lab products who consented to share their local data
** The percentage of all web attacks recorded on the computers of unique users

As is often the case, the TOP 20 is largely made up of objects used in drive-by attacks, as well as adware programs. 73.7% of all verdicts identified links from these black lists.

Noticeably, in 2014 there was an increase in the number of advertising programs in the TOP 20, up from 5 to 12 compared to the previous year and accounting for 8.2% of all malicious objects detected online (+7.01 percentage points). The growth in the amount of advertising programs, along with their aggressive distribution schemes and their efforts to counteract anti-virus detection, has become the trend of 2014.

In 2014, #Kaspersky Lab's web antivirus detected 123,054,503 unique malicious objects #KLReport


The Trojan-Clicker.JS.Agent.im verdict is also connected to advertising and all sorts of "potentially unwanted" activities. This is how scripts placed on Amazon Cloudfront to redirect users to pages with advertising content are detected. Links to these scripts are inserted by adware and various extensions for browsers, mainly on users' search pages. The scripts can also redirect users to malicious pages containing recommendations to update Adobe Flash and Java - a popular method of spreading malware.

The TOP 10 countries where online resources are seeded with malware

The following stats are based on the physical location of the online resources that were used in attacks and blocked by our antivirus components (web pages containing redirects to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malware, botnet command centers, etc.). Any unique host could be the source of one or more web attacks.

In order to determine the geographical source of web-based attacks, domain names are matched up against their actual domain IP addresses, and then the geographical location of a specific IP address (GEOIP) is established.

In 2014, Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked 1,432,660,467 web-attacks #KLReport


In 2014, Kaspersky Lab solutions blocked 1,432,660,467 attacks launched from web resources located in various countries around the world.  To carry out their attacks, the fraudsters used 9,766,119 unique hosts, 838,154 hosts or 8% fewer than in 2013.

87% of notifications  about attacks blocked by antivirus components were received from online resources located in 10 countries. This is 5 percentage points more than in the previous year.

The distribution of online resources seeded with malicious programs in 2014

In 2014, the TOP 10 rating of countries where online resources are seeded with malware remained largely unchanged from the previous year. However four countries changed places: Germany and Russia swapped, with the Germans climbing to 2nd and Russia dropping to fourth. Ukraine overtook Britain to move up to 5th.

44% of all web attacks came from resources located in the USA and Germany.

Countries where users face the greatest risk of online infection

In order to assess the countries in which users most often face cyber threats, we calculated how often Kaspersky users encountered detection verdicts on their machines in each country. The resulting data characterizes the risk of infection that computers are exposed to in different countries across the globe, providing an indicator of the aggressiveness of the environment facing computers in different parts of the world.

The TOP 20 countries where users face the greatest risk of online infection

  Country* % of unique users** 1 Russia 53.81% 2 Kazakhstan 53.04% 3 Azerbaijan 49.64% 4 Vietnam 49.13% 5 Armenia 48.66% 6 Ukraine 46.70% 7 Mongolia 45.18% 8 Belarus 43.81% 9 Moldova 42.41% 10 Kyrgyzstan 40.06% 11 Germany 39.56% 12 Algeria 39.05% 13 Qatar 38.77% 14 Tadjikistan 38.49% 15 Georgia 37.67% 16 Saudi Arabia 36.01% 17 Austria 35.58% 18 Lithuania 35.44% 19 Sri Lanka 35.42% 20 Turkey 35.40%

These statistics are based on the detection verdicts returned by the web antivirus module, received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data.

* We excluded those countries in which the number of Kaspersky Lab product users is relatively small (less than 10,000)
** Unique users whose computers have been targeted by web attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products in the country

The year 2014 saw a change of leader in the TOP 20: the rating was topped by Russia where 53.81% of users faced the risk of online infection.

Last year's leader, Azerbaijan, fell to 3rd position (49.64%).

Uzbekistan, Malaysia, Greece and Italy dropped out of the TOP 20. Among the newcomers were Mongolia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Lithuania.

All countries can be divided into three groups expressing different levels of infection risk.

  1. The high risk group (over 41%)
  2. In 2014, this group includes nine countries from the TOP 20, compared to 15 countries in 2013.

  3. The risk group (21-40%)
  4. This group includes 111 countries; among them are Kyrgyzstan (40.1%), Germany (39.6%), Qatar (38.8%), Tajikistan (38.5%), Georgia (37.7), Saudi Arabia (36%), Turkey (35. 4%), France (34.9%), India (34.8%), Spain (34.4%), USA (33.8%), Canada (33.4%), Australia (32.5% ), Brazil (32.1%), Poland (31.7%), Italy (31.5%), Israel (30.2%), China (30.1%), the UK (30%), Egypt (27.8%), Mexico (27.5%), the Philippines (27.2%), Croatia (26.2%), Pakistan (26.1%), Romania (25.7%), Japan (21. 2%), Argentina (21. 1%).

  5. The low risk group (0-20.9%)
  6. The 39 countries with the safest online surfing environments include Sweden (19.5%), Denmark (19.2%), Uruguay (19.5%) and a number of African countries.

In 2014, 38.3% of computers were attacked at least once while their owners were online.

On average, the risk of being infected while surfing the Internet decreased by 3.3 percentage points over the year. This may be caused several factors:

  • Firstly, developers of browsers and search engines realized the necessity of securing their users and started to contribute to the fight against malicious sites
  • Secondly, many exploit packs have started to check if Kaspersky Lab's product is installed on the user's computer. If it is, the exploits do not even try to attack the computer.
  • Thirdly, users using more and more mobile devices and tablets to surf the Internet.

In addition, the number of attacks using exploit packs slightly decreased: arresting the developers of these packs was not in vain. However there are no grounds to expect some drastic change in the situation with exploits: they are still the main technique used to deliver malware, including for targeted attacks. The Internet remains the major source of malware for users in most countries.

Local threats

Local infection statistics for user computers are a very important indicator. This data points to threats that have penetrated the Windows operating system through something other than the Internet, email, or network ports.

This section contains an analysis of the statistical data obtained based on antivirus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they are created or accessed, and the results of scanning various removable data storages.

The TOP 20 malicious objects detected on user computers

In 2014, Kaspersky Lab's antivirus solutions detected 1,849,949 unique malicious and potentially unwanted objects.

  Name % of unique attacked users* 1 DangerousObject.Multi.Generic 26.04% 2 Trojan.Win32.Generic 25.32% 3 AdWare.Win32.Agent.ahbx 12.78% 4 Trojan.Win32.AutoRun.gen 8.24% 5 Adware.Win32.Amonetize.heur 7.25% 6 Virus.Win32.Sality.gen 6.69% 7 Worm.VBS.Dinihou.r 5.77% 8 AdWare.MSIL.Kranet.heur 5.46% 9 AdWare.Win32.Yotoon.heur 4.67% 10 Worm.Win32.Debris.a 4.05% 11 AdWare.Win32.BetterSurf.b 3.97% 12 Trojan.Win32.Starter.lgb 3.69% 13 Exploit.Java.Generic 3.66% 14 Trojan.Script.Generic 3.52% 15 Virus.Win32.Nimnul.a 2.80% 16 Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Agent.jkcd 2.78% 17 Worm.Script.Generic 2.61% 18 AdWare.Win32.Agent.aljt 2.53% 19 AdWare.Win32.Kranet.heur 2.52% 20 Trojan.WinLNK.Runner.ea 2.49%

These statistics are compiled from malware detection verdicts generated by the on-access and on-demand scanner modules on the computers of those users running Kaspersky Lab products who consented to submit their statistical data.

* The proportion of individual users on whose computers the antivirus module detected these objects as a percentage of all individual users of Kaspersky Lab products on whose computers a malicious program was detected

The DangerousObject.Multi.Generic verdict, which is used for malware detected with the help of cloud technologies, is in 1st place (26.04%). Cloud technologies work when the antivirus databases do not yet contain either signatures or heuristics to detect a malicious program but the company's cloud antivirus database already includes the information about the object. In fact, this is how the latest malware is detected.

The notorious worm Net-Worm.Win32.Kido dropped out of the TOP 20. In general the proportion of viruses continues to decrease: for example, last year Virus.Win32.Sality.gen affected 13.4% of users while in 2014 – only 6.69%.

Both this rating and the rating of web detections show that advertising programs are becoming more common. In 2014, the number of users who encountered adware doubled from the previous year and reached 25,406,107. At the same time advertising programs are becoming both more intrusive and more dangerous. Some of them "cross the border" into the category of potentially unwanted programs and are assigned a "harsher" verdict. For example, Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Agent.jkcd (16th place), in addition to displaying ads and changing search results, can download malware on the computer.

Countries where users face the highest risk of local infection

For each country we calculated the number of file antivirus detections the users faced during the year. The data includes detections of malicious programs located on users' computers or on removable media connected to the computers, such as flash drives, camera and phone memory cards, or external hard drives.

The TOP 20 countries by the level of infection

  Country* %** 1 Vietnam 69.58% 2 Mongolia 64.24% 3 Nepal 61.03% 4 Bangladesh 60.54% 5 Yemen 59.51% 6 Algeria 58.84% 7 Iraq 57.62% 8 Laos 56.32% 9 India 56.05% 10 Cambodia 55.98% 11 Afghanistan 55.69% 12 Egypt 54.54% 13 Saudi Arabia 54.37% 14 Kazakhstan 54.27% 15 Pakistan 54.00% 16 Syria 53.91% 17 Soudan 53.88% 18 Sri Lanka 53.77% 19 Myanma 53.34% 20 Turkey 52.94%

These statistics are based on the detection verdicts returned by the antivirus module, received from users of Kaspersky Lab products who have consented to provide their statistical data.

* When calculating, we excluded countries where there are fewer than 10,000 Kaspersky Lab users
** The percentage of unique users in the country with computers that blocked local threats as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products

The TOP 4 countries for risk of local infection remained largely unchanged from the previous year: Vietnam was in 1st position; Mongolia and Bangladesh changed places – Bangladesh moved down from 2nd to 4th position while Mongolia climbed from 4th to 2nd place.

Djibouti, Maldives, Mauritania, Indonesia, Rwanda and Angola left the TOP 20. The newcomers were Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Syria, Myanmar and Turkey.

Within the TOP 20 countries at least one malicious object was found on an average of 58.7% of computers, hard drives or removable media belonging to KSN users. The 2013 figure was 60.1%.

Countries can be divided into four risk categories for local threats.

  1. Maximum risk (over 60%): four countries including Vietnam (69.6%), Mongolia (64.2%), Nepal (61.0%) and Bangladesh (60.5%).
  2. High risk (41-60%): 83 countries including India (56.0%), Kazakhstan (54.3%), Turkey (52.9%), Russia (52.0%), China (49.7%), Brazil (46.5%), Belarus (45.3%), Mexico (41.6%), the Philippines (48.4%).
  3. Moderate local infection rate (21-40.99%): 70 countries including Spain (40.9%), France (40.3%), Poland (39.5%), Lithuania (39.1%), Greece (37.8%), Portugal (37.7%), Korea (37.4%), Argentina (37.2%), Italy (36.6%), Austria (36.5%), Australia (35.3%), Canada (34.8%), Romania (34. 5%), the US (34.4%), the UK (33.8%), Switzerland (30.8%), Hong Kong (30.4%), Ireland (29.7%), Uruguay (27.8% ), the Netherlands (26.4%), Norway (25.1%), Singapore (23.5%), Japan (22.9%), Sweden (23%), Denmark (21.3%)
  4. Low local infection rate (0- 20.99%): 3 countries including Finland (20%), Cuba (19.1%) and Seychelles (19%).

The 10 safest countries were:

  Country %* 1 Seychelles 19.03% 2 Cuba 19.08% 3 Finland 20.03% 4 Denmark 21.34% 5 Japan 22.89% 6 Sweden 22.98% 7 Czech Republic 23.13% 8 Singapore 23.54% 9 Martinique 25.04% 10 Norway 25.13%

* The percentage of unique users in the country with computers that blocked local threats as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky Lab products

In 2014, three new countries appeared in this TOP 10 — Martinique, Singapore and Sweden. Slovakia, Slovenia and Malta dropped out of the rating.

In 2014, on average, 23% of user machines were attacked in the 10 safest countries at least once #KLReport


On average, 23% of user machines were attacked in the 10 safest countries at least once during the year. This is 4.2 percentage points more than last year.

Banks Get Green Light in Target Breach Suits

Threatpost for B2B - Fri, 12/05/2014 - 14:17
A Minnesota District Court ruling this week related to the 2013 Target data breach has opened the door for banks to pursue damages from retailers victimized by a data breach.

EC3 Head Paints Bleak Cybercrime Picture

Threatpost for B2B - Fri, 12/05/2014 - 12:45
Troels Oerting, head of Europol's EC3, explains the extreme difficulties law enforcement faces when investigating and prosecuting cybercrime at Georgetown Law's Cybercrime 2020.

Upcoming Adobe Reader, Acrobat Update to Patch Sandbox Escape

Threatpost for B2B - Fri, 12/05/2014 - 09:19
Adobe announced security updates for Reader and Acrobat that likely include patches for a sandbox escape vulnerability. Google's Project Zero released details and exploit code earlier this week.

DOJ Launches New Cyber Unit, Claims Privacy is Mission Critical

Threatpost for B2B - Fri, 12/05/2014 - 08:42
The United States Department of Justice yesterday announced the creation of a new cybercrime unit within its Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section.

Details Emerge on Sony Wiper Malware Destover

Threatpost for B2B - Thu, 12/04/2014 - 16:24
Kaspersky Lab has published an analysis of Destover, the wiper malware used in the attacks against Sony Pictures Entertainment, and its similarities to Shamoon and DarkSeoul.

Ransomware is the Future of Consumer Cybercrime

Threatpost for B2B - Thu, 12/04/2014 - 16:02
WASHINGTON D.C. - Panelists at a Georgetown Law's conference agreed that ransomware schemes will be the malware of choice on the Internet of things.

Sony/Destover: Mystery North Korean Actor's Destructive and Past Network Activity

Secure List feed for B2B - Thu, 12/04/2014 - 14:53

This week, for the first time, the FBI issued a Flash warning about a destructive wiper activity, used in the attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. Samples of this Destover malware contained configuration files created on systems using Korean language packs.

Since the attack, further information about the malware has surfaced in one form or another, but some details, such as those relating to the previous activity of the prime suspects, are still to be examined.

So, while Sony Pictures silently completes its costly clean-up efforts and prepares to release "The Interview", let's discuss some of the malware functionality, glaring similarities with other wiper events, and some of the suspect group's previous activity.

The first thing to note is that destructive activity targeting the networks of large organizations is clearly becoming more commonplace. Previous major wiper malware is discussed here.  For these, most of the related events occurred in the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. We also noted a separate Eastern European BE2 ICS environment-related wiping event, covered in more detail here. And it's hard to ignore the complete customer data wipe of Code Spaces in Great Britain by a cybercriminal holding them for ransom, as reported here.

The malware involved in the Sony Entertainment attack is called Trojan Destover and is capable of wiping disk drives and MBR.

Destover Wiper Functionality

The most interesting aspects of the destructive functionality of the malware are related to the selection and storage/delivery of the drivers that are now used repeatedly in these kinds of sabotage attacks.

The Destover droppers install and run EldoS RawDisk drivers to evade NTFS security permissions and overwrite disk data and the MBR itself. There are implications for data recovery in this. In the case of the DarkSeoul malware, the overwritten data could be restored using a method similar to the restoration of the Shamoon 'destroyed' data. Destover data recovery is likely to be the same.

The chain of intermediary components leading to the destructive payload follows multiple stages (which have previously been described elsewhere), with capabilities set to run in several modes, just like Shamoon:

  1. The sample is run on a 32-bit OS for the first time.
  2. The sample is run on a 32-bit OS as a self-installed service, with one of several code paths.
  3. The sample is run on a 64-bit OS as a self-installed service.

On a first run, it creates the 'Backup and Restore Management' Windows brmgmtsvc service, adds its own executable and sets a startup '-i' switch. It also drops several copies of itself and starts each of them with a different switch: -m, -d, and -w.

-m (mbr overwrite):
This attempts to connect with the three IP addresses.  Even if this is unsuccessful, process execution takes place.
It fetches its resource that contains the compressed EldoS RawDisk driver, and writes it out to the temp directory as a 'usbdrv3.sys'.
It then installs the driver as the usbdrv3 service 'USB 3.0 Host Controller'.
After this, it starts the driver service and closes its service handle.
It then creates a filehandle to the driver with write permissions:
and writes to that handle with 64k strings of '0xAAAAAAAA'. ← note that the issue of a  lengthy license key (#99E2428…) is discussed in our Shamoon The Wiper - part ii blogpost.
It then creates new threads, each of which attempts to connect to any possible physical drive letter and overwrite them as well.

-d (data overwrite):
This attempts to connect with the same three IP addresses. Again, process execution takes place regardless of communications.
It gets the logical drives and traverses recursively through them, identifying all data files. If it is not .exe or .dll, the process overwrites file contents with '0x0df0adba' in a 20k chunk. This overwrite is completed from user mode, without the EldoS drivers.
It then attempts to delete the data file using the win32 api 'DeleteFileW'. As it recurses through all the system's directories, it attempts to delete .exe and .dll files.

-w (web server):
This attempts to connect with the same three IP addresses. Again, process execution takes place regardless of communications.
It stops the Windows Terminal Services from the cmd line: 'cmd.exe /c net stop termservice /y'
Then finds resource#85, decompresses and writes contents out to 'c:\windows\iissvr.exe'.
It launches the iissvr.exe process and exits.
iissvr is what it seems to be - a web server that maintains an encoded JPG, HTML and WAV file. It listens on Port 80 and serves these files. The full graphic and scrolling green warning can be found later in the article. The decoded jpg here:

Lastly, after a two hour sleep, the original service restarts the machine with a call to ExitWindowsEx(EWX_REBOOT|EWX_FORCE, 0).   This forces an exit but delays the shutdown itself while system state file creation occurs.

Commonalities Across Wipers

Just like Shamoon, the Destover wiper drivers are commercially available EldoS RawDisk driver files.

Just like Shamoon, the Destover wiper drivers are maintained in the droppers' resource section.

Just like Shamoon, the DarkSeoul wiper event included vague, encoded psuedo-political messages used to overwrite disk data and the master boot record (MBR).

Just like DarkSeoul, the Destover wiper executables were compiled somewhere between 48 hours prior to the attack and the actual day of attack. It is highly unlikely that the attackers spear-phished their way into large numbers of users, and highly likely that they had gained unfettered access to the entire network prior to the attack.

The Shamoon components were compiled in a similarly tight timeframe prior to their deployment. The CompiledOn timestamps all fall within five days of their executables' detonation. Nearly all were compiled on Aug 10, 2012 (between 00:17:23 and 02:46:22) and set to detonate on Aug 15, 2012. That is a tight window to quietly deploy these binaries considering the fact that tens of thousands of machines were destroyed with this payload.

In all three cases: Shamoon, DarkSeoul and Destover, the groups claiming credit for their destructive impact across entire large networks had no history or real identity of their own.  All attempted to disappear following their act, did not make clear statements but did make bizarre and roundabout accusations of criminal conduct, and instigated their destructive acts immediately after a politically-charged event that was suggested as having been at the heart of the matter.

Images from the DarkSeoul 'Whois' and Destover 'GOP' groups included a 'Hacked by' claim, accompanied by a "warning" and threats regarding stolen data.  Both threatened that this was only the beginning and that the group will be back. It appears that original skeletal artwork was also included in both.

Whois team graphics and warning:

GOP team graphics and warning:

Differences between the Destover and DarkSeoul Wiper attacks include Destover's lack of *nix scripts to erase partitions across Linux systems.

The above list of commonalities does not, of course, prove that the crew behind Shamoon is the same as the crew behind both DarkSeoul and Destover. But it should be noted that the reactionary events and the groups' operational and toolset characteristics all carry marked similarities. And, it is extraordinary that such unusual and focused acts of large scale cyber-destruction are being carried out with clearly recognizable similarities.

Network activity

Related beacon destinations were published as:


However, directly related samples perform callbacks to a number of other IP addresses as well. Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) data presents a complete lack of malware being served from any of these addresses in the past:


The connections appear arbitrary and inconsequential to the execution of the malicious package. Some are not currently active. These IPs all appear to be oddly selected.

Some of these addresses are known to have performed RDP Scans in the recent past. In late 2012, was a known RDP brute forcing network scanner. The server is hosted at an IP address in Poland, maintained at that provider since 1996.

In early 2014, was hosted in Italy and served as a 'Hide My Ass' premium and free proxy server over port 443. The malware attempts to connect to that server on ports 8000 and 8080, and currently no resources are available. also previously served as a free SOCKS proxy in 2011 and 2012. Often, these sorts of resources were misused by spammers and blackhat SEO scammers.

Previous Backdoors

The DarkSeoul campaigns have been linked to several families of Trojans and backdoors, all used over the course of several years. Some links are much stronger than others:

  • Concealment Troy
  • DarkSeoul
  • HttpDr0pper
  • HttpTroy
  • TDrop
Destover MD5s


MD5 Size CompiledOn Kaspersky name d1c27ee7ce18675974edf42d4eea25c6 262 kb 2014.11.22 00:06:54 Trojan.Win32.Destover.a 2618dd3e5c59ca851f03df12c0cab3b8 430 kb 2014.11.22 00:05:02 Trojan.Win32.Destover.d 760c35a80d758f032d02cf4db12d3e55 244 kb 2014.11.22 04:11:08 Trojan.Win32.Destover.c b80aa583591eaf758fd95ab4ea7afe39 304 kb 2014.11.24 04:12:55 Trojan.Win32.Destover.b e1864a55d5ccb76af4bf7a0ae16279ba 112 kb 2014.11.13 02:05:35 Backdoor.Win32.DestoverServ.a a3fa8c7eb4f061ab8b9f7829c6741593 111 kb 2014.05.03 07:10:22 Trojan.Win32.Destover.f 2c545b89acdb9877da5cbb96653b1491 53 kb 2014.07.14 13:38:18 Trojan.Win32.Destover.e e904bf93403c0fb08b9683a9e858c73e 90 kb 2014.07.07 08:01:09 Trojan.Win32.Destover.d

Eldos Drivers:

6aeac618e29980b69721158044c2e544 (32-bit), signed by the EldoS Corporation
86e212b7fc20fc406c692400294073ff (64-bit), signed by the EldoS Corporation

Certificate (6aeac618e29980b69721158044c2e544 32-bit and
86e212b7fc20fc406c692400294073ff 64-bit):

Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 01:00:00:00:00:01:10:0c:98:3a:31 Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=ObjectSign CA, CN=GlobalSign ObjectSign CA Validity Not Before: Jan 10 15:20:07 2007 GMT Not After : Jan 10 15:20:07 2010 GMT Subject: C=VG, O=EldoS Corporation, CN=EldoS Corporation/emailAddress=info@eldos.com Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption Public-Key: (1024 bit) Modulus: 00:d7:60:2f:bf:3c:85:1b:f3:a1:19:8c:4d:0e:49: c5:a5:f5:16:15:b6:ea:91:e2:c2:92:7b:d6:e5:2a: 1e:68:8c:7b:28:eb:07:dc:b0:3a:dd:11:ee:84:a9: 8b:6f:04:b0:ae:c2:2d:bc:b7:56:41:61:e1:ae:01: 0d:0e:83:47:00:3a:ca:b5:12:fb:e5:b6:55:ac:e0: 94:00:5b:e0:61:70:24:ba:d9:ef:4a:e2:af:8f:21: 93:9e:8b:83:17:2a:e4:3d:74:e6:07:c8:4a:69:ed: 60:9b:89:6e:5b:85:50:49:52:f9:fa:91:63:9f:61: a7:ea:e2:3e:d7:1b:07:22:a1 Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: Netscape Cert Type: Object Signing X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:D2:5B:F3:4B:26:4B:A5:B0:E7:5D:FD:56:7F:F6:F1:2E:38:4E:53:A0 X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://crl.globalsign.net/ObjectSign.crl Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 44:0d:5b:2c:f4:c3:c0:91:c0:9f:4d:91:f0:25:5c:79:72:ff: 82:7a:a8:97:fb:08:2b:c2:eb:ae:4b:78:b6:a8:0f:5b:3a:1d: 12:c9:07:81:d0:16:e0:94:1e:69:3c:43:c1:d8:85:b1:4c:1a: 21:84:1c:c8:ed:0a:7e:e4:55:b7:f8:ae:69:a8:b0:8c:10:da: 6e:57:f4:a3:62:5b:2b:4f:06:25:a9:35:f0:63:cc:3f:e0:f6: 4c:ee:1d:d8:9f:d8:ae:d3:fe:de:3b:0b:c5:f3:19:1c:2a:37: ad:0d:5c:87:5e:da:8f:31:02:d3:78:5d:f1:30:28:78:c3:86: f7:b2:f6:6c:2d:d8:45:8a:8b:16:eb:bb:d0:6e:5b:98:68:8e: 9b:cc:7e:77:9d:0d:b3:5f:01:d8:57:26:6d:cf:85:2a:46:52: 0f:79:93:85:f7:19:14:01:73:d5:03:e7:96:1a:16:cd:24:0b: 67:6d:f9:72:55:b8:b9:e9:be:07:58:b3:01:bd:a1:18:57:bb: b3:19:e5:88:0e:f5:96:fe:eb:b8:66:a6:c6:2c:62:b5:21:59: f2:d9:4d:2b:d1:59:20:07:13:78:26:dc:d5:b3:d1:55:47:5e: 2e:cb:cb:cc:04:7c:d5:e2:9d:7c:24:b1:18:70:da:1f:54:5b: 59:88:d1:17 Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 01:e2:b4:f7:59:81:1c:64:37:9f:ca:0b:e7:6d:2d:ce Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption Issuer: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Code Signing CA-1 Validity Not Before: Sep 18 00:00:00 2012 GMT Not After : Sep 22 12:00:00 2015 GMT Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=CULVER CITY, O=Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., CN=Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc. Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption Public-Key: (2048 bit) Modulus: 00:b6:08:80:f6:6d:9c:3a:f4:fb:45:bc:bd:6a:27: e5:97:23:fa:6a:5d:39:08:97:37:53:13:70:85:1b: 0e:08:b1:b7:5f:e3:78:6e:b1:6b:26:7a:82:86:f8: 37:2d:b0:b2:65:f0:8a:56:c7:e1:1a:88:19:f9:00: bd:c3:4b:8d:97:10:b6:9a:09:14:8d:95:0a:75:56: cd:c5:2f:1c:ad:21:82:cb:8c:ad:8d:78:11:1e:b8: 50:94:90:96:7a:e4:69:38:9c:bd:2f:4c:8c:2b:23: 45:f1:ac:59:2f:10:12:d4:64:3a:9b:41:5d:14:2b: 56:10:eb:c6:15:ed:1d:f0:06:d3:0e:9e:96:8e:c1: 0e:cf:62:17:7c:c7:a9:d5:2a:40:99:d6:a2:68:93: f6:02:2a:1e:95:e6:1e:a4:d6:c4:fd:61:7d:d7:15: 9a:1f:2d:ab:4e:fc:61:9f:d8:54:55:8e:79:d3:57: 8a:22:14:31:d4:a4:4e:a5:43:ec:4b:35:04:8d:f8: 10:37:10:3f:bb:2a:ae:b7:b8:a1:16:f4:f6:02:df: 97:fc:32:95:97:38:23:48:c2:96:b3:aa:9f:88:66: 26:eb:d4:70:38:2f:84:b1:e0:1e:a1:27:5f:3f:14: b7:dd:4c:f2:c7:22:6a:1a:f8:85:1a:57:23:b3:c7: 58:1f Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: keyid:7B:68:CE:29:AA:C0:17:BE:49:7A:E1:E5:3F:D6:A7:F7:45:8F:35:32 X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 51:6E:D7:E5:BB:2E:FD:39:6B:0D:37:D5:D0:70:6B:5A:8C:D6:11:F8 X509v3 Key Usage: critical Digital Signature X509v3 Extended Key Usage: Code Signing X509v3 CRL Distribution Points: Full Name: URI:http://crl3.digicert.com/assured-cs-2011a.crl Full Name: URI:http://crl4.digicert.com/assured-cs-2011a.crl X509v3 Certificate Policies: Policy: 2.16.840.1.114412.3.1 CPS: http://www.digicert.com/ssl-cps-repository.htm User Notice: Explicit Text: Authority Information Access: OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.digicert.com CA Issuers - URI:http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDCodeSigningCA-1.crt X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical CA:FALSE Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption 90:0f:0b:0f:93:f7:77:e7:34:dc:b4:2a:7e:bd:d1:0f:05:ac: a5:9d:c8:1c:77:18:cd:28:90:28:e7:c6:ac:ad:f9:9e:b0:c6: 74:db:da:8c:b2:38:06:c5:a0:e4:cd:66:e4:ef:f7:21:58:1f: 9a:4f:17:3c:e1:af:c3:67:1e:37:ab:2a:2b:8f:7d:bc:9e:eb: 9b:f5:aa:c0:24:80:70:63:b0:2a:10:54:27:01:12:ec:61:12: 97:2d:98:c5:6f:e5:7e:1c:7c:17:2c:f5:ad:40:fb:b2:44:40: fa:e1:02:45:22:7d:6f:6d:04:fc:ff:2c:d2:e5:2f:3e:49:5c: 72:4b:0c:5a:ce:6e:13:44:79:f9:b9:26:d9:2e:6f:4d:05:72: 0d:d2:e9:bc:66:88:af:63:5b:1b:44:50:a4:c7:e4:bc:73:d6: ac:25:7c:1a:88:37:c2:71:3f:1c:32:38:32:12:55:75:db:55: 6d:d9:1e:40:a7:d3:35:f4:bf:86:a3:72:60:49:c3:a4:9a:2e: 4d:5d:0d:4d:97:2b:34:91:5c:e1:e6:a9:93:eb:d2:62:2a:ef: a1:73:6e:a4:0b:22:d4:31:a8:d5:53:9d:26:29:e1:1c:4a:04: c5:8a:df:15:01:42:6f:a2:b3:3b:da:2e:e5:4c:b5:53:6b:76: 86:b2:25:29

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